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**ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS.**



LOUIS PHILIP 1st.

King of the French.

Pub. by Lilly Wait & Co. Boston.
1833

MEMOIRS

OF

GENERAL LAFAYETTE

AND OF

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830.

By B. SARRANS,

SECRETARY TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

NEW YORK:

J. AND J. HARPER.

BOSTON:

LILLY, WAIT, COLMAN, AND HOLDEN.

1833.

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TILDEN FOUNDATIONS,
1899.**

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MEMOIRS
OF
GENERAL LAFAYETTE,
AND OF
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830.

CHAPTER I.

Louis Phillipe's tendency to Retrograde.—Lafayette in his relations with Foreign Patriots.—The Belgian Deputies make open Overtures to Him.—His Disclosures respecting Russia and Poland.—His Communications with the Italian Patriots.—His Letter to Them.

It is evident that the system of non-interference, as marked out by Lafayette, at least gave to France an attitude favorable to her interests and her glory. However, it was easy to perceive that the Palais-Royal would utterly reject the consequences of the principle which had been proclaimed, and that its policy was no longer dictated by the glory and interests of France. Lafayette, who beheld this retrograde tendency with alarm, assumed a steady opposition to that individualism which had so rapidly taken place of the revolutionary enthusiasm and republican sentiments he credulously invested with the civic diadem. The error was too palpable, the disenchantment too

prompt, and the responsibility too great, not to occasion lively remonstrances. Lafayette expressed them openly, and with all the authority which an honest man derives from the consciousness of his rights, and indignation at unexampled deception. His complaints were frequent and severe. 'I know,' said he, one day, to Louis Philippe, 'only one man who can now bring France to a Republic; and you are that man. Continue to disavow the principle of your origin, and I will answer for it that the republic, or I may perhaps say the demagogic system, can desire no better auxiliary than your Majesty.' 'Wait,' replied the king, on another occasion, 'wait till such or such a time, and you will see.' 'Wait till that time!' resumed Lafayette; 'but are you sure that you will reign till then? For my part, I doubt it.'

It may easily be conceived, that observations of this nature were heard with the more impatience, as they came from a man who had so good a right to make them. A speedy emancipation from the ties of troublesome gratitude was therefore earnestly desired. Lafayette was inscribed on the condemned list by the Palais-Royal—by that Palais-Royal where, while in public, filial reverence was shown to the veteran of liberty. It was whispered in private, that there were three troubles to be got rid of—Lafayette, Lafitte, and Dupont de l'Eure. It was now evident, that all that was desired was a plausible opportunity for the removal of Lafayette. That opportunity occurred, and we shall soon see how artfully it was brought about, and how eagerly it was seized upon.

I will now return to the diplomacy of the early period of the revolution, in its relations with Lafayette.

At the first breaking out of the insurrection in Brussels, the Belgians opened an intimate correspondence with the friend of Washington. Their deputies proposed to him successively the acceptance both of

the presidency and the crown. 'That, at least,' said he, in allusion to the latter, 'shall be a civic crown.' Lafayette received these important overtures with respect and gratitude, but he declined the signal honor intended for him, and recommended the Belgians to choose, in either alternative, one of their fellow-citizens to be the head of the new government. As to himself, he observed, that even for the interest of foreign liberty, his presence would be more useful in France than any where else.

It was Lafayette's wish that Belgium should become a federal republic, so as to form a northern Switzerland, in the close alliance, and under the immediate guarantee of France. In like manner, he had ardently desired that Greece should be transformed into an eastern Helvetia, in the hope that the moral action of these two democratic constitutions, and the example of order and public prosperity presented by them, would overthrow many prejudices, and introduce many salutary modifications in the social and governmental ideas of Europe.

However, when it appeared to him certain that the majority of the Belgians were not inclined for a republic, but only for a republican monarchy, like that whose first principles had been accepted in France, Lafayette warmly urged the cabinet of the Palais-Royal to abstain from exercising any influence on the Belgians, in the choice of either their constitution or their prince. In his opinion, it was the policy of the French Government merely to protect the sovereignty of the people of Belgium against direct interference, and the influence of the intrigues of foreign powers. After the choice of the Duke de Nemours by the Belgian congress, Lafayette declared himself decidedly for the acceptance of that young prince, whose election, as he stated in the tribune, he regarded as the lawful exercise of the national sovereignty. But all these views, which the cabinet of the Palais-

Royal pretended to adopt, were suddenly changed by the mission of M. de Talleyrand to England,* the renewal of the Holy Alliance, and the resurrection of the Congress of Vienna, disguised under the title of the Conference of London. It is, however, certain, that Lafayette's influence secured to Belgium that previous independence and protection which saved her rising revolution, and by the aid of which she was enabled to exercise at least a semblance of popular sovereignty.

The commotion of July was felt in every point of Europe. The name of Lafayette was in some sort, the conductor of the electric stroke. In Dresden, Brunswick, Hanover, and in many other towns of Germany, the people were roused to liberty by cries of *Vive Lafayette!* Absolute governments were plunged into consternation, aristocracies into stupor. The revolution of Poland broke out on the 29th of November. There, also, the name of Lafayette, invoked by the patriots of Warsaw, resounded through all the insurgent districts. Only a few months had elapsed since the friend and companion of Kosciusko, being present at a fête to commemorate the birth-day of that great man, had rendered homage to the national perseverance of Poland, and prophesied the speedy

* The appointment of M. de Talleyrand as ambassador to London, is a fact so important, and one which has exercised so fatal an influence on the destiny of the revolution of 1830, that the circumstances which attended it cannot fail to interest my readers. That appointment, which was required by the king, was warmly opposed in the council by M.M. Lafitte, Molé, Dupont de l'Eure, and Bignon. M. Lafitte dwelt particularly on the unpopularity of such a choice, but the intrigues of the Doctrinaires, and the obstinacy of Louis-Philippe, triumphed over the opinions of the friends of the revolution. The Grand Chamberlain of Louis XVIII was accordingly sent to London: the spirit in which he conducted matters there is well known.

emancipation of that noble country. When the result verified his predictions, his name became, as it were, a symbol of redemption, by the aid of which Poland summoned all her sons to arms and to liberty.

On hearing of the great events of Paris, the Emperor Nicholas determined to raise up the standard of the Holy Alliance. War with France was decided on in the cabinet of St Petersburg. Preparations were making for forming magazines in Poland, and arranging a plan of campaign, by which the Polish regiments were to form the advance-guard of the Imperial army.* The Belgian revolution afforded fresh food for the rage of the Autocrat, and promoted the activity of the measures adopted by the Russian Ministry, in the expectation of a speedy and general war. These measures are attested by the documents found in the portfolio of the Grand Duke Constantine, which he left behind him in his cabinet, on the night of the 29th of November. Among these important papers, copies of which were sent to Lafayette, was the first letter which Louis-Philippe addressed to the Emperor Nicholas, announcing to him his accession to the throne of France. Lafayette, though justly offended at the term *catastrophe*, which the new king applied to the revolution of July, wished, nevertheless, to withhold this letter from the knowledge of the public. Copies of it had, however, been transmitted to England, and it was published in the London papers, and copied into those of Paris.

When, at a subsequent period, the French ministers attempted to deny in the tribune the hostile intentions of Russia, and the existence of the warlike preparations denounced by Lafayette, the latter conceived it to be his duty to produce proofs of these facts,

* In reference to these military arrangements, Lafayette said, one day, in the tribune, that the advance guard had turned round against the main body.

and he communicated to the Chamber some extracts from the important correspondence in his possession. This disclosure, which was made on the 22d of March, excited the utmost astonishment and indignation throughout Europe.

The following is the speech which Lafayette delivered in reply to the explanations of M.M. Sebastiani and Guizot, on the system of non-interference, and the extraordinary assertion that *not to consent* did not imply the obligation of *preventing*.

‘The declarations which have just been made respecting the manner of explaining the system of non-interference, appear to me very different from those which were first made with reference to Belgium, and which had the ministerial assent, and were lately included in despatches which the ministry will not disavow. It therefore appears to me, Gentlemen, that on this subject the king’s government has *changed its maxims*. This was the phrase employed by Cardinal Richelieu, when he entered the council of Louis XIII ; but the difference is, that the change of maxims then had for its object to prevent the Austrians from entering Italy.

‘Proofs have been required on points respecting which my testimony has been invoked. I have to defend myself against the charge of error, when I said, in the tribune, that in the Polish insurrection, the advanced guard had turned against the main body, in other words, that Russia was then preparing to attack us. These proofs, Gentlemen, are in my hands, and for that obligation I am indebted to the Grand Duke Constantine, who, on his departure, left many of his papers behind him.

‘I shall say nothing, Gentlemen, of the singular letter which the Emperor of Russia sent in reply to that of the King of the French, who, though doubtless animated by those sentiments and emotions naturally excited in his mind, by the glory of the great

week, ought not to have provoked such a reply. I should have wished the letter of our monarch to be made public, for I am sure it would have made the language employed by the Emperor of Russia, appear still more out of place.

‘I am also enabled to state that there existed in Poland no magazine of arms or ammunition, and that all which have been found there were brought from Russia after intelligence of our revolution was received.

‘Such are the facts of which I have received assurance from all parts.

‘I will now, Gentlemen, read some extracts from letters, which will make you acquainted with the intentions of Russia.’

Letter to Prince Lubecki, Minister of Finance.

St Petersburg, Aug. 6, (18) 1830.

‘MY DEAR PRINCE,

‘His Majesty, the Emperor and King, authorizes me to acquaint you that the Polish troops are at present in a condition to march, and that you are requested to collect, without delay, the necessary funds, on which the public treasury may rely, if needful, to defray the expenses of transporting the army, and carrying on a campaign.

‘TURKUL,

‘Counsellor of State.’

In reply to this letter, Prince Lubecki, on the 3d of Sept., 1830, rendered an account of his resources. ‘Poland,’ said he, ‘possesses in her treasury eight millions of florins, and one million of crowns in Berlin. She is, therefore, ready to undertake the necessary preparations.’

Extract from a letter addressed to Prince Lubecki, by Count Grabowski, Minister of State at St Petersburg.

‘ St Petersburg, Oct. 15 (27), 1830.

‘ MY DEAR PRINCE,

‘ The official correspondence which I have had the honor to communicate to you, by order of His Majesty, and which directs that the Polish army should be placed in a condition fit for service, has doubtless proved even more mortifying to you than to me. I am deeply grieved to see all our progress thus checked. (It is true that Prince Lubecki had the superintendence of the finance department.) We should soon possess a superb budget, were it not for those extraordinary expenses which must prove fatal to us ; for on this occasion, our geographical position places us in the foremost line.’

From the same to the same.

‘ Oct. 6 (18), 1830.

‘ Having this day learned from His Excellency, Aide-de-Camp Chernicheff, that orders have just been issued to His Imperial Highness, the Czarewitsch, to prepare for immediate service all the troops under his command, without excepting those of the kingdom of Poland, and that this order must be carried into effect by the 10th (22d) of December, I have the honor, my dear Prince, to inform you, by order of His Majesty, that the necessary funds must be supplied, without delay, to the minister of the war department.’ Further down, he says :— ‘ I merely, my dear Prince, request you, by order of His Majesty, that you will supply His Imperial Highness, the Czarewitsch, with the sums requisite for rendering the Polish army fit for service.

‘ GRABOWSKI.’

Count Grabowski to Prince Lubecki, Minister of Finance.

St Petersburg, Nov. 20, 1830.

‘The return of Field-Marshal Diebitsch* will decide the measures which it will be necessary to adopt. He has received orders to proceed, on his return from Berlin, to Warsaw, to consult the Grand Duke, Constantine, on all that respects the march and subsistence of the army. The emperor desires that you will see the marshal as soon as he arrives in Warsaw, to consult with him upon these subjects ; and he authorizes you to execute whatever measures may be determined on, without waiting for ulterior orders from His Majesty. You will also conform with the wishes of His Imperial Highness, the Grand Duke. Finally, His Majesty orders me to invite you to come to St Petersburg, as soon as the army shall be put in movement, and the *general war* shall be declared, in order to receive the commands of His Majesty in person.’

In another part of his letter he says : — ‘We are now in the month of November. The distances are great. Our forces cannot be in readiness till the spring ; and events succeed so rapidly, that Heaven knows what may happen before that time. No courier has hitherto equalled in rapidity the current of events. This has placed the affairs of Belgium in so fatal a situation. But I am entering upon another useless political topic. The first courier may bring us other intelligence, for the despatches succeed each other with a rapidity which exceeds all conception.’

‘Would you like to know, Gentlemen,’ continued Lafayette, ‘the conversation which Generals Field-

* Field-Marshal Diebitsch was then in Berlin, whither he had been sent to engage the Prussian cabinet in an offensive alliance against France.

Marshal Diebitsch and Binkendorf had with Colonel Wylezynski, the envoy from the Polish Dictator to the Emperor Nicholas ? This conversation took place after the colonel's short interview with the monarch, at which, as being initiated in the secret affairs of the empire, the two Russian dignitaries were present. It was to this effect : —

‘ Well, Poles ! your revolution at least has not the merit of being well timed. You rose in insurrection at the moment when all the forces of the empire were marching towards your frontiers, for the purpose of bringing to reason the revolutionists of France and Belgium.’ On the Colonel observing that Poland conceived herself able to stem the torrent for a period long enough to rouse Europe, and prepare her for the conflict, Marshal Diebitsch replied — ‘ Well, and what would be the result ? We intended to make a campaign on the Rhine ; we shall make it on the Elbe, or even on the Oder, after having put you down. Reflect accordingly.’

‘ I shall abstain,’ said Lafayette, ‘ from reading the statement made to the Diet of Warsaw by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It displays the noblest sentiments of patriotism and courage. It proves the confidence which the Poles reposed in France, and their determination to perish for the liberty of Europe ; for, gentlemen, it cannot be denied that the standard which we planted in July, at the head of European liberty, has passed from our hands to those of the Poles. It is now in Warsaw.’

‘ I shall say but little of a private affair, respecting which my evidence has been invoked, because I dislike to enter into personalities. I can certainly affirm that I have seen letters from the French Consul at Warsaw, written in a favorable tone ; but it is nevertheless true that that Consul committed the great error of consulting the Grand Duke Constantine, whether he

should take the oath of fidelity to the new government. I find it stated in a letter from the Czarewitsch to Prince Lieven, then at St Petersburg, dated 6th (18th) of September, 1830, that in determining the Consul to take this course, the Grand Duke had in view to *prevent the French government from superseding him by an individual imbued with the ideas which are now the order of the day in France.* Such an agent would not fail to involve us in all sorts of trouble, by seeking to propagate among the Poles opinions which are incompatible with public order and tranquillity.

‘To be assured that this formality was duly fulfilled, the Grand Duke Constantine sent to Count Molé the Consul’s reply, “*of which,*” says the Prince, “*I had a copy taken at the post-office.*”

‘The sentiments of the Court of St Petersburg on this subject may be judged of from the reply, dated the 17th of September, which Count Nesselrode wrote in the name of the Emperor, “*who,*” he says, “*was much interested in the contents of the document of the 6th (18th) of September, and who orders him to inform the Czarewitsch, that the advice given on that occasion to the French Consul met with the full approval of the Emperor.*”

‘These, gentlemen, are the facts on which my opinion was founded when I suspected his Majesty the Emperor of Russia of entertaining hostile intentions towards us. I leave you to judge of these facts.

‘As to other places in the neighborhood of Poland, I shall merely observe that there is now at Breslau a Russian agent, and that he has himself declared that he can determine, as he pleases, on the fate of all individuals passing through that country on their way to or from Poland. Every one is arrested; money is taken not only from the bank, but from private persons; and outrages are practised which are neither compatible with the law of nations, nor the principle of non-interference.

‘ I wish I had not to say that vexations are at present exercised in France towards foreigners against the right they possess of travelling in the country and departing from it. I cherish the belief that this is not with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs ; for I recollect that some years ago, when appeals were made by three great powers respecting a distinguished Piedmontese, he addressed to the Minister of that time a letter full of patriotism and energy.

‘ I must, nevertheless, observe, that M. Visconti, who was proceeding to his country, and who had nothing to do with the Italian recruiting, has been brutally conducted in exile to Macon : that another Italian, M. Mislei, who was not even among the number of the proscribed, cannot obtain permission to embark on his return home : that General Pepe is similarly situated ; and that other Italians are condemned to the same captivity on the frontiers of France. I inquire whether, under the government of free France, such vexations can be tolerated ? I proclaim these facts, being persuaded that the Ministry, were it only to prove their neutrality, will eagerly put a stop to them.

‘ Gentlemen, I wish to tell you my opinion respecting the two hundred millions for which I voted, because I conceived it necessary and urgent to defend the vital principle of our existence against the aggressions of the system of Pilnitz, of the Congress of Vienna, and that combination of infernal policy with absurd mysticism, known by the appellation of the *Holy Alliance*. I recollect that all the declarations made by the absolute governments, especially that of 1815, were at variance with their real intentions ; consequently I cannot now rely on the assurances of peace which we receive from the President of the Council.

‘ I voted those two hundred millions twice, because I conceived it to be necessary and urgent for our own

security, for our own national happiness, to practise in its full extent the system of non-interference, such as it was declared by the government at the commencement of the revolution, and on the occasion of the Belgian insurrection; such as it was defined three several times, in this tribune, with at least the silent assent of the king's ministers (the rules of parliamentary decorum prevent me from speaking more precisely); such, in short, as it was declared, if I am not mistaken, in recent despatches of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he said that if the Austrians should enter the insurgent territories of Italy, it would never be with the consent of France.

‘What do these expressions mean on the part of a great nation? The words, “*No, I do not consent,*” at the same time suffering her honor to be violated, may be all very well in a burlesque poem, but certainly they ill befit the diplomacy of the victorious French people, the people of July.

‘I neither know, nor do I pretend to know, much of the diplomacy of Agnats, and the pretexts alleged for the occupation of Modena. All I know is, that we cannot abandon the vital principle of our existence. The President of the Council seems to think that the revolution of July merely repelled the aggression of Charles X. It went still further: it has changed every principle of our government; it has substituted the principle of the national sovereignty for that of divine right and a conceded charter. On this account, gentlemen, notwithstanding my respect for the Chamber, and my regard for my colleagues, I have always conceived that we should be superseded by a Chamber of an origin posterior to the revolution of July, seeing that even in the most praiseworthy of its antecedent measures, as, for instance, the celebrated and important address of the 221, this Chamber has professed sentiments and doctrines absolutely at variance with the fundamental basis of our new social order, upon

which, whatever may be the accidental changes of a family, the genuine and unique title of one of the highest powers of the state rests now and for ever.

‘Gentlemen, I will await the precise explanations with which it may be thought fit to favor us with respect to the intentions of government towards Italy. I request at the same time to be informed, what intentions and principles are entertained on the question which has been raised respecting Luxemburgh. Finally, I appeal, once more, for the efforts of the government in favor of Poland, of that glorious Poland which has a claim upon the sympathy and concern of all Europe, and for whose sake, in rising to the height of the reign of Louis XV, the government should do something more than it has hitherto done.’

After a speech from General Sebastiani, the minister for foreign affairs, General Lafayette rose and spoke upon a fact of a personal nature.

‘Gentlemen,’ said he, ‘the violence of the reproaches which have been just uttered, calls for some explanations on my part. We have been described, as eager for war, and prodigal of the blood of Frenchmen. It is ridiculous that this reproach should be directed against a man, who when in the vigor of his age, and in 1792, entrusted with the most important military command, was of that party which was for waiting the declaration of war from the foreign powers. Yet, at that time our principles, our friends, our natural allies, were not to be found in other countries as they are now.

‘Some time ago, in this tribune, I lamented the vague use of the terms republic and monarchy, thinking they contributed to mislead our ideas upon the essential conditions and inviolable laws of liberty. Now, I have to lament, that a proper distinction is not drawn between the friends of war and the friends of peace. I will not attempt to follow the honorable minister in the eloquence of his harangue, but I like not discussions which are maintained by reproaches.

‘For example, when we are reproached with desiring war at any price — of inflicting upon our country all kinds of misfortunes, while our only wish is to defend her independence, her liberty, her vital principle and national honor, — may we not with equal justice, or, rather, with equal injustice, accuse in their turn, the friends of peace at any price, with wishing to purchase a pardon from the courts of Europe for our popular revolution of July, of deadening the spring of liberty in the interior of our country, and stifling its effects abroad ?

‘Let us desist from these accusations on both sides. I persist, however, in inquiring of the minister of foreign affairs, whether it be true, that he officially declared the French government would never consent to the entrance of the Austrians into the insurgent districts of Italy.’

General Sebastiani rose and said, ‘Yes, but between opposing and making war, there is a great difference.’

‘And I,’ pursued General Lafayette, ‘persist in affirming, that after that official declaration, to allow its spirit to be violated and to be content with exclaiming “no, I do not consent,” is a proceeding incompatible with the honor of the French people. I imagined, when the French people said, “No, I will not consent,” the meaning was, “I will prevent you from doing it.” The conduct which has succeeded this declaration is in conformity with the manifestations of reaction to which; in every case, I trust the French people will render justice.’

The doctrinarians have made a great noise about certain letters which Lafayette is said to have written to Poland, before the revolution of the 29th November, for the purpose of exciting the people to insurrection, I can pledge myself that every word of this is completely false, and that the report has been got up with the perfidious intention of throwing upon this dis-

tinguished patriot, the responsibility of the disasters which accompanied and have followed the defeat of the Poles.

The same may be said, of the pretended secret correspondence, by which he is reported to have excited the movements in Italy. This second accusation is as unfounded as the first. Lafayette was an entire stranger to the Italian insurrections up to the moment of their breaking out. He had even declined to enter into a plan of conspiracy in which the Duke of Modena was engaged, and whose object was said to be to relieve Italy from the Austrian yoke and the Papal authority. When solicited by the agents of that petty tyrant to engage in this conspiracy, and lend the influence of his name to the Italian patriots, Lafayette replied, that he distrusted the Duke of Modena too much, to consent to have any communication with him, under any pretext, or, for the furtherance of any purpose.

However, when the insurrections in Modena and the Roman states began to develop themselves, Lafayette attached the highest importance to their progress, and took the liveliest interest in the success of the cause of the patriot Italians.

His first care was to urge the expediency of immediately forming an army-corps upon the Alps, to keep the Austrians in check, and also to protect the free progress of the popular insurrections. He required also, that the government should notify the principle of non-interference to the cabinet of Vienna, and that it should declare the formal determination to enforce its full application with regard to the affairs of Italy. In fact, notes drawn up in this spirit were addressed to the courts of Vienna, Russia, Naples, and Turin, after having been previously communicated to Lafayette. Then, also, M. Sebastiani declared officially to the Pope's Nuncio, that France would not permit the Austrian troops to aid his holiness in repress-

ing the patriotic movements in the legations. Finally, Marshal Gerard received orders to take the command of an army corps upon the Alps.

On the occasion of the adoption of these different measures, the king said to Lafayette, 'How can we get to Italy without traversing the neutral states of the King of Sardinia?' The general answered, 'If that should embarrass your Majesty, I will require but twelve days to open two passages larger than your columns will require. Sire, you have only to say through what part you wish them to pass.' Indeed, nothing at that time could have been more easily obtained, not, certainly, from the King of Sardinia, but from the inhabitants of Savoy, Piedmont, and Genoa, than safe debouches for a French army marching to the succour of Italy. I shall recur to this point of our external policy when I come to treat of the parliamentary conduct of Lafayette subsequently to the revolution of July. But his letter, in reply to a deputation of patriotic Italians, who had written to him to ascertain the real sentiments of the French government towards them, has been the object of so much vile insinuation within, as well as without the Chamber, that I feel it my duty to record this important document here. It is as follows:—

To Messrs Misley, Fossati, Maroncelli and Linati.

Paris, 26th February, 1831.

'GENTLEMEN,

'I received with a warm feeling of gratitude, the letter with which you have honored my fidelity to the cause of general liberty, and our mutual wishes for Italian independence. It is in perusing the history of your fine country, the first study of our boyhood, that our hearts first learn to beat at the recital of republican actions and virtues. Twice, as you observe, has that sacred flame blazed in Italy. But in the present

progress of political civilization, disentangled as it is from the old meshes of slavery and aristocracy, emanating from the sovereignty of the people, and founded upon the representative system, — now that the imprescriptible rights of men and of society are clearly defined, it remains for your beautiful language to proclaim to your intelligent population, the practice of the principles of true and complete liberty, in their fullest extent.

‘ Too long, gentlemen, has Italy been the property of certain families, an object of traffic between them, the theatre of the intrigues of foreign diplomacy, the sport of false and constantly violated promises. Every friend of human emancipation hopes that your liberty may at length be established upon the bases of perfect independence and nationality.

‘ To the spontaneous impulses of your patriotism are due your recent revolution of which I pride myself in being the ardent admirer. We Frenchmen, in our barricades of July, claim but the merit of having set a good example of courage in combat, and of generosity in victory. We are far from rejecting this glory. It imposes on us, in my opinion, towards our brother patriots of other nations, sentiments and duties more important than those of ordinary sympathy.

‘ But if it also gives us some claims upon you, gentlemen, permit me to avail myself of them to recommend that national and truly Italian union which must assure the success of your noble efforts, and the independence and welfare of your beautiful country.

‘ You may yourselves convey to your fellow countrymen a sincere testimony of the vivid and deep sympathy cherished for them by the French people. You have had the opportunity of witnessing their admiration of your country, their wishes for your success, and their desire to seeing noble and classic Italy conquer and consolidate her liberty and indepen-

dence. My colleagues in opinion, in the Chamber of Deputies and elsewhere, namely those who have formed themselves into a special committee on the affairs of Poland, are imbued in the highest degree, with these sentiments, and they direct me to express them in their behalf.

‘As to the constitutional government which regulates our internal affairs, I must refer you to the professions made in the national tribune, and to the assent thrice tacitly given in the Chamber, by not gainsaying, my definitions, of the French system of *non interference*, I may add that I have had cognizance of official letters which accord with these principles.

‘Receive, gentlemen, the every expression of my gratitude, my good wishes, my zeal, attachment and high consideration.

‘LAFAYETTE.’

CHAPTER II.

Lafayette in his relations with Spain. — His demands in favor of that Country. — The French Government plays the part of the Propaganda. — Enlistment of the Spanish Refugees. — Louis Philippe supplies them with Subsidies. — Nocturnal interview between M. Guizot and a Spanish Refugee. — That Minister pays to him in quadruples, a sum destined for General Valdez. — Proofs of the above Facts. — Change of System. — The Government sacrifices the Refugees. — First Diplomatic overture from Austria. — Causes of the Resignation of M. Lafitte. — The King's dislike to M. Perier. Important Dispatch secreted from the knowledge of the Council. — Particulars respecting the formation of the Ministry of the 13th of March. — Lafayette's Conduct during all these Intrigues.

IN taking a retrospect of the different acts of the external policy of Lafayette subsequently to the revolution of July, I should have commenced with his connexion with unhappy Spain. Of all the nations of Europe, Spain is that for which he contended with most interest and solicitude. From the impious war waged by the restoration against the constitution of the Cortes; from the sacrilegious triumph of the French soldiers who had the misfortune to be the instruments of crushing Spanish liberty, amidst the plaudits of the despots of Europe, Lafayette incessantly denounced that crusade a national crime; and demanded for the oppressed Spaniards the reparations due to them. Neither in Europe nor in America did he omit any opportunity of branding the name of Ferdinand VII, and rendering justice to the memory of the victims of his tyranny especially the unfortunate Riego. From the disastrous day of the capitulation of Cadiz, he advocated

the interests of the Spanish refugees, particularly those who capitulated at Alicante and Carthagena; and this in defiance of the clamors in the Chamber and of the vociferations of the absolutists without.

Never were a people so shamefully deceived. Never did tyrant so shamelessly violate his faith and the rights of man. The government of the restoration proved treacherous to the Spanish constitutionalists; but Ferdinand acted the part of an atrocious miscreant, stained with perjury and with the blood of his countrymen who had been so merciful, to the crimes of his whole life. Lafayette made France and the world ring with the recital of the horrors which for nine years he incessantly pointed out to the indignation of all who possessed the feelings of human nature.

The capitulation of Santana signed by Prince Hohenlohe, provided that if the Spanish officers possessed property in Spain, the possession of it should be secured to them, and that no person residing in the garrison, should be persecuted on account of his political opinions. Yet these very men had their possessions confiscated, and all who manifested any sympathy for the constitution were thrown into prison or led to the scaffold. The capitulation of Grenada, signed by General Mollitor, that of Barcelona, signed by Marshal Moncey, that of Carthagena by General Bonnemain, all stipulated the same guarantees; and yet the defenders and the inhabitants of these different towns suffered the same fate as those of Santana. The protocol of the conference held at Santa Maria on the 7th September 1822 between General Aalva on the part of the Spanish Government and Generals Bordesoult, and Guillemiot on the part of France stipulates, in express terms, that 'it is agreed that in forty eight hours after the King of Spain shall be at perfect liberty, a proclamation shall be issued offering to the nation a constitutional

government in unison with the intelligence of the age, since even the interest of France requires that the same system of government should be established in Spain, as exists in France.'

And how were these stipulations fulfilled? First came the Decree of the 1st May, 1824, which excluded from all amnesty the commanders of the constitutional army, the authors of the conspiracy of Madrid, the leaders of the insurrection of Ocana, the judges in all cases in which traitors had been condemned for conspiring against the constitutional system, the leaders of the constitutional guerillas, the authors of all the books and journals which had attacked the Catholic religion; in a word, all who had paid allegiance to the government of the Cortes.

Lafayette never ceased representing the general violations of the treaties concluded under the auspices, and with the participation of France, as so many insults to our national dignity. He also denounced particular cases of a still more atrocious character; for example, that of a Catalonian, named Joseph Pepemorcure, who was included in Ferdinand's amnesty of 1828. The letters of pardon declared that Pepemorcure was free, both in person and property; nay, the general-in-chief, commanding in Catalonia, sent to the proscribed individual the original copy of the amnesty in which he was included; and the unfortunate man, furnished with that document, entered Barcelona, where, two hours after his arrival, he was shot, hanged, and quartered.

In 1826, Ferdinand VIII having proceeded to Catalonia, for the purpose of suppressing the formidable insurrection which had broken out in that province, he granted an amnesty, which included generally all the insurgents and insurgent chiefs. Under the protection of this amnesty, which was dated from Tarragona, the two principal promoters of the insurrection, Vidal and Olivier, presented themselves be-

fore the king, who not only received them with apparent kindness, but even ordered three months' pay to be given to Vidal and his comrades from the royal treasury. Five days after this, Vidal, and the other chiefs of the insurrection, were arrested, put to death without trial, and to the feet of each victim was attached a label, with the inscription — 'Hanged by order of the king.'

With a generous pertinacity, Lafayette continually revived the recollection of these royal crimes. 'Restore,' he used to say, 'the Spanish Constitutionalists to the situation in which they stood at the commencement of your iniquitous war, and you may then maintain your neutrality as long as you please.' These were not the only services he rendered to the patriots of the Peninsula. He maintained a correspondence with the different fractions of the national party, who, though unfortunately disunited among themselves, still reposed entire confidence in him. Lafayette even made pecuniary sacrifices, scarcely consistent with his fortune, to promote the success of their cause, and to alleviate their individual sufferings.

Such was the relative situation of Lafayette and the Spanish patriots, when the revolution of July broke out. That great event he thought must decide the fate of Spain. The moment was critical for both countries: Lafayette felt this, and wished to attach the cause of France to that of the neighbor country. By this means, he thought we might wipe away some portion of the disgrace which the war of 1821 had drawn upon us, while, at the same time, a revolution in Spain, aided by us, in the cause of liberty and our principles, would singularly simplify our foreign policy, by enabling us to dispense, in case of war, with the maintenance of an army of 30,000 or 40,000 men on the frontiers of the Pyrennees, for the purpose of preventing Ferdinand and the Carlist emigrants from exciting counter-revolutionary movements in the south

of France. Such a course would have been warranted by the law of self-defence, even though the attitude of the cabinet of Madrid had not plainly indicated its necessity to the new government which directed the affairs of France. In fact, Ferdinand VII had downrightly refused to recognize the revolution of July, and the king, whom it created. His prime minister even went so far as to despatch officially, to all the authorities of the kingdom, a circular, couched in terms the most insulting to Louis-Philippe and hostile to the principles of July. Thus the power of the barricades, as yet insulated in its usurpation, and never dreaming of the tardy and disgraceful consecration it has since sued for and obtained, seriously entertained the design of fomenting abroad, revolutions analogous to that on which its own safety depended. In fact the system of propagandism was decreed in principle, and secretly executed by the council of Louis-Philippe. These are facts which it is necessary, once for all, to prove by incontrovertible evidence, as well for the benefit of governments, as for the edification of nations. They are proved by the documents which I have now before me, and which I will freely communicate to ministers, if their memory should fail them.

It is said, that immediately after the revolution of July, the Spanish constitutionalists spontaneously flocked to Paris. This assertion is not exactly correct. Doubtless, the revolution of July lighted up in the hearts of these brave, but unfortunate men, the hope of reconquering their country. But the greater number of them, tied by absolute poverty to the places where they had taken refuge, left them only at the tacit solicitation of the French government. Thus, for instance, that government invited into France all the Spaniards who had found an asylum in England. If this be untrue, the minister then in office will

doubtless inform us why Colonel Valdez, M.M. Llaño, Navarelle, Inglada, and some other Spanish chiefs, known through all Europe by their constant opposition to the government of Ferdinand VII, having, at the beginning of August, 1830, landed at Havre, without passports, obtained them from Paris, on the application of the sub-prefect, for the purpose of repairing to the frontier of the Pyrenees? Why, two hundred Spanish refugees, who also landed at Havre, were organized into detachments, commanded by Spanish officers of their own choice, and thence directed upon Bayonne and Perpignan, with routes, specifying the allowance of pay and other indemnities granted to French troops on a march? Why, in short, did the same things take place at Calais, at Boulogne, and Paris?

The government has shamelessly denied these facts in the tribune, and contended that the Spanish patriots had only passes to go to their own country, such as are granted to the poor. Passes! and to go where? To Spain! To seek in captivity and torture some alleviation of their misery! One word will suffice to prove the falsehood of this assertion. From the 1st to the 30th December, 1830, detachments, each consisting of from thirty to forty Spanish refugees, set out daily from Paris for the Pyrenees, provided with collective passports; and these passports were remitted by government to a commanding officer, who was directed to receive and distribute the pay of the common soldiers. I have at this moment lying before me the route of a detachment of thirty-seven men, who left Paris on the morning of the 7th December. This paper contains the designation of the halting stations, such as Arpajon, Etampes, Orleans, Beaugency, Blois, Châtellerault, (Vienne), Poitiers, &c.

Is it not true that these routes were delivered by M. Girod de l'Ain upon the mere application of one of the members of the Spanish committee, who acted

with the positive consent of the government, and in concert with M.M. Guizot, and Montalivet. Is it not true that the principal condition on which those gentlemen granted assistance and protection to the Spanish constitutionalists, was the ultimate union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal on the head of Donna Maria, who was to marry the Duke de Nemours ? Is it not true that the two ministers just named had every week two secret interviews with one or more members of the Spanish committee, to deliberate on the best means of bringing this business to a successful issue ? Is it not true that of all the then ministers, M. Sebastiani was the only one who opposed this scheme ? Is it not true that in one of these secret interviews, a promise was made by M. de Montalivet to dismiss certain prefects and sub-prefects who impeded the measures of the committee ? Is it not true that the Spanish Ambassador, Count Offalia, having addressed urgent remonstrances to the Palais Royal, relative to certain depôts of arms, M.M. Montalivet and Guizot caused the Spanish committee to hold a meeting, in which it was agreed to form false depôts of arms, that is to say, of arms unfit for service ; and that these depôts should be indicated by our agents at Marseilles and Bayonne, to the prefects, who were to order their seizure, taking care to spare the real depôts ? Was not all this going on in the two towns I have just mentioned ? Is it not true that the subscription of government formed a great portion of the million collected by the Spanish committee, and that it was only on the faith of ministerial promises that M. Calvo, a Spanish banker in Paris, advanced 500,000 francs ? Is it not true that it was with the tacit authority of the government, and the support of a banking house at Marseilles, to which it had recommended the agent of the committee, that the latter despatched men and arms from Marseilles to General Torrijos ? Is it not true that

whilst on the one hand the refugees were required immediately to enter the Spanish territory, Marshal Gerard, on the other, enjoined Mina to delay the expedition as much as possible ; and hence arose the unfortunate divisions which broke out among the Spanish patriots ? Is it not true that M. Guizot sent at midnight for M. Inglada, formerly aide-de-camp to General Torrijos, and paid him a hundred and eighty quadruples for Colonel Valdez, who had established the depôt of his troops at Ustaritz ? Is it not true that on his arrival at Bayonne, with M. Sanchez, M. Inglada received from the sub-prefect of that town the following authority : —

‘ Bayonne, Sept. 30, 1830.

‘ The sub-prefect of Bayonne authorizes the Sieurs D. Francisco Sanchez, and D. Emmanuel Inglada, Spanish subjects, to proceed whenever they choose from Bayonne to Ustaritz.

Signed, GROUAY.’

Is it not true that the Parisian volunteers, who at a subsequent period fell into the hands of the Spaniards, and were thrown into the dungeons of Pampe-luna, departed with the permission of the government, and were furnished with routes by its orders ? Finally, is it not true, that the day before the *Moniteur* published the order for detaining the Spanish refugees, even by force, if requisite, M. de Montalivet, affirmed to the Spanish committee that he had just despatched a telegraphic order for favoring the expeditions of Mina, Valdez, and Torrijos ? Why the change ? It was, because in the interval of a few hours, the injunction of European diplomacy for repressing the patriotic efforts of the Spanish constitutionalists arrived at the Palais-Royal, along with the threatening and disgraceful recognition of Ferdinand VII, and because the royalty of the barricades, proud

of this dishonorable adoption, did not hesitate to pay for it by an act of perfidy.

I have documents in my hands which prove the truth of all the statements I have here made. Yet the ministry impudently presumed to deny them. M. Guizot maintained in the tribune, that if the ministry, of which he formed a part, was *indulgent* to the Spanish patriots, it was because the government at that time yielded to an influence which it could not resist. Lafayette disdained these hints, which he perfectly understood, and declared himself to be the object of the ministerial allusion. But it is easy to perceive, from the constrained tone of his speech, that while in possession of an important fact, he would not compromise any but himself in the affair. This fact I will disclose; first, because it is important that France should know it, and next, because, since it took place in council, and in the presence of eight individuals, it cannot now be regarded as a state secret.* The crown granted one hundred thousand francs, to aid the success of the Spanish constitutionalists, and this sum was converted into two letters of credit, of fifty thousand francs each, one of which, drawn upon a banker at Marseilles, was given to the unfortunate Torrijos. This is the real truth.

It is well known what odious persecution succeeded to this exalted protection, on the faith of which so many victims were hurried to the scaffold. The refugees were brutally dispersed, and their most trivial proceedings reported to the Spanish authorities; the brother of the unfortunate Riego was expelled from Paris; Torrijos, old Lopez de Calderon, General

* I may here declare, upon my word of honor, that notwithstanding my urgent solicitations to induce M. de Lafayette to confirm the truth of this fact, I could never prevail on him to do so. The general always avoided an avowal, by undecided answers.

Pinto, and fifty other martyrs of liberty were entrapped, executed without trial by Spain, and without remonstrance from France who had placed arms in their hands. Such have been the results of the confidence reposed by those victims in the government of the barricades ; — such too is the responsibility which rests on the heads of certain men ; political machiavelism may perhaps absolve them ; but while humanity is any thing more than an empty word, will it not demand a strict account of this bloodshed and suffering.

The ministers of the 13th of March declared in the tribune that the insurrections in Italy broke out without their concurrence. This to be sure was so far true, that the French government shrank at first from the necessity of openly promoting the political interests which those insurrections had created for it in Italy ; and that it did not venture to support by force of arms, the struggle and the public opinion so favorable to France, which had risen up among our transalpine neighbors. But a falsehood was stated in the face of France and the world, when the ministers affirmed they had never taken cognizance of the revolutionary movements of the Peninsula, and had entered into no promise or guarantee to the Italian patriots. With regard to Italy as well as Spain, propagandism was a part of the early policy of the French cabinet. A few facts will suffice to demonstrate the truth of this assertion ; and these facts, be it remembered, are incontrovertible.

What the new monarchy had done for the Spanish constitutionalists, it also did, but more timidly for the Italian refugees. A great number of the latter had secretly directed their course upon Lyons and various other points of the frontier of the Alps ; pecuniary and other aids were granted to them ; a considerable quantity of arms was collected with the perfect knowledge of the government at Lyons and Grenoble, a central committee whose operations were communicat-

ed to the ministry, was established at Lyons, where it acted freely and was protected by the local authorities civil and military. Finally, Louis Philippe having written in vain to the late King of Naples, and to his young successor, to induce them to enter into an alliance with new France, and grant a constitution to the Neapolitans ; and being well aware that his good advice would be disregarded, if not backed by the alarm with which the patriots of the Two Sicilies might inspire their government, General Pepé was invited to present to the Palais-Royal the plan of a constitution which was transmitted to the Neapolitans. However, as it is right to render justice to every one, I must add that Pepé having intimated to Louis-Philippe his intention of proceeding to Naples, the king informed him that he would not advise him to carry that design into effect, because he could not answer for his personal safety.

Lafayette, who wisely distrusted these private assurances, and wished to obtain a public declaration on the subject, thrice appealed to the ministry in the Chamber, and thrice obtained the official assent of the government to his definition of the system of non-interference ; a definition which left no doubt as to the course which France would pursue with respect to Italy. But not satisfied with the public approbation of the Cabinet, Lafayette wished also to obtain that of the king. He accordingly waited upon Louis Philippe, and thus addressed him. ' Have you read my speech on the system of non-interference, and do you approve of the definition I have given of that system ? ' ' Yes, certainly,' replied the king. ' Then it has your majesty's assent, resumed the General. ' Without doubt,' added the king.

Meanwhile the insurrection of Modena, and afterwards that of Bologna broke out. The patriots of central Italy, not doubting the concurrence of France, but anxious to know how far they might rely on her

support in certain circumstances, sent deputies to Paris to ascertain what would be the conduct of the new government, in the probable hypothesis of an attempt at armed interference by Austria in the affairs of Modena and the Legations. These deputies, in several interviews with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, received the formal and reiterated promise that France would never permit the interference of Austria, and that if a single regiment of the Emperor's troops should pass the frontiers of the Duchy of Modena, or the Papal States, a French force would be simultaneously marched into Italy. Lafayette, to whom the Italian deputation was also sent, and who fathomed more accurately than any one the abyss into which false confidence might precipitate the Italian patriots, waited upon M. Sebastiani, and having entreated an explanation of the intentions of the Cabinet on this point, received from him the same protestations which had been made to the deputation. On the faith of these guarantees were brought about the insurrections of Modena and Bologna, whose issue, ably directed, might have thrown into the hands of France all the moral and physical power of Italy.

Such was the state of things when Louis-Philippe's government indignantly repelling all idea of its concurrence with the Italian patriots, and even the suspicion of having in any way patronized the foreign exiles, sent General Bachelu to Lyons, with orders to dissolve the Italian committee (which had been organized with its consent), to disperse the refugees who had assembled on the frontiers of the Alps, and to paralyze every insurrectionary movement which the French government had excited them to make, in the hope of restoring their country's liberty.

In order to point out the object of this shameful abandonment of principle, it will be necessary to explain the causes which brought it about.

The sovereigns of Europe, terror-struck by the ex-

traordinary event of July, beheld their dominions exposed to the invasion of the revolutionary torrent ; and, in their first alarm, they looked forward to the counter stroke with which their thrones were menaced, as the consequence of a decree of fate. The daily course of events appeared to justify this presentiment. Already Belgium, Switzerland, and Poland had ranged themselves between the French principle of popular sovereignty and the foreign dogma of legitimacy. Even Germany saw the gathering of the clouds, which foreboded the tempest. Cordial sympathy with our revolution was the prevailing sentiment throughout the nations of Europe. In short, the absolute monarchies of Europe could not possibly flatter themselves that France, whatever might be her moderation, would neglect to profit by the embarrassment into which her enemies were so suddenly thrown. It was evident that a modification, more or less important, in the treaties of 1815, must be the natural and inevitable consequence of the downfall of the monarchy of which those treaties had guaranteed the existence. No one did or could foresee that we ourselves should have a Cabinet capable of condemning the France of July to be a quiet spectator of the events which were about to ensue on the continent of Europe. Truly, it is one of the miracles of the present age that there should have existed men capable of abandoning the position in which the revolution of July placed their country, and blind to the palpable necessity of conducting all our negotiations in such a spirit as to obtain compensation for the painful sacrifices imposed on France by the treaty of Paris.

Austria very well understood the logical consequences of this situation. That power had at stake the preservation of the brightest gem in her crown ; viz. Lombardy, which threatened to follow the example of the insurgent states of central Italy. Piedmont was already harassed by the rising of Parma ; and the

German troops scarcely sufficed to repress the Austro-Italian population from the Lake of Como to the Lagunes of Venice.

The Cabinet of Vienna clearly understood that the appearance of a single French flag on the southern side of the Alps would kindle a flame throughout all Italy.

In this state of things, Austria, while she was marching her best regiments into Italy, where she expected to engage with us, was the first to open with France negotiations with the view of preventing, or, at least, of adjourning a conflict, the issue of which might involve the loss of her possessions in Italy. M. d'Appony then presented to the Cabinet of the Tuileries, a verbal proposition, which M. Sebastiani reported to the Council, and the object of which was,

- 1st. To permit Austria to occupy immediately the Duchy of Modena, by right of the reversibility of that duchy to the house of Hapsburgh, after the extinction of the reigning ducal family.

- 2d. To concur in inducing the Holy See to grant a representative constitution to the Ecclesiastical States.

- 3d. To deliberate respectively, and with common accord, on the means of effecting a general disarmament on the continent of Europe.

This triple proposition excited warm discussions in the council. The king, who, even before the question respecting the Duchy of Modena was broached, had declared himself for the occupation of that state, by right of reversibility, now again urged that concession. M. Lafitte warmly opposed it. That minister represented, in support of his opinion, 1st, that the succession of the Duchy of Modena was not open; 2d, that even if the right of reversibility claimed by Austria, were actually established, the interests of France, and especially the moral interests of the revolution of July, would

render it impossible that the exercise of that right could be permitted. With regard to the constitutional institutions to be obtained for Romagna, the president of the council saw the absurdity and impossibility of such a project, as long as the temporal power of the sovereign Pontif should continue unseparated from his spiritual power. 'Only imagine,' said he, 'a chamber of peers, composed of cardinals, and an elective chamber filled with curés and vicars!' As to the proposition of disarming, M. Lafitte regarded it merely as a lure or a delay, intended to plunge France into false security, and to paralyze her activity. Finally, the president of the council, regarding the propositions of Austria altogether as an intended deception upon France, and the order of things risen from the barricades, requested that a note, having for its basis, the reasons he had adduced, should be immediately forwarded to the cabinet of Vienna, to notify the positive refusal of France to accept its propositions, and her resolution to exact, by all means in her power, the rigid observance of the principle of non-interference, proclaimed by her as the basis of her foreign policy. Such was likewise the opinion of M. Lafayette respecting the affairs of Italy, and he expressed his opinion with a degree of warmth which had the effect of overawing, at least, in appearance, the weak men who had already begun to conspire for the sacrifice of the principles and the men of July.

The other members of the cabinet, and even the king himself, seemed to yield to the opinion of M. M. Lafitte and Lafayette. M. Sebastiani read to the council a note drawn up in accordance with the opinions expressed on the preceding day, by the prime minister.

Was this note transmitted to the court of Vienna? We must presume it was: but be this as it may, serious suspicions of the existence of a secret corres-

pondence, between the Palais Royal and foreign diplomatists, arose in the minds of the patriotic ministers who then formed part of Louis Philippe's cabinet. M. Lafitte, with grief suspected that despatches of primary importance, and the results of which might involve his responsibility, had been concealed from the knowledge of the council, when an accidental circumstance converted this suspicion into certainty.

This circumstance occurred a short time after the discussion on the affairs of Italy above described, that is to say, on the 5th of March, 1831. A courier from Vienna had brought to Sebastiani a despatch from Marshal Maison. The Marshal acquainted his government that he had just learned from M. de Metternich, that the Austrian cabinet did not recognize the principle of non-interference, and that its firm determination was to interfere, by force of arms, not only in the states of Parma and Modena, but in all the Italian provinces into which insurrection might spread. 'Hitherto,' said M. Metternich, 'we have allowed France to set up the principle of non-interference, but it is time she should know that we do not recognize it as far as regards Italy. We will carry our arms wherever insurrection may extend. If this interference should bring about war, let war come! We would rather incur every chance of it than be exposed to the risk of perishing in the midst of revolution.'

'You know,' said Marshal Maison, in his note, 'that no one has declared more decidedly for peace than I have; but I now feel convinced, that to avert the dangers which threaten France, we must, without delay, and before the levies of Austria are organized, take the lead in preparations for war, and throw an army into Piedmont.'

This important despatch arrived at the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Saturday, the

5th of March. A copy, written by the hand of M. Sebastiani's son in law, was immediately transmitted to the king; and yet, on Tuesday the 7th of March, no communication on the subject had been made to the Council of Ministers. M. Lafitte himself only heard of it through a breach of confidence, made in the offices of the Hotel des Capucines; he immediately proceeded to the Palais-Royal, to ask the king whether he knew any thing of a despatch from Vienna, which was said to have arrived within the last three days at the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs? The king replied that he did, and, on the astonishment expressed by M. Lafitte, the Prince explained this strange silence by observing that he sometimes found it necessary to take precautions against the indiscretions which were committed in the Council. At this moment the War Minister arrived, and M. Lafitte having put to him the same question which he had addressed to the king, Marshal Soult replied that he knew nothing of the matter, and expressed the utmost indignation against M. Sebastiani, whom he called a traitor. At length the Minister for Foreign Affairs made his appearance, and being interrogated by the President of the Council, stammered out the confession that he had indeed received a letter from Marshal Maison, but that it was of no great importance, and that he had not had time to communicate it to his colleagues. At the desire of M. Lafitte, the Minister who had not yet deposited the despatch in his portfolio, went to the office to procure it, and it was at length submitted to the Council. The opinion of the members who had not been informed of the arrival of this document was, that the king and M. Sebastiani intended to keep it from their knowledge.

From that moment, though a promise was given that this sort of mystification should not be repeated, M. Lafitte determined to retire. I can affirm

that the principal cause of his retirement was the opinion the king entertained respecting the foreign policy of France. The king was for maintaining peace at any price, and loudly declared that whatever might be the opinion of his Council on this subject, his was irrevocably fixed. However, Louis-Philippe used, or feigned to use, every endeavor to oppose M. Lafitte's design of retiring, by which he said his friend would do him more harm than he had done him good when he helped to place the crown on his head. However, at the termination of an audience in which he again explained his system of government, a system which was diametrically opposite to that in which the king declared his intention of persisting, M. Lafitte requested his Majesty to receive his resignation, and earnestly entreated him to appoint M. Casimir Périer President of the Council. The king still hesitated to accept the resignation, and evinced the most decided dislike of the individual whom M. Lafitte had recommended as his successor. Louis-Philippe said at that time, that the imperious character, the constant ill health, and even the countenance and complexion of M. Casimir Périer, were exceedingly disagreeable to him.*

In spite of all this, M. Lafitte resolved, at all events, to extricate himself from the false position in which he stood, and which was so unworthy of his political good faith; he next day convoked a ministerial Council, in which, after representing

* This antipathy, real or pretended, to M. Casimir Périer, was not the only sacrifice which the monarchy of the barricades imposed upon itself in the choice of Ministers. It is certain that in their intimate communications the king and the Duke of Orleans professed, at that time, the most sovereign contempt for Marshal Soult, and often laughed at the clumsy endeavors of that minister to get himself chosen President of the Council.

the system hitherto pursued as fatal to the principles of the revolution of July, and to the interests and honor of France, he again explained his governmental opinions, and urged his colleagues to decide without delay on one of two things, the adoption of his system or his immediate retirement. His colleagues were silent; he renewed his demand still more urgently, and at length, after a pause, M. Montalivet observed that he, for his part, would more readily adopt the system of M. Périer than that of M. Lafitte. On hearing this M. Lafitte declared the Sitting ended. This was on the 11th of March. On the 12th the resignation of the President of the Council was offered for the third time, and was accepted by him who, a few days previously, had observed that 'St James and St Philip were united on earth as in Heaven.'

Such are the circumstances which brought about the formation of the ministry of the 13th of March.

Here a question presents itself, which has given rise to doubts very unfavorable to the citizen monarchy, but for the solution of which, history, as yet, rests only on the evidence of probabilities. It has been asked, whether the regret expressed for the retirement of M. Lafitte, and the dissolution of his cabinet, were really sincere; or whether, on the contrary, the temporary employment of a few patriots in public affairs, had been considered merely as a transitory necessity, and their removal premeditated, from the day of their appointment, and prepared by an intrigue of which the ordinances of the 13th of March, were but the natural denouement? However ready one may be to give credit to all sorts of political hypocrisy, yet it is difficult to admit a supposition which would render the throne of the barricades a mere stage, on which even the confidence of friendship was but a theatrical performance. I am unwilling to believe that the king's

demonstrations of affection, gratitude, and repugnance, were merely feigned; yet it is a positive fact, and I leave it without commentary to the judgment of the reader, that before M. Lafitte became President of the Council, some one who was endeavoring to get M. Périer appointed to that office, received from him the following very significative reply: — ‘It is of no use: the moment has not yet arrived. Lafitte must have his turn first.’

I have dwelt upon some facts relative to the ministry of the 3d of November, because they bear the same character of political apostacy as those circumstances that caused Lafayette’s removal from public affairs. Still it would be a great mistake to suppose, from this circumstance, that a perfect union of principles existed between the Commander-in-Chief of the National Guards of the kingdom and the ministry of the 3d of November. On the contrary, I shall show, in a future chapter, that Lafayette and this cabinet, collectively considered, manifested a decided difference of opinion on some of the most essential points of our foreign and domestic policy. For instance, they never could agree upon the questions of the pecuniary qualification for a deputy, the liberty of the press, the securities required from the proprietors of newspapers, the monopoly of the press, &c. They were, however, confounded together, and equally reprobated by the Court, and by those intriguers who are always to be found in Courts; and the short account which I have given will be sufficient to show the false position in which those patriots were placed, who, though differing as to the means, were united as to the end — the triumph of the revolution of July, and the interest and honor of France.

In the midst of all the difficulties which he had to struggle against at the council and at the tribune, in order to preserve the honor of France and the

liberty of her natural allies, he was not forgetful of those other objects which he had always had deeply at heart, however remote might be the sphere in which they would be serviceable. Under the regime which had just perished, he had for ten years past in vain urged the recognition of the States of South America, and the old government, influenced by family considerations; and blind to the commercial and political interests of France, had allowed England to obtain, by the establishment of relations with the new States of that rich hemisphere, those advantages which the conformity in our manners, climate, and religious belief, and the circumstance of our carrying on commercial transactions in every part of Spain, would easily have secured to us.

The French nation having now thrown off the yoke of the Restoration and the Holy Alliance, Lafayette thought the time had arrived for a plain and frank declaration of the independence and nationality of the old Spanish colonies. Accordingly, soon after the revolution of July, he questioned M. Mollé from the tribune, and extracted from the government an official declaration of the recognition of the South American republics, as independent states, and of their readiness to treat with the agents of those states, and to send French chargé d'affaires to their governments.

This was a grand point gained in diplomacy; a point which, perhaps, would have been still in dispute, had not the hero of the two worlds effected its settlement, more by the force of circumstances, than from any favorable inclination on the part of the individuals in power. Who, indeed, would, at the present moment, venture to say, that if Ferdinand VII had exacted the non-recognition of the independence of his possessions beyond the sea, as the condition of his acknowledging Louis Philippe as King of the French, this concession would have been refused him?

Such was the conduct of Lafayette in reference to diplomacy and the foreign policy of France, after that revolution which ought properly to have restored his country to the rank and consideration of which it had been deprived by the Bourbons.

Educated in the great school of revolutions, a witness of the vicissitudes which had accompanied the emancipation of America, and of the finest kingdom of Europe; by turns an actor and a victim in these bloody dramas, Lafayette had contracted, from the experience of half a century, the firm conviction that the best security for the liberty of one nation is the liberty of all the surrounding nations; and that a revolution, to be consolidated, especially upon a continent, by the formation of alliances with those whose interests and whose wants are the same, and who, having the same enemies to contend with, must necessarily employ the same means to oppose them. From those opinions upon the nature of government which he has held for the last fifty years, has sprung Lafayette's unquenchable attachment for every nation which has conquered, or attempted to conquer its freedom. This is also the cause of the filial affection, the unlimited confidence, and the religious veneration, with which the veteran of the cause of nations is regarded by all the patriots of Europe and America.

The almost universal naturalization of Lafayette is, indeed, a real phenomenon in the history of the world. It must be admitted that the man, whom all the South American States, from Chili to the Isle of Palma, have constituted the arbiter of their destinies; whom North America considers it one of her greatest glories to claim as her adopted son: and to whom the nations of Europe manifest the same sentiments of affection and respect, in proportion as they desire to be free, it must be admitted, I say, that such a man occupies a peculiar position in the political world: a position, which, to use his own expression in a letter of his con-

stituents, he is far from wishing to resign. This universal patriotism is a source of terror and affright to the aristocracy and the despotism, which bears so cruelly upon the world, but the friends of order and true liberty only perceive in it a moral power, which may be of immense utility in the emancipation of Europe and in the introduction into public law of an influence which should work out the true principles of equality, liberty and order, with the least possible disturbance and misery.

CHAPTER III.

Trial of the Ministers. — Expectations of all parties excited. — Distress of the Palais-Royal. — The whole hope of the Court in Lafayette. — Flattery and Promises resorted to. — Lafayette proposes the Abolition of Capital Punishment. — State of the Public Mind. — Lafayette endeavors to save the Lives of the accused. — Compromises his Popularity. — Result of the Trial. — The Court's Ingratitude.

THE difference in opinions and political views, which separated Lafayette from the men of the 7th of August had gone on continually increasing, when the approaching trial of the ministers, induced the Court to exhibit a more conciliatory disposition towards the Chief of the National Guards of the kingdom. The unmerited suspicion, absurd jealousy and low sarcasm, with which the noble general had hitherto been treated, all at once gave place to marks of the most unlimited confidence and respect, and a display of almost filial affection.

Lafayette did not attach to those attentions, greater value than they deserved. He pitied the feeling which dictated them, and though he foresaw that they would soon have an end, he did not, on that account, allow himself to be moved from his resolution of performing his duty in every particular ; and, if necessary, of sacrificing his popularity, to preserve the honor of the revolution of July. His attachment to this revolution approached almost to fanaticism ; and the object of all his thoughts was to make it descend to posterity as the beau ideal of popular omnipotence.

To any other than Lafayette, the design of saving the lives of men, whose hands were still red with the

blood of thousands of patriots, slain but a few days ago, would have presented insurmountable difficulties. The popularity of any one but himself would inevitably have perished in the attempt. The name of the ministers, whom he wished to snatch from the vengeance of the people, was associated with a sentiment of their mortal and unconquerable hostility to our liberty. They were the instruments of the oligarchy, who had selected them on account of their being most offensive and odious to France, in preference to the other accomplices in the counter revolutionary plots, which had been concocted during the last forty years. They were the promoters of all the intrigues, and the executors of all the acts of violence, by which the country had been harassed under the restoration. They possessed no quality which could redeem the vices of their character. By nature, both slavish and despotic, ferocious and weak ; the issue of the dens of Coblenz, or of the sinks of the empire ; they presented the most extraordinary picture of inconsistency that had ever insulted national probity. Besides, it was they who conceived, prepared, and signed the ordinances. It was they, who directed the capital to be fired upon for three whole days, and made twenty thousand families mourn the death of their dearest relations and friends. And to what class did their victims belong ? Precisely to that which possessed all Lafayette's predilections, and which enjoyed his sincerest affection and respect.

Nearly all the national guards, too, required that the law for the punishment of high treason, should be executed against the ministers with the greatest severity.

The trial of the ministers presented a point of attraction to the most opposite parties, the most hostile passions, and the most contrary hopes ; and the period of its commencement was expected with equal impatience by Carlists and Bonapartists ; and particularly by

the administrations abroad. They all firmly believed, that the monarchy of July would not survive the experiment.

The difficulties of this state of things were still further increased, by the number of liberated felons and malefactors present in the capital ; who, having made no harvest in the grand week, were in hopes that fresh disorders would give them an opportunity to make up for the *sacrifices* they had been obliged to submit to by that scrupulous regard of probity, which threw such splendor on the days of July. To these elements of confusion, must be added, the secret but active co-operation of the police, who, having been well paid, during the periods of the empire and of legitimacy, were disposed to favor any power, which offered them greater profit and a better guarantee of durability than a throne of yesterday, to whom no person could assure continued existence.

With respect to the young men of republican sentiments, already dissatisfied with the tortuous progress of the new government, it is but justice to say, that whether in obedience to a conscientious feeling for legal order, — whether fearful that any disturbance might be favorable either to the Carlist or Imperial interests, or whether it was, that their affection for Lafayette was stronger than their resentment, they sacrificed every feeling to public tranquillity, and actively seconded the efforts and the zeal of the national guards.

In the mean time, the capital was the scene of the greatest agitation. In the court, the 'change, the saloons, in counting-houses, and shops, in short, in all quarters, those very men, who when the moment of danger had passed, most ardently desired and urged Lafayette's dismissal, were now the loudest bawlers in his favor, and again proclaimed the Saviour of the country, and the *Ægis* of the monarchy. The Palais-Royal, the asylum in which all the apprehensions

which were in vogue, took refuge during the storm, was in a trembling ecstasy when in the presence of the unique man, as he was called, whose virtues eclipsed the finest characters of antiquity. When the name of Lafayette was another word for loyalty, patriotism and disinterestedness. I recollect some of the amusing witticisms of the Prince Royal, prompted by the curious spectacle of pale visages, grotesque confusion, and *doctrinaire* agony, which his father's palace presented. 'It is enough to make one die of laughing,' said his Royal Highness.

Such was the state of the public mind, when the king's council communicated to Lafayette, that he was invested with the fullest powers, during the continuance of the trial of the ministers. The police of the Palais-Royal, of the Luxembourg, and of the Chamber of Peers, the command of the troops of the line, concurrently with that of the national guard, were exclusively confided to him. His duty being thus clearly defined, it was impossible for Lafayette to hesitate. He willingly undertook to bear all the responsibility which was heaped upon his septuagenarian head, resolved to protect the regular course of justice, and secure the strict execution of whatever sentence might be passed upon the ministers.

The following is the order of the day which he published with this view, and which I only give as a starting point for the measures which were afterwards to be taken.

' Order of the Day, Dec. 8, 1830.

'The General, Commander-in-Chief of the National Guards, having by the king's orders also assumed the command of the troops of the Line on duty during the trial of the Ministers, directs as follows:

'The Chief of the Staff of the National Guards and General Fabvier will make arrangements for the

execution of the measures ordered by the General-in-Chief, for the removal of the prisoners to the Luxembourg, and the maintenance of public order.

‘The Generals Fabvier and Carbonnel must transmit the General-in-Chief’s orders to the troops, whether belonging to the National Guards or to the Line, and likewise to Lieut.-Colonel Lavoent, second in command.

‘In the absence of the Chief of the General Staff, Aides-de-Camp G. W. Lafayette and Joubert will discharge the duties of under officers of the Staff; and one of them will remain at the General Staff, with the General-in-Chief, for the purpose of signing the orders.

‘From the 14th of the present month, until fresh orders, the Assistant-Major-Generals, Colonels, the superior Staff-officers, and officers of the legions, and all the citizens composing the National Guard of Paris, and its precincts, must not, under any pretext, put off their uniform.

‘The National Guards, forming part of the battalion of reserve in each legion, may attend to their private business, on leaving at their respective dwellings precise directions where they may be found, in the event of their assistance being required.

‘Those composing the guard at the Luxembourg must not quit their posts without the written permission of the superior officer.

‘From the period mentioned above, a chief of battalion will be upon duty at the principal town of each arrondissement, and will see to the execution of the orders given by the General Staff, or by Generals Fabvier and Carbonnel.

‘Particular instructions will be sent daily to the chief of each legion, or to the superior officer.

‘LAFAYETTE.’

From the period of the arrest of the ministers

(which was perfectly fortuitous, and not certainly in conformity with the wishes of Louis-Philippe, who anxiously desired their escape), Lafayette had done every thing in his power to save these great criminals from the fate which threatened them, and which seemed almost inevitable. He wished them to be the object of a severe example of national justice; but he was anxious that the people of the barricades, who had shown so much generosity to Charles X, should not prove vindictive or implacable towards the executors of the counter-revolutionary projects of that despot; and he did not think himself the less bound to act upon these sentiments, from the knowledge that he, in whom now consisted their only safeguard, had been a short time ago ordered to be arrested and shot by these very men. Besides, Lafayette idolized the revolution of July; and the very idea of a return to the system of the scaffolds, would, in his mind, despoil it of all its romantic purity, and, as I have already said, of its beau ideal.

With this view (which he publicly avowed, notwithstanding the popular ill will which he knew it would necessarily create against him), Lafayette, who had, moreover, at all times manifested a dislike to the infliction of capital punishment, especially for political offences, supported, on the 17th August, M. de Tracy's proposition for the immediate abolition of that species of punishment. Lafayette did not conceal that the approaching important trial was with him an additional motive for asking the Chamber to adopt the proposition of his honorable friend; for he did not fail to observe that it was a point of great importance in his consideration that, after the termination of the conflict, the list of victims should be closed. When he was told by some of his friends, that the anxiety which he manifested for the criminal ministers, at a time when the relations and friends of six thousand victims were calling loudly for justice on the heads of those

who had caused so much blood to flow, he replied, that 'popularity, though the most precious of treasures, and the only one that is worthy of ambition, must, nevertheless, like all other treasures, be given up by every patriot when he thinks that the public good, the justice of the case, and the national interests, demand the sacrifice.'

The following speech on this subject was spoken by him, three months before the trial of those Ministers who, only twenty-eight days before that period, had pointed him out as a victim to the assassins of Charles X.

'I look upon the question of capital punishment to have for its ground an isolated principle, or rather sentiment, which is independent of those judicial reforms of which I, as well as the honorable gentleman, see the necessity. I shall continue to support it, until I am convinced of the infallibility of the human judgment. This question, gentlemen, is not a new one. At all periods has the abolition of capital punishment been advocated by the most eminent statesmen. It was proposed in the Constituent Assembly by several Deputies, the names of three of whom I will mention: Adrian Duport, one of the most enlightened magistrates; M. de Tracy, the father of my honorable friend, the author of the admirable commentary upon Montesquieu; and lastly, the virtuous Laroche-foucauld, that true type of a great and excellent citizen, so cruelly and so basely murdered at Gisors, after the 10th of August. The Senate of the United States is at present occupied with the consideration of this question, which has been proposed by Edward Livingston, who is now completing the work he began in the legislature of the state of Louisiana.

'How unfortunate it was, gentlemen, that the Constituent Assembly did not adopt the abolition of capital punishment! What irreparable misery might we then have been spared! and what would not they who

concurred in those innumerable and various condemnations which subsequently took place — what would not they shortly after have given, even to the sacrifice of their lives, to recall their own act! I confess, gentlemen, that ever since the period of our political tempests I have felt an invincible horror of the punishment of death. Our present revolution bears a very different character from all preceding revolutions. In it we have beheld a union of patriotism and courage, with the greatest generosity, and we could do nothing more in character with this last revolution than now, at this early period, to illustrate it by the great act of humanity proposed by my honorable friend. I vote for the consideration of the question.'

I cannot here avoid rendering my homage to the sentiments which inspired such language in one, who was justly called the legacy of the Constituent Assembly, and who, forty years ago, had supported the eloquent Duport in proposing the suppression of this human immolation. The inviolability of the life of man has been regarded by the most enlightened philosophers of every age, as the principle upon which society rests; and the time is doubtless not far distant when this conservative principle will be held sacred, and considerations of temporary utility will cease to prevail against eternal justice. As M. de Tracy justly observed, there is nothing truly pregnant with good consequences except what is just and true.

Still it may be disputed whether the most fit period was chosen to submit this grave question to the legislature, since, to proceed in a logical manner, it was necessary in the first place to direct a revision of the entire penal code, which still bears the stamp, in its Draconic severity, of the most intolerable despotism. Was it right, for the purpose of saving a few great criminals, to debate isolatedly a question which, in the general opinion, required much consideration and discussion, and a period of tranquillity for its discussion?

Finally, the punishment of death being the existing law at the time of the trial of the Ministers, and the commission of the enormous crimes of which they were charged against that which is dearest to man — his liberty, was it not to be apprehended that the depriving the criminal code of its severest part might tend to weaken the authority of the national sovereignty, and subject it to the charge of an aristocratic partiality? I confess my own opinion, like that of every conscientious man, is that the punishment of death ought to be abolished; and I confess, too, that after having contributed by my feeble endeavors to save the Ministers of Charles X from the punishment which the vengeance of the people might have inflicted upon them, I feel great pleasure in the recollection that they were not subject to the severe execution of national justice. But, when I reflect on the considerations which appeared to call for a striking example, such, for, instance, as the necessity of associating the cause of the new monarchy with that of the revolution by some decisive act; of terrifying all who might be disposed to follow in the track of a criminal cabinet, and of proving to Europe that an impassable abyss separated the restoration from the new order of things; above all, when I recollected the state of the public mind, and the loud cries raised for the punishment of these great criminals, and when I see that the executioner's axe has fallen upon the neck of the people, after ceasing to be suspended over the heads of their most implacable enemies, I cannot avoid saying that, in this terrible ordeal, Lafayette benevolently staked his immense popularity to satisfy an exalted sentiment of generosity and humanity. M. de Polignac had selected Lafayette for death — Lafayette determined to save the life of M. de Polignac. History will doubtless declare what there was of the man in this conduct; of a virtuous man, undoubtedly; but has not even virtue its own pride?

At this period the whole of Europe had its eyes fixed upon Lafayette. His enemies waited the result with the liveliest expectation, and his friends with the most distressing anxiety; for they both believed that it must necessarily cause the destruction of his popularity, and put a termination in consequence to his political existence. Indeed symptoms of the greatest discontent at the solicitude displayed in favor of the prisoners of Vincennes, appeared even in his own staff. There, as among the people, the national guard, and the youth of the schools, a feeling of indignation was created by the thought that the instigators of the ordinances of July, the promoters of the massacre of 7000 patriots, should enjoy a scandalous impunity, while the graves were as yet scarcely closed over their victims. One loud cry for vengeance proceeded from every quarter, and the truth must be told, that it was only in the expectation of procuring vengeance from the laws that they refrained from obtaining it for themselves.

This exasperation of the public mind, which was well known to Lafayette, and which was exaggerated by his friends and enemies, only served to strengthen him in the determination of opposing the storm, and, at every sacrifice, of enforcing obedience to the law. He consequently employed all the influence of his vast authority for the maintenance of public tranquillity, the preservation of the lives of the accused ministers, and the independence of the high court which was to sit in judgment on his friends.

In 1789, as in 1730, Lafayette in his efforts to maintain public order always acted on the principle of avoiding sudden and violent movements, of preventing rather than repressing, of persuading rather than coercing. His system was constantly to oppose to the torrent of commotion, patience, and the steady power of masses, in preference to those murderous attacks and fierce demonstrations which in general appeared

to him calculated only to sow the dangerous seeds of hatred and revenge amongst the citizens. He said himself, what he most dreaded was to excite the animosity of the workman's jacket against the uniform of the national guard. All powerful as these circumstances were in his eyes, still they never divested him of firmness in the discharge of his duty, however painful it might be.

This prudence, at once politic and paternal, always had its advantage. I have had frequent opportunities of knowing that the zeal of his fellow citizens of all parties, procured him information, and enabled him to adopt measures which anticipated the tardy communications transmitted by the police to his head quarters. This system of firmness and conciliation was at all times his rule of conduct. On referring to the journals of the period one perceives that in the most difficult crisis of our first revolution, it frequently happened that in order to avoid compromising the national guard with the rest of the population, he would rush alone into the midst of a popular commotion, appease the tumult, rescue the victims, and himself deliver the guilty into the hands of justice.*

The Doctrinaires have had the insolence to tax Lafayette with weakness and with capitulating to sedition. This false imputation has not failed to

* A circumstance mentioned by M. de Montlosier in his *Memoirs* (a work nevertheless very partial and inaccurate) attests the generous solicitude which always characterized the conduct of Lafayette even towards his enemies. M. de Montlosier relates that on leaving the constituents assembly, after a very strong sitting, in which the right side had violently attacked Lafayette, he observed some national guards following him, and having inquired the cause from an officer who more particularly appeared to watch his movements, he heard with gratitude that on all such occasions, Lafayette ordered the national guards secretly to protect the members of the right side from any insult on the part of the people, whose irritation they had excited.

produce some effect upon superficial minds, who prefer adopting an idea offered to them to observing and thinking for themselves. If it were necessary I could easily prove that at no time, and least of all during his command in 1830, did Lafayette purchase his popularity by misplaced concession. Let any one compare the troubles which arose out of the first effervescence of the revolution of July with the insurrections provoked by the re-actionary policy of the 13th of March, and state candidly whether they bear any proportion to each other with respect to their intrinsic importance or disastrous consequences. I do not now speak of the deplorable conflict which covered the streets of Paris with blood — those melancholy days will find a place in this work which was not reserved for them.

M. Odillon Barrot has reminded the present ministers, in allusion to the late events at Lyons, that at the commencement of the revolution, when popular agitation was at its height, numerous and formidable bodies having advanced unjust claims, Lafayette and the prefect of the Seine, men of the revolution and the movement, repressed these tumultuous demands with a very different kind of firmness from that which the men of the *juste milieu* have since exhibited. Then also, the workmen of different trades, men who were still covered with the dust of the barricades, loudly demanded an increase of wages, and others called for the destruction of machinery, which, in their ignorance, they considered prejudicial to their interests. Well ! shall we be told that the Commander-in-Chief, or the first magistrate of the department of the Seine, surrendered in this crisis any one of the true principles of justice and political economy.

I recollect, that some time before the trial of the ministers, M. de Montalivet being present, some ardent patriots informed Lafayette, that a numerous assemblage was about to proceed to the triumphal arch

of the Tuileries, for the purpose of tearing down the trophies of the Trocadero. What was the answer of the Commander-in-Chief? That he detested as much as any one could do those impious trophies, but that he did not wish them to be destroyed illegally. He went out to the mob, which retreated at the voice of Lafayette. It is true, that Lafayette had in the interim, strongly urged the minister of the Interior instantly to efface those bas reliefs—the odious monuments of a sacrilegious victory. M. de Montalivet promised that they should be immediately destroyed; but nevertheless, these playthings of the restoration were allowed to stand until, after Lafayette's resignation, the people a second time demanded their removal in the presence of the king, the new Commander-in-Chief of the National Guards, and the commander of the first military division, who were then reviewing four battalions in the court-yard of the Tuileries.

In the same manner were effaced those dear *fleurs de lys*, for the preservation of which so much solicitude was expressed. It required two popular meetings to effect the removal of these emblems from the pediments of the Palais-Royal, and the pannels of the Citizen-King's carriages. Lafayette, to whom Louis Philippe complained bitterly of the demands of the people, said, 'You know, I always wished these memorials of Co-blentz and the restoration to be effaced. I would have done it before, or any day since you have done it.'

The patriots attached much importance to removing to the Pantheon, the remains of Manuel and Foy. Six thousand young men, accompanied by a body of national guards, procured the busts of those great citizens, and in their generous impatience to pay the debt of their country, went in procession towards the temple. M. Odillon Barrot hastened to meet them, and having represented that by their proceedings they were violating the law, he prevailed upon them, without

difficulty, to deposit their two busts in the great hall of the Hotel de Ville, until a bill, which he promised to introduce should be passed, to legalize the removal of the remains to the Pantheon. The government lost no time in ratifying the engagement of the prefect of the Seine, by appointing a committee, composed of Marshal Jourdan, M.M. de Schonen, Jacqueminot, and Casimir Delavigne, with Lafayette as President. This committee drew up a project of law which was approved of, and presented to the Chamber by M. Guizot. But still this was only bargaining with danger, it was a trick, a deception, a baseness on the part of the men of the 7th of August, who, after the lapse of eighteen months, have succeeded in excluding from the sepulchre inscribed, *Aux Grands Hommes la patrie reconnoissante*, the ashes of those men to whom France incontestably owes most gratitude. Every one remembers the petty artifices and miserable intrigues which compelled the honorable M. de Salverte to withdraw his proposition, in order to avoid fresh outrages on the memory of the defenders of our liberties. But it is not equally well known, and it may perhaps appear incredible, even at this period, so fertile in monstrosities, that the only cause of the repugnance evinced in a high quarter to the memory of Manuel, was the anathema pronounced by that great orator on the elder branch of the Bourbons. In certain places, people were shocked at the bare idea of seeing a French Chamber bequeath to immortality, a tribune, who had dared in the face of the world to affirm, that an uncontrollable repugnance separated France from the men of Coblenz and Quiberon. How could the dynasty of the barricades conscientiously pardon this insolent contempt for the Lord's anointed?

It may be well to recall these circumstances to the recollection of those who, for these last eighteen months, have represented men of popular principles as the promoters of trouble and anarchy. Unskilful statesmen, who allege that their own unpopularity is

owing to their talent for governing; who affect not to know what is precisely that popular fibre, that instinctive sympathy between the mass and certain men which enables them the more readily to rule, by persuasion or force, the most violent passions! 'True popularity,' said Lafayette, 'is not to be judged of by a complaisance in doing what will please the multitude, but by the success with which we persuade the people that they ought not to do that which is wrong, and the firmness with which, when necessary, we prevent them from doing wrong without losing any of their affection.'

This is true popularity, and not that which has recently deluged the streets of Lyons, Grenoble, and Paris with blood; which is always armed with the lighted match and the axe; arms the citizens one against the other; spreads on all sides hatred and revenge; fills the land with conspiracies and plots, and divides France into five or six factions, for the purpose of keeping itself suspended amidst their divisions. This popularity belongs neither to Lafayette nor his friends. The moral power of their popularity has enabled them, during eight months of storms and political convulsions, to settle an empire shaken to its very foundations; to defend French society against the greatest dangers which have ever menaced it; to refer to a doubtful and suspected tribunal great criminals who had called down popular vengeance on their heads; and to save, in spite of itself, a monarchy which was hurrying to its ruin. All this, as M. Lafayette observed, has been effected without causing any one to put on mourning. This, however, is the popularity which the doctrinaires' doctrine designate governmental incapacity. But sides are changing, and ministers also: let us have patience.

To return to the trial of the Ministers. From the moment the first troubles occurred in Paris, after the events of July, Lafayette, admirably seconded by the prefects of the Seine and of the police, and more im

mediately by the chief of the general staff, made arrangement by which 15,000 of the national guard could at any moment be assembled under arms at given points, the intermediate spaces being constantly occupied by troops of the line, equally well distributed by the judicious care of General Fabvier.

These precautions for the public safety did not however appear to Lafayette sufficient to stem the torrent which threatened to overwhelm the capital from all parts. In fact, he had not to put down mere partial risings, but an insurrection, which was the more formidable, inasmuch as it was augmented by the discontented of all parties, and even by numbers of excellent citizens, who, strangers to all factions, were animated only by a laudable feeling of indignation against the impunity promised to the Ministers of Charles X. All men, however different their opinions, united in a single call for death and revenge. The Luxembourg, the Palais Royal, the prisons, the public establishments and private property, might be, and were equally menaced. The prudence and activity of the Commander-in-Chief were proportionate to the multitude and the imminence of the dangers he had to oppose. His first care was to agree upon and establish constant communications with the President and the Grand Referendary of the Chamber of Peers, the War Minister, and the Minister of the Interior, the prefects of the departments, and the police, Generals Pajal and Fabvier, and the respective commanders of the legions of the national guards.

After having secured to himself the assistance of all the citizens and soldiery, and combined their movements with those of the troops of the line; having anticipated all accidents, and divided the general command of Paris into four principal sections, entrusted to the inspector-general and the major-generals of the national guards; after having specially provided for the safety of the Palais Royal and the Hotel-de-Ville, Lafayette directed all his solicitude to the Luxem

bourg, against which the tide of popular commotion was about to turn.

Colonel Fisthamel was made Commander-in-Chief of this central point of attack, and the second command was given to Lieut.-Colonel Lavocat. This officer had been a few years before tried and condemned to death by the Cours des Pairs, and Lafayette conceived it would be granting him a noble compensation, to place under his safeguard the judges who had lately sentenced him to capital punishment.

These arrangements being determined upon, the ex-ministers were transferred from the Chateau Vincennes to the prison of the Luxembourg, where the generosity of Lafayette had provided for these great criminals every consolation which could alleviate their misfortune.

The government wished that their removal should take place during the night; Lafayette, on the contrary, insisted that it should take place in open day, and this confidence had the desired effect. The objects of so much hatred and menace traversed at noon, without insult, the most popular quarters of the capital, thronged by an irritated, but silent multitude.

But no one could misunderstand the feelings of the people. The death of the ministers was evidently wished for, as well as expected; and it was certain, that if the people consented not to execute justice themselves, it was because they had a perfect conviction that the Court of Peers, whatever might be its partiality, would never dare to spare the lives of the guilty.

Lafayette perceived the necessity of no longer encouraging this delusion, and of preparing the public for what he well knew would be the issue of the trial.

Then, in spite of the solicitations of men who honestly feared, and of those who heartily desired, the loss of his popularity, he declared in an order of the day, that whatever might be the sentence of the high court, he would cause it to be respected. The fol-

lowing is the document, which, while it embodies the principles of his long political life, attests the abnegation which he always made of himself in the greatest crisis of our two revolutions.

' Order of the Day, Dec. 19, 1830.

' In circumstances which different passions and different interests, at the expense of public peace and legal order, attempt to render critical, the Commander-in-Chief commences by returning thanks to the national guards and the troops of the line, who, by the services they have for some days performed under his orders, have shown, by their zeal, excellent spirit, and union, that the cause of liberty has good defenders against anarchy and contempt of the laws. The marks of confidence and affection which he lately received, on visiting the posts, both from the troops under arms and other citizens, have excited his warm gratitude. These sentiments are reciprocal.

' The Commander-in-Chief, at the commencement of this week, when the glory of the great work, is in danger of being tarnished by disorders and violence, thinks himself bound to lay before his fellow citizens the principles and experience of his whole life.

' He will not address himself to counter-revolutionists, to the partizans of the fallen dynasty, to the old followers of all aristocracies, and all despotisms who not content with the protection granted them by a generous people, and by the rights of true liberty would wish, as in the first revolution, and the risk of being themselves the victims, to bring about a third restoration by disorder, and under a hypocritical mask, to substitute for liberty, licentiousness its mortal enemy, to soil by anarchy and murder our unstained revolution, to encourage our foreign enemies, to disenchant the admiration of the world and thus to frustrate the effects of the example we have set them. The

Commander-in-Chief has never had any thing in common with these men.

‘ Still less does he address himself to those who are accustomed to crime, and eager for pillage, who regret that the rapidity and the purity of our victory did not afford them time to execute their wicked intentions. It is certain that, let them disguise their objects under what pretext they may, they cannot seduce a virtuous, industrious, and intelligent people, who, even in the heat of combat, manifested its horror of such excesses and persons.

‘ But if, even amidst this population itself there should be well intentioned, although misled citizens who imagine they serve justice by committing against her the greatest of offences, that of menacing judges, or of executing, as it is called, justice with their own hands ; who suppose they serve liberty by employing measures which liberty reprobates ; who finally, for partial dissatisfaction would desire to destroy their own work at all risk, I will remind them that at a former period the French people plunged into the horrors of that anarchy and sanguinary tyranny, which gave birth to bankruptcy, famine, and the *maximum* ; and afterwards passed through despotism to an odious restoration imposed by foreigners.

‘ However, the confidence of the Commander-in-Chief in the Parisian population, in the brave and generous conquerors of July, in the energetic youth, of whom he prided himself in being the constant friend, in his dear brothers-in-arms of the national guard, has not been for a moment shaken. They will always find him what he was at nineteen years of age ; what he was in 1789, and is in 1830, he will continue to be during the few years which he has yet to live, *viz.*, the man of liberty and public order, loving popularity more than life, but determined to sacrifice both rather than fail in his duty, or suffer the commission of a crime ; and deeply persuaded that

no object can justify means which public or private morality disavows.

‘ He thought, during the barricades, that the present government, founded on the sovereignty of the people, and having at its head Louis Philippe the First, was the best, which under the circumstances of France and Europe we could adopt. He thinks so still, and defends the government, not only because he has promised to do so, but also because he has not changed his opinion. As to the other combinations of our political existence, as to the secondary measures of administration, it is in the tribune, or anywhere, rather than in an order of the day, that it becomes him to express his opinion. *A popular throne, surrounded by republican institutions*, was the motto adopted at the Hotel-de-Ville, by a patriot of 1789, now become a citizen-king. Both people and king will prove themselves faithful to this contract.

‘ The Commander-in-Chief, quite sure of being supported by his patriot fellow-citizens, and his brothers-in-arms, (of the former of whom, some, and of the latter, he ventures to say, all, are his friends), in his adherence to those principles of liberty and public order, which he will never abandon, even if he stood alone, relies now for their co-operation in the strict and faithful discharge of all their duties.

‘ LAFAYETTE.’

This language roused against the Commander-in-Chief, all those parties whose hopes it thwarted, or whose passions it irritated. These parties did not consider themselves beaten, and their loud outcries for vengeance and death were a prelude to the scenes which accompanied those memorable proceedings in the Chamber of Peers. Paris appeared to be on the eve of one of those inevitable catastrophes, of which it is impossible for human foresight to calculate the results. The Republic, the Empire, the Restoration, the Convention, Napoleon the Second, Henry

the Fifth, anything, save the security of Louis-Philippe's throne, appeared, in the eyes of the people, possible to rise out of this chaos.

Amidst this general panic, the trials commenced. The peers themselves, were terror-stricken, and it was only after long hesitation, and the reiterated assurance given by Lafayette that he would answer for their inviolability with his life, that our conscript fathers witnessed the opening of those proceedings on which their dearest affections were at stake.

Lafayette had formed the garrison of Luxembourg of national guards, and troops of the line, among whom he had endeavored to establish the most perfect harmony. Numerous battalions of the Parisian militia defended the avenues of the palace ; others guarded the Louvre, the Palais-Royal, and the Chamber of Deputies, or were stationed on the various points of the capital, where popular meetings might be formed with most facility. The legions of the banlieu occupied the outer Boulevards, as corps of reserve, and were connected by close posts, with the force specially destined to cover the Louvre. Finally, numerous patrols paraded Paris in every direction, dispersing in their rounds the groupes of people, whose numbers were incessantly augmenting, and whose object was to march to the Luxembourg.

But in spite of all the precautions which prudence and energy dictated, vast crouds had collected in every point of the capital ; violent tumults arose ; the streets and places adjacent to the Luxembourg were soon filled by an insurgent populace, which, and this fact was then the more alarming, was not the populace of the barricades. The danger was imminent ; the close ranks of the battalions which defended the advance-posts were broken ; the people had already attacked the great gate of the palace ; frantic shouts resounded in the interior of the tribunal ; a few more efforts on the part of the insurgents, and the sanctuary of justice would have been sullied by the blood of

the accused, perhaps of their judges ; the revolution would have been dishonored, and Heaven knows what storms might have gathered over France !

Lafayette, who at the commencement of the trials had established his head-quarters at the Luxembourg, did not hesitate, according to custom, to venture forth from the protecting ranks of the national guards, and to mingle with the insurgent mob. He would allow only a few aides-de-camp to accompany him : I was one of the number. In vain we represented to him the imprudence of this course, observing, that the crowd to whose discretion he trusted himself, was not composed of the men of July. It was indeed a disorderly assemblage of the lowest of the Paris populace, and the dregs of political factions, presenting nothing in common with the stern but honest character of the champions of the barricades. It was not, indeed, those honest workmen, whose brawny arms, covered with dust and blackened with gunpowder, had been exerted in defence of their country's liberty, but a set of the most abandoned characters, felons, thieves, and police agents, who are ever at the service of the best payer, and whose shabby appearance and tattered clothes formed a striking contrast with the aristocratic air and fine apparel, *quand même*, of their instigators, among whom were to be seen several clergymen in disguise. Lafayette did not, however, hesitate to go into the midst of this lawless mob, who offered him not the slightest insult, and who at once desisted from their riotous proceedings, at the instance of the very man who had been held out as an object of popular odium : and who, it had been said, had endeavored to save the lives of the enemies and butchers of the poor people.

This bold and venturesome conduct saved the Luxembourg. But the mob, who were not to be so easily diverted from their object, soon commenced a fresh attack. The national guards, however, opposed all

their attempts and cries for the death of the Ministers, with such determined firmness and courage, that the Chamber of Peers were enabled from that moment to proceed with their discussions in perfect security. The mad cries of the mob no longer reached them, and their sentence was pronounced without causing the shedding of a single drop of blood, or the pillage of a single house.

At this period of difficulty Lafayette published the following order of the day :

' Order of the Day, Dec. 21.

' The General-in-Chief cannot find language sufficiently strong to express his admiration and gratitude for the zeal, firmness, and devotion, which his comrades of the national guards and of the Line manifested at a time of so much difficulty as yesterday. He knows very well that his confidence in their patriotism will be justified on every occasion ; but he deeply regrets the fatigue and inconvenience to which they are exposed. Not being able, as he would wish, to save them this trouble, all that he can do is to take a share of it. We all equally feel the necessity of protecting the capital against the efforts of malevolence and anarchy, of maintaining the security of property and person, and of preventing our revolution being sullied by the commission of crime and the compromise of our honor. We are all of us determined, as one man, to execute these sacred duties ; and in the midst of the grief which he feels for the tumults of yesterday, and those which are threatened to-day, the General-in-Chief finds much consolation and satisfaction in the sentiments which he entertains for his dear and brave comrades in the cause of liberty and public order.

' LAFAYETTE.'

As had been anticipated, the tumults of yesterday

were renewed on the 21st of December, but anarchy, in its nature always powerless, was on this occasion, as on the preceding, obliged to submit to the authority of the law.

However, the Palais Royal, which was still threatened by serious danger, thought it right to impart, if possible, new zeal to its defenders. The king accordingly addressed a letter to the General-in-chief, who communicated it to the National Guard in the following order of the day:

' Order of the day, Dec. 22d.

' Every order of the day, at this critical moment, cannot fail to contain a repetition of the General-in-chief's thanks to his dear brothers in arms, because every day gives them a fresh claim to his public and personal gratitude. Their conduct under existing circumstances must have its effect, in promoting the general cause of liberty and public order. It shows the excellence of institutions, founded on an enlarged and complete confidence in French rights and sentiments: it points out our duty which we are resolved to perform; and the revolution of July, which suggests to the General-in-Chief recollections so glorious to his dear comrades, reminds him of the many marks he has received of their affection and confidence, and forms an indissoluble band of union among all of us, who participated in the events of July.

' The General-in-Chief is anxious to particularize all his obligations; but he thinks that he cannot do any thing more satisfactory to the national guard than at once to publish the following letter, which he has just received:—

The King's Letter to Lafayette.

Tuesday Morning, Dec. 22nd.

' It is you, my dear General, whom I select to transmit to our brave and indefatigable national guard,

the expression of my admiration of the zeal and energy which they have displayed in the maintenance of public order, and the prevention of disorder. It is you also, my dear General, to whom my thanks are due, for the promptitude with which you have come forward, and again give, a fresh example of this courage, patriotism, and respect for the laws, which you have so often exhibited in the course of your long and noble career.

‘Express in my name, the delight I feel at witnessing the revival of the beautiful institution of the National Guard, for the origin of which we are chiefly indebted to you, and which, distinguished by vigor and patriotic sentiments, has, since the defeat of the plots, formed for its annihilation, in the glorious days of July, become more beautiful and numerous than ever. It is this great institution, which assures us of the triumph of the sacred cause of liberty, as much by making our national independence respected abroad, as by securing the uninterrupted execution of the laws at home. Let us not forget that there is no liberty without law, and no law where any power whatever succeeds in paralyzing its operation, and rising above it.

‘Such are, my dear general, the sentiments which I beg you will express for me to the national guards. I count on the *continuance of their efforts and yours*, so that nothing may disturb that public tranquillity, of which Paris and France stand so much in need, and which it is so essential to maintain.

‘Receive, at the same time, my dear General, the assurance of the sincere friendship which you know I cherish for you.

‘LOUIS PHILIPPE.’

Almost all the inhabitants of Paris, and that same citizen guard, which had so courageously defended the lives of the ministers against the summary justice of the populace, confidently hoped that the high court would pronounce upon them sentence of death. The

enemies of the new order of things, who were aware of this disposition of the public mind, and wished to profit by a violent reaction, had, some hours before the sentence was passed, circulated a report, that the peers had doomed the prisoners to capital punishment.

This report which was actively spread through every quarter of Paris, was received with general enthusiasm ; even those who had expressed most horror at any attempt against the lives of the prisoners, or the independence of their judges, were satisfied with the terrible verdict which they supposed had been pronounced. But great was their disappointment and indignation, when it was ascertained, that instead of the forfeiture of their lives, perpetual imprisonment, (if there could be any thing perpetual in politics) was the only punishment awarded to the men, who for three long days, had deluged the streets of Paris in blood.

On the sentence being made known great agitation was manifested among the battalions of the national guards, on duty in the court-yard of the Luxembourg ; they insisted on being immediately relieved. These honest citizens had suffered every fatigue and privation, and braved every threat to save the prisoners from being assassinated in their prison, and to secure to them every guarantee of a regular trial, but they never imagined it possible that the authors of so many massacres and calamities could escape that punishment which the law irremissibly assigns to less guilty criminals.

This explosion of dissatisfaction, which was so serious, considering the social position of the men among whom it was manifested, might have spread abroad and occasioned incalculable misfortunes. Lafayette, who was still at the Luxembourg, hastened to his comrades, and delivered to them a feeling and persuasive address. So powerful was the affection which bound the National Guard to its old General, that at

the voice of the latter the rage of these brave citizens was appeased, as if by enchantment.

It was necessary to reconduct to Vincennes the prisoners, whose sentence, severe as it was, produced on the public mind the effect of a bill of impunity. Government had proposed that they should be secretly removed on the night preceding that on which sentence was pronounced. Lafayette was of a different opinion ; he thought that the Ministers ought to be taken back to Vincennes in the same way as they had been brought to Paris, viz. — in open day, and that they should not be removed until after the sentence, whatever it might be. However, as the forms of the Court of Peers did not require that the accused should be present on the delivery of the sentence, it was determined, with the concurrence of Lafayette, that their removal should take place immediately on the close of the trial. Lafayette accordingly arranged with the President that the accused should be conducted back to that portion of the palace which served as their prison, as soon as the legal forms permitted ; and with the Minister of the Interior that they should be conveyed to Vincennes as privately and as speedily as possible. The execution of this important measure was intrusted by Lafayette to General Fabvier, who on this occasion manifested the intelligence and zeal which have always distinguished him in the discharge of his duty.

It was four o'clock in the afternoon. The troops of the line and the national guards who defended the Luxembourg, those who were on duty in the interior of the palace, the crowds who surrounded the building, in short, every one, save the judges and a few privileged confidants, were under the impression that sentence of death had been pronounced on the ministers of Charles X. As I have already observed, this intelligence had been received with almost universal satisfaction. No one dreamed of the virtual acquittal of the prisoners, who themselves, on being conducted

back to their place of confinement, were haunted by the fear of falling victims to the vengeance of the people, even more than by the dread of forfeiting their heads upon the scaffold.

When Lieutenant-General Lavocat announced to them that they were to be conducted back to the castle of Vincennes, the impression produced on their minds evidently was, that their last hour was at hand. Colonel Lavocat, however, assured them that he could answer for their lives, and they then prepared to follow him to the vestibule, where the guard of the prison was waiting for them under arms. Profound anxiety was depicted in the countenance of M. Poulignac; resignation and courage were apparent in the calm and expressive features of M. Peyronnet; M. de Chanteleuse looked like a man struggling to overcome the painful feelings by which he was agitated: he inspired sentiments of regret and pity: M. Guernon de Ranville endeavored to appear indifferent, but he was only resigned. It must be confessed that all of them, at that awful hour, behaved with dignity and courage.

The ceremony of Lieutenant-Colonel Lavocat consigning the prisoners to Colonel Fisthamel, who waited for them at the head of the national guard on duty in the interior of the prison, was a truly dramatic scene. What would be the conduct of that guard at the sight of the great criminals, who they supposed had been condemned to death, and whom they now saw escaping from the sword of justice? If, at the recollection of a father, a brother, a son, or a friend, whose blood had been shed at their hands, a single national guard had greeted their approach by a cry of vengeance, what might not have been feared from the exasperation of thirty or forty thousand furious men, who were only at a hundred paces distance, and who had been for four days past loudly invoking the death of the ministers! But the conduct of the brave citizen guard was that of men of honor. The prisoners

passed through their ranks in silence, and there was not a word, a look, or a gesture, calculated to wound or alarm them.

The prisoners arrived at the carriage destined to convey them. It was surrounded by a detachment of cavalry, under the command of General Fabvier, who had *echeloned* numerous posts along all the road to Vincennes. Seated in a light caleche, at each side of which General Fabvier and the Minister of the Interior rode on horseback, the prisoners were rapidly transported to their destination : and it may be questioned whether the moment when the drawbridge of the old fortress of Vincennes closed upon them, was not one of the happiest of their whole lives. Be this as it may, no attack, no accident, no tumult, interrupted their short, but perilous journey.

I have described what took place at the Luxembourg, when the sentence and removal of the prisoners were made known simultaneously ; what would have happened had these two circumstances been known some moments sooner, I do not pretend to say.

Next day tranquillity prevailed throughout the capital, and Lafayette, impressed with the importance of the service the national guards of Paris had rendered to all France, testified his gratitude to them in the following terms : —

‘ Order of the Day, Dec. 24.

‘ The critical moment, announced as the rendezvous of all plans of disorder, is happily over. The revolution has issued pure from this new trial, and has refuted the falsehoods of its calumniators in all countries. The law remained unviolated, the accused were protected, and their sentence respected. The judges have thanked us through the medium of their president. The approbation of the Chamber of Deputies was proclaimed in the sitting of yesterday ; and acclamations of affection answered the personal ac-

knowledgment of the king. The inhabitants of the capital, whose safety was secured by prudent firmness, are satisfied with us ; and the same feeling pervades the whole of France. Business, like our duty, is resuming its ordinary course ; confidence will be restored, and industry revived. Every thing has been done for public order ; our reward is, to hope that every thing will be done for liberty.

‘ All the legions of the national guard, artillery, infantry, and cavalry, and the legions of the banlieu, have vied with each other in zeal and punctuality, in patience under fatigue and privation, courageous opposition to tumultuous efforts, calmness under provocation, and in the exercise of that moral energy and activity which overcome all dangers.

‘ Already the national guards of Senlis, St Germain-en-Laye, Dreux, St Cloud, Beaumont-sur-Oise, and Crecy, are hastening to join their brethren in arms of the Seine. Other offers of service are momentarily arriving. The pupils of the public schools have also received the just thanks of the Chamber of Deputies.

‘ The General-in-Chief cannot too highly commend the services of the troops of the line of the first military division ; and while he particularly thanks Generals Fabvier and Carbonel for the manner in which they seconded him, he feels pleasure in remarking the fraternal feeling which prevails between the whole National Guards and the troops of the Line, who are united by one general and patriotic sentiment of duty.

‘ The General-in-Chief would wish to publish in detail all the services that have been performed. The post of his old companion in arms, General Dumas, was at the Hotel de Ville. The Adjutant-Majors and Generals on duty have fully justified his confidence, and it has been seen how well the Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels have justified the choice of their fellow-citizens. The wound of Colonel Sussy did not prevent him from remaining with his legion, and

earning the share of honor which that duty has assigned to him.

‘Colonel Fisthamel and Lieut.-Colonel Lavocat have acquired strong claims to the gratitude of the General-in-Chief.

‘The battalion of the fifth legion, which had a most delicate duty to perform at the prison of the Luxembourg, is also entitled to congratulations on its excellent conduct.

‘Here the General-in-Chief must stop ; for, in every instance, he found in all the officers of the different corps, in that of the general staff, of which Colonel Gabriel Delassort had the special command ; finally, in all the national guards and troops of the Line, indefatigable zeal, devoted patriotism, and incontestible claims to the public gratitude and to his, as well as to that confidence, whose reciprocity is the most valuable bond of life.

‘LAFAYETTE.’

Order being every where re-established, the danger over, and all apprehension removed, no obstacle remained to oppose the manœuvres of the enemies of the programme of the Hotel-de-Ville. The diplomatic intrigues, and the suspicions which previous to the trial were directed against one who never deigned to take a step or speak a word in his defence recommenced with the period of tranquillity ; and it will be seen in the following chapter with what indecent ingratitude attempts were immediately made to calumniate and blacken the character of this *saviour*, to whom a few days before, the deepest gratitude was proffered for the security of the crown, and the preservation of respect for order and the law, which can alone give the crown its grace, value, and permanence.

CHAPTER IV.

The Court, the Chamber of Peers and Deputies, the Ministry, and Foreign Ambassadors leagued against Lafayette. — Motives of this combination. — Calumnies circulated in other Countries. — The insincerity of the Ministry of the 3d of November to Lafayette. — Proofs of this Ministry's duplicity. — Exceptions. — Sitting of the 24th December. — Lafayette's Resignation. — Unpublished Letter of Lafayette to the King. — Their explanations on the System of Government. — Lafayette's persistence in his resolution to resign. — Another unpublished Letter of Lafayette to the King.

THE sentence, subjecting the ministers of Charles X to perpetual imprisonment, was pronounced at half past ten o'clock of the 21st day of December. The exasperation of the enemies of the citizen-monarchy was at its height. Fresh disorders broke out on the 22d equally serious as the tumults of the three preceding days; and the attacks of the discontented were now all directed against the Palais-Royal, where the greatest consternation and terror prevailed. But these new efforts of impotent rage were again repressed by the determined firmness of Lafayette, the zeal of the national guard, and the frank and decided co-operation of the youth of the schools.

On the 23d, order was restored, and, as I have just said, nothing remained to oppose the development of the machinations which the dark suspicion of the Court, the intriguing ambition of the doctrinaires, and the hateful interest of foreign diplomatic agents, had prepared against Lafayette.

This combination of the contemptible refuse of every regime against the purest and most devoted

patriotism, had been some time hatching. For a long while the fine gentlemen of the doctrine, in conjunction with certain ambassadors, had taken care to have it published in some English and German newspapers, that Lafayette was greater than the king, and that Louis-Philippe was only an instrument in the hands of the Commander-General of the armed nation, for the establishment of a vast republic, and the implanting of his dear American institutions throughout the whole of Europe. The most insidious caricatures were placed before Louis-Philippe's eyes, representing the Prince with the crown in his hand, and Lafayette saying 'Sire, be covered;' and some deputies affected to style him, in the saloons, and even in the king's cabinet, *the Mayor of the Palace!*

The Court was, on its part, well disposed to listen to these insinuations. Nay, the unconquerable dislike which it entertained for Lafayette needed not their aid for its manifestation. Indeed, notwithstanding the sincere affection which he had felt for the royal family, ever since he became acquainted, as he thought, with their private life, and the simplicity of their domestic habits, which he believed afforded a guarantee for the liberality of the national sentiments;* notwithstanding his respectful

* To one who saw, during the early period of the monarchy of July, the family of the king, sitting in the most simple and domestic manner round a work-table, Lafayette's delusion will appear perfectly natural. The spectacle which the palace offered, then only guarded by the men of July, to whose fidelity the most honorable posts were entrusted; the liberty and respectful familiarity which prevailed in the household caused even Americans to say, that it was an exact picture of the domestic life of the President of the United States. What a difference between this confidence and familiarity and the distrust and foolish pride which have surrounded the monarchy of July with the forms of the restoration. Who, then, would have predicted the resurrection of that swarm of gentlemen of hon-

behaviour and language to the king, in the Tribune and in every other place ; notwithstanding the apparent sincerity of the respect which-Louis Philippe showed him both in public and private, it is evident that a Court which was already dreaming of the return of the royal etiquette, a corrupt court of justemilieu, quasi-restoration and quasi-legitimacy, must necessarily view with impatience and humiliation the influence of a citizen, whose presence unceasingly called to mind the programme of July, and the republican conditions of a monarchy of the barricades.

The repugnance of the Crown was strengthened by that of the old European aristocracies, who for half a century had professed abhorrence of Lafayette, whom they regarded as the most persevering enemy of right divine, of privileges, and of all the abuses for the maintenance of which cabinets were leagued against the emancipation of nations. After their efforts to ruin Lafayette in 1792 ; after raising every obstacle to his release from Olmutz ; after seeing him, in 1815, on the point of heading a renewal of the movement of 1789 ; after witnessing the mortifying spectacle of his triumphant journey through America, and the daily attacks which for fifteen years he directed against them from the Tribune, his enemies became the more implacable in proportion as they were humbled. They now beheld him anew at the helm of a purely popular revolution, acknowledging no thrones but those based on institutions essentially republican ; and during the first days of that revolution giving a haughty impulse to French diplomacy, by obliging it to proclaim the system of non-interference ; a system

or, ladies in waiting, aides-de-camp, household officers, of courtiers, of cup-bearers, of chamberlains, and that crowd of valets which now separate the king from the rest of the people.

which would obviously secure the emancipation of nations, and the destruction of the treaties on which the Holy Alliance rests.

Nothing was more natural than that all the old cabinets should combine to the overthrow of Lafayette, and to neutralize the decisive influence he was ordained to exercise on the new destinies of Europe. Thus diplomacy armed herself with every precedent to prove, to the satisfaction of Louis-Philippe, the impossibility of any connection between a cabinet under the control of such a man and the old governments, of which he had shown himself the irreconcilable enemy for forty-five years. His removal was represented as a concession, at the price of which the friendship of foreign cabinets might be purchased by the new dynasty, and it was signified that if that concession were refused, it would be necessary to prepare for all the consequences of the displeasure of the Holy Alliance.

Fear produced more effect than diplomacy had hoped for, to use the expressions of a certain ambassador. The disgrace of Lafayette was willingly conceded without reflecting that this scandalous sacrifice would turn to the advantage of the enemies of France, without altering the real question: viz., the radical incompatibility existing between absolute governments and revolutionary monarchies.

On the other hand, as soon as the Chamber of Peers, whose influence was all powerful at the new court, felt itself secure, that body beheld in Lafayette only the declared adversary of hereditary rights, to which he had already given a mortal blow, and would never assuredly allow them to recover from it.

In fine, the doctrinarian portion of the elective chamber — the men who supported the double vote — the partisans of the overturned dynasty, all whom fear, or honest conviction, or the love of aristocratic institutions threw into the ranks of the *juste-milieu*,

bitterly remembered that during the revolutionary movement of July, the patriotic solicitude of Lafayette had allowed them no time to declare against the deposition of the ex-royal family (the primary principle of the sovereignty of the people), the arming of the whole nation, electing its sixty thousand officers, the programme of a popular throne, surrounded with republican institutions, and the repeated and formal adoption of the principles of that programme by the Duke of Orleans. All these things were proclaimed and consummated before the Chamber had time or power to oppose them.

Independently of these causes of regret, the immense majority of the Chamber had been deeply mortified at the opinion frequently expressed by Lafayette at the Hotel de Ville, in favor of the convocation of primary assemblies, and of the election of a constituent congress. Besides, the storm being once laid and public order re-established, the existence of so great a power and its pretended rivalry of influence with the royal authority, would have thrown into the shade not only the cloud of ambitious intriguers who besieged the new throne, but even many of the well-intentioned members of both Chambers. Thus, that patriotic susceptibility, considered alone and disengaged from the suspicions and bad feelings which accompanied it, appeared so much the more natural to Lafayette, inasmuch as he had himself in some measure provoked its manifestation, by declaring publicly that the post which the actual state of circumstances made it incumbent on him to accept, seemed to him in 1830 as it had done in 1790, a bad institution, and one which ought to last as short a time as possible.

As to the ministry of the 3rd November it did not conceal its displeasure at the power with which Lafayette was invested; and though it heaped eulogies on the patriotism and loyalty of the *great citizen* and *illustrious general*, yet it is matter of record that that

ministry never was at its ease until rescued from the control of Lafayette, which, added to the influence he exercised over the men of July, oppressed the cabinet like the weight of the night-mare. This strange fact may perhaps appear somewhat improbable, considering the circumstance of the unanimity of principles which now exists between Lafayette and many of the members of the administration of the 3rd November, but it is nevertheless a fact, the truth of which history will attest.

Thus, then, the crown, the two chambers, foreign diplomacy, the aristocracy, the king's council, and, generally, intriguers of all parties, parasites of every system, conspired together for the removal of Lafayette from public affairs, for the object, as they themselves avowed, of outlawing the revolution. None, however, could venture to take lead in this delicate question. It was rather judged prudent to adorn the victim with a new civic crown, for on the eve of the sacrifice, that is to say, in the sitting of the 23d December, M. Dupin, the elder, moved that the thanks of the Chamber should be voted to the national guard, and to its illustrious chief.

Those who opposed the continuance of Lafayette in the post of commander-in-chief, had long resolved to avail themselves, as the first step towards his removal, of the presentation of the law for the final organization of the national guards. But the discussion of the project having commenced in the committee, prior to the trial of the ministers, care was taken not to allow a design to transpire in public, which might have produced fearful disasters. It was accordingly decided, in the first committee appointed by the government, and at which the Duke de Choiseul presided, that Lafayette should continue commander-in-chief of the national guards, but that he should be the last appointed to that post. This article was afterwards read in the presence of the general, at a meeting of the com-

mittee, and several of the ministers and generals, specially convoked at the house of M. Guizot, then Minister of the Interior.

However, when the project thus worked up by the commission, was carried to the king's council, a pretence was made of discussing it seriously, and even of opposing it. Three members of the king's cabinet objected to it, because the interdiction of the power of appointing a new commander-in-chief, after the death of Lafayette, was an interference with the exercise of the royal prerogative. But in spite of this pretence, it was determined at an after meeting, composed of two ministers, the Commander-in-Chief and the Inspector-General, deputed by the king's council to arrange the respective functions of the General and of the Ministers of War and the Interior, in all that concerned the national guards, that M. de Montalivet should attend the committee of the Chamber of Deputies, and declare that the king's government considered the continuance of Lafayette as Commander-in-Chief of the national army as a measure of absolute necessity. Lafayette, who attached no importance to these personal considerations, and who, besides, had expressly reserved to himself the power of resigning, as soon as he could do so without danger to the revolution, concurred in an arrangement which seemed favorable to the principles of July, already menaced on all sides.

But this was only a base manœuvre. The arrangement agreed on between the ministers and Lafayette was not carried into effect, and the president of the council, in proposing to the Chamber the absolute suppression of the generalship, adhered, in the name of the government, to a measure to oppose which, a pledge had been given when it was suggested in the committee. I shall merely observe, that the ministry of the 3d of November, consented to the dismissal of Lafayette; for if the proposition which it then made,

of conferring on that distinguished patriot the nominal title of *honorary commandant* had been reflected on, it must have been considered an absolute insult.*

In this sitting of the 24th of December, the government and the Chamber presented to the world, an example of the blackest ingratitude towards the man, who some hours earlier, had compromised fifty years of popularity, to save both the one and the other. A more scandalous scene was never performed in the national tribune. The 50th article of the government project says:—

‘In those communes or *cantons* where the national guards may form several legions, the king shall have power to appoint a superior commandant, but he cannot appoint him superior commandant of the national guards of a *whole department*, or even of an *arondissement of a sub-prefecture*.’

‘This formula, virtually implied the dismissal of Lafayette. In vain were five amendments proposed to extenuate the atrocity of such conduct. These amendments, which were proposed by M.M. de Vaucelles, Jules de Larochefoucauld, Eusébe Salverte and Pelet de la Lozère, and which had for their object the exceptional continuance of Lafayette as Commander-in-Chief of the National Guards, were

* This pitiable farce was enacted in the Chamber of Deputies on the 24th of December. Some days previously, the honest Dupont de l’Eure, had resolved to give in his resignation, on account of the crooked conduct of the council. Lafayette, influenced by the expectation that his honorable friend might still do some good to the cause, prevailed on him to delay that step. Odillon Barrot was of the same opinion as Dupont de l’Eure, both as regarded the minister of justice and himself personally, and both determined to give in their resignations, if the power created by the revolution of July persisted in its retrograde career. This explanation is necessary to absolve these two patriots from all participation in the malevolence or the weakness by which Lafayette was assailed at this memorable conjuncture.

successively rejected, after being opposed by M. Charles Dupin, who closed a very long speech in these remarkable words: — ‘General Lafayette cannot remain all his life the living law, at least, unless the political law be defunct.’ These few words were the expression of the feelings of the court.

The ministry, which it is to be hoped, felt itself disgraced by the part it had played on this occasion, sought to palliate its misconduct by proposing that the *honorary* command of the national guards should be conferred by a new ordinance on the creator of the civic militia.* The Chamber, however, pronounced the final and total abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief, or in other words, the dismissal of Lafayette.

This deliberation took place on the evening of the 24th of December, in the absence of the General-in-Chief, whom the precarious state of the public tranquillity detained at his head-quarters. I know not whether this involuntary absence entered into the calculations of his adversaries, but it is certain, that the press, and honest men of all parties were of opinion,

* I have already observed, that it is only the absence of all reflection that can exempt this proposition from the charge of being an insult to Lafayette. What value could be attached to the immense services which Lafayette had just performed, if it was supposed a vain title, conferred by ordinance, was the recompense they merited? I appreciate the value which this ordinance must have had in the eyes of Lafayette; it is necessary to compare it with the ordinance of the 23d of August, by which he was made Commander-in-Chief. This latter ordinance says; ‘(Lafayette) is entrusted with the direction of every thing relative to the distribution of the national guards, conformably with the territorial division, the discipline, the instruction, the arming and equipment of the national guards, the execution and transmission of the orders which will be given him.’ The 3d article declared, that ‘The commandant-general shall transmit to the minister of the interior the instructions which he may have given: and the minister of the interior shall on his part, inform the commandant of the measures he may have taken,’ &c.

that the hurry of the Chamber to decide this great question, without the participation of the individual most interested, was a want of decorum and respect, which excited the highest degree of public indignation.

On the following day, Lafayette wrote to Louis-Philippe the subjoined letter, which a feeling of delicacy towards the king, whose ministers had just conspired to bring about his dismissal, prevented him at the time from making public : *

‘ SIRE :

‘ The resolution yesterday adopted by the Chamber of Deputies, with the concurrence of the ministers of the king, for the suppression of the command in chief of the national guards, occurring in coincidence with the law about to be voted, sufficiently expresses the sentiments of two of the branches of the legislative power, and above all, that of which I have the honor to be a member. I should conceive myself wanting in respect to the king, if I awaited any other formality before tendering, as I now do, my resignation of the powers which his ordinance had conferred upon me. Your majesty knows, and the correspondence of the staff will prove, if necessary, that the exercise of those powers has not, up to the present time, been of so illusory a description as stated in the tribune. The patriotic solicitude of the king will enable him to see the importance of removing, by ordinances which the law leaves at his disposal, the alarm which has been produced by the division of the rural battalions, and the dread of seeing that very useful corps, the civic artillery, reduced to serve in the garrison of fortresses or sea-ports.

* The author of this work being, at the period here alluded to, the editor of a political journal, abstained, at the solicitation of General Lafayette, from publishing the correspondence, which the nature of his employment at the head-quarters, caused to pass through his hands.

‘ The president of the council has kindly proposed to confer on me the title of honorary commandant. He himself will feel, and your majesty will also be of opinion, that such nominal decorations are neither suitable to the institutions of a free nation, nor to me.

‘ In restoring, with respect and gratitude, to the hands of the king the only ordinance which gives me authority over the national guards, I have adopted precautions for preventing any derangement of the duty. General Dumas will receive the orders of the minister of the interior ; General Carbonel will superintend the duties of the capital, until such time as your majesty shall be pleased to supersede him in any way you please.

‘ I pray your majesty to accept the very cordial homage of my attachment and respect.

(Signed) ‘ LAFAYETTE.’

Will it be believed ? On the 25th, at mid-day, Louis-Philippe knew nothing of the discussions of the previous evening in the Chamber of Deputies, on a question which, for two months, had fixed the attention of the court and of the capital. Be this as it may, the following was the king’s reply : —

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL :

‘ I have this moment received your letter, and am as much grieved as surprised at the resolution you have taken. I have not yet had time to *read the journals*. The council of ministers assembles at one o’clock : after that, I shall be at leisure — that is to say, between four and five. I hope to see you there, and to prevail on you to retract your determination.

‘ Accept, my dear General, &c.

‘ LOUIS-PHILIPPE.’

Lafayette accepted the king’s invitation, and was received with the most cordial testimonies of affection.

Louis-Philippe seemed inconsolable for what had passed in the Chamber of Deputies, and especially at the part which his ministers had acted 'maladroitly,' as he said, and 'without any ill intention. 'But,' added the king, 'the unfortunate article has not yet become law, and I know well——' — 'Sire,' interrupted Lafayette, 'the distrust of my colleagues, and my dismissal, which they have pronounced as much as it was in their power to do, make it a point of delicacy with me no longer to retain an authority which is offensive to them, and the principle of which, notwithstanding its transient utility, has been at all times condemned by myself. Besides, being bent on promoting to the utmost of my power the abolition of the hereditary peerage, it would not be consistent in me to await, from the Chamber of Peers, a confirmation, which would place that assembly in a state of hostility to me; or a favorable amendment, which would place me under a sort of obligation to the Chamber. Indeed,' added he, 'I can assure your majesty that I regard all this not only as a duty to be performed, but also as an opportunity——' — 'Explain yourself,' said the king. — 'Sire,' resumed Lafayette, 'your system of government is not what I approve, I feel that the public confidence has given me a mission: I will not tell you where it is written; it is, perhaps, in public opinion — perhaps in the air. But, in truth, the French people, and many patriots of all nations, persuade themselves that where I am, there liberty will suffer no injury. I find, however, that liberty is menaced — compromised; and I do not wish to deceive any one. The policy of your government, both with respect to its internal and external relations, is not such as I think salutary for the interests of liberty; and I should not be acting with sincerity, if I longer remained like an opaque body between the people and the government. When I retire from my post, every one will better see on what he has to depend.'

The question being placed on this footing, the king next endeavored to overcome what he termed Lafayette's prejudices. But neither the assurances of boundless friendship, nor the reiterated offer of retracting the unfortunate article, could deceive the general as to the true state of things. He closed this conversation in the following words : — ' Sire, you offer me personally many concessions, but none for the advantage of the public interest. It is the public interest, and not mine, that is the subject of consideration.'

The king requested twenty-four hours to deliberate upon the questions which had been agitated between himself and the Commander-in-Chief of the national guards. Lafayette consented to this delay, in the hope that it might lead to more mature reflection, and better views. But this hope was vain ! In the interval, the President of the Council, the Minister of the Interior, and some of the principal officers of the national guards, came to him to renew the assurances of the king's friendship, and the offers of reparation which he had received at the Palais-Royal ; but not one word was said about the guarantees he had demanded for the acknowledged principles of the revolution of July. Lafayette answered them as he had answered the king. ' For liberty every thing, for myself nothing.'

At this juncture of affairs, the prime minister having requested a mutual friend to sound Lafayette's disposition, with respect to the formation of a new cabinet, the general replied, that if the patriots he might name, or any other persons of the same opinions, should be elevated to power by the removal of the men whose conduct he thought contrary to the principles and engagements of July, he should consider such a change as the precursor of better prospects. He even wrote to this effect to M. Lafitte, who laid his letter before the Council ; a circumstance which gave great offence to many of its members.

Lafayette's demands did not extend far. To set aside all personal consideration ; to consent to every insignificant reparation, such as adjourning the execution of the article of the law which concerned him ; and finally, to yield to all that was required, in the hope of obtaining, at this difficult conjuncture, a better system of government. Such, in spite of all that has been said, were the *extravagant views* of the man who consented to place the crown on the new king's head. But while he was loaded with compliments and protestations of regard, he found there was to be no retrogression from the disastrous system of the quasi-restoration, and it became the duty of Lafayette to give the enemies of his influence the satisfaction they deserved, by throwing up a command of which the chamber and the government had deprived him five times in one sitting, and to cease to be a cloak for anti-French measures, which his continuance at the head of the national guards might serve to screen from the observance of true patriots. Accordingly, when the required four and twenty hours had elapsed, without any symptom of a change of system, Lafayette wrote to the king the following letter.

' Sunday, 26 Dec. 1830.

' SIRE,

' Your Majesty yesterday told me, that the subject of our conversation should be brought to a result this day. I have seen M.M. Lafitte and Montalivet, who have informed me of the amendment which the President of the Council intends proposing. But, Sire, you are well aware that that does not remove the objections I took the liberty of submitting to you. I have told M. De Montalivet, that I consider my resignation as having been given in ; and I presume he will issue his orders accordingly. However, I think it my duty to repeat this to the King, because General Carbonel and my son, as well as Adjutant-Major-

General Tracy, having followed my example, it will be necessary that orders be issued for to-morrow's duty. Trust me, Sire, the duty I feel called on to fulfil is more painful to me than I can express ; and now, more than ever, do I feel the necessity of joining to the homage of my respect, that of my profound and unalterable attachment to you.

‘ LAFAYETTE.’

CHAPTER V.

Lafayette did not refuse the command of the National Guard of Paris. — Falsehoods of the Court and the Government on that subject. — Lafayette's explanations to the Chamber of Deputies. — The King's proclamation. — The Palais Royal insinuates that Lafayette had advised a *coup-d'état*, and the Dictatorship. — Lafayette's explanation with the King on this subject. — To what Lafayette's desires were limited. — His farewell to the National Guard. — Character of Lafayette.

It was found necessary to anticipate the unfavorable impression which the retirement of Lafayette must necessarily produce upon the public mind. Accordingly, the court, the ministry, and the Anti-Fayettists of both chambers, agreed to circulate two falsehoods : — 1st. That Lafayette's demands were such, that the King had no other course to pursue, but either to reject them, or to retire himself : — 2d. That Lafayette had obstinately refused the command of the national guard of Paris, which he had been urgently solicited to accept.

This system of accusation was the more perfidious, because, on the one hand, it obtained for Louis-Philippe the interest which a generous nation never withholds from oppressed weakness ; whilst, on the other hand, it tended to alienate from Lafayette the affection of his comrades, of the national guard of Paris ; that is to say, to wound him on the tenderest point.

Fear and bad faith resorted to every expedient, in order to give to this fable the weight of the most incontestible truth. The truly theatrical grief, and the hypocritical tears excited by what was called the lament-

able obstinacy of Lafayette, are not the least characteristic traits of the men who now govern us.

‘Sire,’ (said M. de Montalivet, in his report presented to the King on the 26th of December,) ‘General Lafayette has offered to your Majesty his resignation of the office of Commander-in-Chief of the national guards of the kingdom. The strongest remonstrances have been repeatedly made to the illustrious general, to induce him to abandon an intention which deeply afflicts the heart of your Majesty, and which deprives France of the important services which he may yet render her. The resolution of Lafayette being irrevocable, we must renounce the hope of seeing him retain a post where he will leave behind him imperishable recollections.’

This pathetic report naturally had for its moral the proposing of Count de Lobau as successor to Lafayette.

Immediately afterwards came the following proclamation, which was profusely circulated and posted on all the guard-houses of the capital :—

‘PROCLAMATION OF THE KING.

‘December 26th.

‘*Brave National Guards ! my dear fellow countrymen !*

‘You will share my regret when you learn that General Lafayette has considered it his duty to tender his resignation. I flattered myself that I should see him longer at your head, animating your zeal by his example, and by the recollection of the great services which he has rendered to the cause of liberty. His retirement is the more sensibly felt by me, inasmuch as only a few days have elapsed since the worthy General took a glorious part in the maintenance of public order, which you have so nobly and efficaciously protected during the late agitations. I have, however,

the consolation of thinking, that I have neglected nothing to prevent what will be a subject of deep regret to the national guard, and a cause of real pain to myself.

‘LOUIS PHILIPPE.’

The reader must now see the terms in which the President of the Council expressed himself in the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of the 28th of December; that is to say, thirty-six hours after having voted for the dismissal of Lafayette :—

‘The illustrious chief of the national guards, who for a long time has intended to renew the course he had pursued forty years ago, has resigned his functions in spite of our entreaties. It has been his wish to imitate, as far as lay in his power, the noble example of Washington. He has only done, a little too soon, that which he said he wished to do sooner or later. One of our colleagues,* distinguished for his virtues, also entertained the intention of resigning his share of power; but he would not do so on the eve of danger: he did it the day after.’

The king having assembled at the Palais Royal the colonels of all the legions of the national guard of Paris, expressed the strongest regret at the resignation of Lafayette, still, however, complaining of the extravagant propositions which he had made. But what will appear more astonishing is that the king, having undoubtedly confounded the opposite counsels which were simultaneously offered him, added in a tone of displeasure, that monstrous propositions had been urged upon him, such as dismissing the Chambers and assuming the dictatorship. It must be supposed that by mere accident the propositions of Lafayette were identified with a wish for a *coupe-d’etat* and a dictatorship; for when the general complained to the king of the absurd reports circulated respecting him, Louis

* M. Dupont de l’Eure.

Philippe said, 'I should like to see the man who will dare assert that these propositions are to be attributed to you.' 'Indeed,' replied Lafayette, 'it is amusing enough that they should accuse me of wishing to invest you with the dictatorship, when any constitutional monarch who should entertain such an idea, would find me foremost in the ranks of his enemies.'

Be this as it may, these intentional manœuvres on the one hand and *misunderstandings* on the other, served as a text for the false accusations which active and artful intrigues propagated in the capital and the departments, the guard houses and the saloons, and by means of which many persons obtained credit at court for disinterested loyalty.

Yet what was there of truth, or even of probability in these imputations? Nothing, assuredly, and the most ordinary share of common sense was sufficient to convince any one of the absurdity of the data on which this wretched farce was founded.

As to the imperious demands of Lafayette, the king had reason to complain of them, if he considered as an intolerable condition, a prompt return to the principles of the revolution of July, to which he owed his crown, and from which he and his ministers were so evidently departing. Has time proved that these fears were ill-founded?

Finally, with regard to the refusal of the command of the national guard of Paris, one circumstance alone is true, namely, that before accepting that command, Count de Labau asked Lafayette whether he persisted in his *resignation*. Hitherto, Lafayette had commanded the national guard of Paris only by virtue of powers which invested him with the general command of all the national guards of the kingdom. Consequently when the general command was abolished, he could not be induced to retain the command of the capital by virtue of a mandate which the decision of the legislature and the concurrence of government had

virtually destroyed. A new ordinance was necessary; but it was never brought forward or offered.

But why should I refer to legal forms for the purpose of proving that government never entertained the design of confiding the command of the capital to Lafayette. Is not this proof to be found in the very nature of things? In fact the umbrage taken and the jealousy felt by the court, the chambers, ministers, and foreign diplomatists, being the obvious and sole motives for the removal of Lafayette, did not these motives apply particularly to the exercise of the power and influence that would accrue to him from the command of a hundred thousand armed citizens of Paris and its precincts? And if on his part Lafayette had entertained scruples of deceiving France by appearing identified with the policy of the Palais Royal, did it not become him to be equally apprehensive of deceiving the country by exercising the great and imposing command of the capital? Thus then it was evidently neither consistent with the policy of the Palais Royal nor of Lafayette that this command could neither be made nor refused: and neither offer nor refusal ever took place.

In resorting to this system of slander and calumny, the court did not know Lafayette well enough to venture to rely upon the generosity which would make him feel it a patriotic duty to prevent the bad effect his resignation was likely to produce in Paris, and in all parts of France, whence he received very strong expressions of regret, affection, and confidence. Far, however, from wishing to make a triumph of his retirement, he did every thing in his power to weaken the explosion of discontent which it was calculated to produce amongst his numerous friends, and to prevent the resignations which began to be offered from all quarters. He therefore lost no time in publishing the following order of the day:

' Order of the Day of the 27th Dec., 1830.

' On quitting the command of the national guards of the kingdom, General Lafayette proposes to offer them his thanks and to take his farewell, but he feels it necessary at the present moment on this occasion to give utterance to the sentiment which pervades his whole heart towards his brothers in arms of Paris. His confidence in their attachment and regret is unlimited. It will be by redoubling, if possible, their punctuality and activity in service that they will ensure a continuance of it. He will know how to appreciate this new proof of affection, and of their indissoluble union with him in common devotion to liberty and public order. The patriotic foresight of the king has made every necessary arrangement. It is with all his soul and not without sorrowful emotions that their old and grateful friend addressed these few words to them.

' LAFAYETTE.'

Lafayette then presented himself to the king, no longer as commander of the 1,700,000 national guards, but as an affectionate citizen, full of respect for the person and family of the new monarch.

The court and capital awaited, with the greatest curiosity, the parliamentary explanation which Lafayette would give in the tribune, and, as is well known, his arrival in the Chamber, on the sitting of the 27th of December, created a great sensation.

' Gentlemen,' said he, **' it is customary, in a neighboring country, for citizens, when they quit high offices, to explain to the Chamber, the relation in which they stand with their late colleagues. Permit me, upon the present occasion, to avail myself of this privilege.**

' I have always thought that the office of Commander-in-Chief of the national guards of the kingdom, was not compatible, on general principles,

with the institution of a constitutional monarchy. Therefore, when 3,000,000 of my fellow-citizens, in 1790, proposed to confer this command upon me, by the acclamations of their 14,000 deputies, in the field of the federation, I hastened to prevent the possibility of it, by obtaining, from the constituent assembly, a prohibited decree. It was not the same when at the Hotel de Ville the Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and afterwards the king, proposed to me to retain the command. I felt it my duty to do so, with the intention of resigning it, sooner in peace, later in case of war, when I should no longer see any necessity for its continuance.

‘The opinion of the Chamber has anticipated this period, and from respect to it, I have not waited until the law was submitted to other powers. This is simply a question of date; but I should be deeply afflicted if it should be supposed, which no person who knows me; or, who has read the history of the last fifty-four years, can believe, that my conduct has been influenced by the least feeling of personality. I will go further; this opinion of the Chamber has afforded me an opportunity of tendering my resignation. The great power with which I was invested, was looked upon, as you, gentlemen, are aware, with jealousy. This was particularly experienced in the diplomatic circles. My power is now broken, I have no longer the honour of being your colleague.

‘One word more, gentlemen; I would not have tendered my resignation, which has been received by the king, with all the expressions of his wonted kindness for me, before the crisis which we have just passed through. *My conscience of public order* is now perfectly satisfied. I acknowledge that it is not the same with *my conscience of liberty*. We all know the motto of the Hotel de Ville, — *a popular throne, surrounded by republican institutions*. This motto has been accepted, but we do not all under-

stand it in the same sense. It has not always been understood by the councils of the king, as it has been by me, who am more impatient than others to realise it; and whatever may have been my personal independence in all situations, I feel, in my present situation, more at liberty to discuss my opinions with you.

‘However, there are some points on which we shall be always united against internal and foreign enemies. I think, that in the course we have taken since the revolution of July, we have acted, not only for the best, but in the only way in which we could have done: I think so more than ever since I have known the monarch who has been placed by us on the throne. In quitting my uniform, I do not quit our device, *liberty and public order*. We have many legal means of expressing our opinions, and making known our demands. We have for ourselves the tribune; our fellow-citizens have the press, which has performed so many services, and the peaceable course of petitioning. This, gentlemen, is what I felt it necessary to say to my colleagues, whose esteem and friendship I hope I still retain.’

Thanks to the measures which Lafayette adopted in order that his retirement should be attended with the least possible inconvenience, all would have been tranquil, even if, as he said one day to the king, he had not in the execution of this good work met with auxiliaries on whom he had not calculated.

Etiquette required that Lafayette should take leave of the national guards of the kingdom, and particularly of those of Paris. He did so in the two following letters.

General Lafayette to the Parisian National Guard.

Paris, January 1st, 1831.

‘My dear Brothers in Arms,

‘When at the sad moment of my retirement I hastened to warn you, not against unexpected accusations, which I consigned to your good sense and kindness, but rather against any imprudent manifestation of your friendship to me, I addressed to you a farewell letter, which I annex to this. You will find in that, as well as in my speech to the Chambers, the explanation of my conduct, and the expression of my sentiments. I, however, feel a desire to address myself especially to you, whose fathers were my friends and companions in 1789; to you, who during the last five months have so amply satisfied my patriotism, my pride, and my affection.

‘In resigning the general command to the king, whose ordinance was my only title to it, I have yielded not only to the wish of the sitting of the 24th of December, but to manifestations of umbrage of various sorts, and to patriotic scruples not less applicable, in my personal situation, to the important command of the Paris National Guard, if it had been drawn out for me, than to the functions with which I have been invested.

‘It would have been pleasing to me, my dear comrades, to present you myself the paternal congratulations on your conduct during the late crisis which flow from all parts; this will be transmitted to the excellent general who so well justifies the honorable choice of the king.

‘May our motto of July be more and more acted upon! Such is the wish of France; for it is as false to say in Paris that the departments look coldly upon the cause of liberty, as it is in the departments that Paris is regardless of public order. The reality of things will not require a passport in any name.

‘Receive all of you, my dear comrades, chiefs, officers, sub-officers, national guards, the respect, the sympathy, and the wishes of an affectionate, grateful, and devoted heart, which continues identified with you, and can be separated from you by death alone.

‘LAFAYETTE.’

General Lafayette to the National Guards of the Kingdom.

‘A short time since, my dear brothers in arms, I was invested with an important command; now I am only your old friend, and the veteran of the national guard. This two-fold title will, until I descend into the tomb, constitute my happiness and glory. The title which I now no longer retain, invested me, during the great work, with the unlimited confidence of the people, and placed me in the centre of those glorious barricades, where was unfurled the tricolor flag, twice the signal of victory — when were decided in three days the present destinies of France, and the future destinies of Europe. The functions which I had refused in 1793, I accepted in 1830, from the hands of a prince who had appointed our King. They have been fully exercised. 1,700,000 national guards were raised and organized at the call of the people. They are evidence of the confidence which they might have placed in me during a time when I was told to be cautious and of which I have been the seal. The majority of the people of France thought that these functions ought to be exercised at the present moment. I have received the confidence of the people at the same sitting. Before me, I have a right to say recollect that I have been taken in different quarters.

decided manner, and could not be satisfied except by a total and unreserved abandonment of power on my part; and even when the royal intervention, in its solicitude, afterwards adopted measures for prolonging my services, an instinct of liberty which has never deceived me throughout my whole life, revealed to me that it was necessary to sacrifice that favor, these enjoyments and affections, to the austere duty of promoting all the consequences of the glorious revolution of 1830.

‘My course has not been unprofitable: an immense correspondence confirms this statement.—In fact, if the sublime movement of altered France was spontaneous; if to guarantee us for ever against the future schemes of narrow, malevolent, or timid policy, it was sufficient to place ourselves freely and in open day under the safeguard of the principles of 1789 and 1791, and particularly under the vital and universal principle of election, it is not less true that a central influence and if I may venture to say so, the confidence created by certain passages in my past life, usefully contributed to regulate the various organizations and wishes, and to surmount the obstacles raised by the mischievous intrigues of a fallen party. I am pleased to acknowledge my obligations in this respect to the general inspection which has so well seconded my efforts.

‘I will not enumerate all that has been done by us to organize these admirable legions of towns, those numerous battalions of cantons, the unfortunate parceling out of which you have recently beheld me oppose in vain;—to concur in their instruction, their arming, and their equipment, as far as means would allow;—to demand from the first moment new and efficient means of acquiring, fabricating, and repairing those arms which are the patriotic want and the noble cry of the national guards;—to assist in the formation of citizen cavalry, and of that artillery which already serves upwards of fifty batteries, and expects numer-

ous additions promised by the department of war (a civic and fruitful innovation, the great importance of which has not been sufficiently appreciated in our legislative discussions;—finally, to prepare all that five new months may develope. Thus must be completed that immense organization, protective of liberty and public order, from whence will arise so many hundred thousand combatants and the independence of France.

‘ Ah! far from fearing this vast institution formed without hesitation, without disorder, by an extensive and sympathetic confidence among the national classes, let us rather hasten to adopt it as the model of our other institutions.

‘ How can I express the gratifying emotions of my heart, when at the expiration of some weeks, I was enabled to offer to public admiration, to the King, to foreigners, to adversaries as well as to friends, the Parisian national guard of which I was so proud,—which for more than forty years has been as it were my own family—now rising up more brilliant, more numerous than ever; and speedily presenting with the fine legions of the precincts nearly 80,000 men on the Champ-de-Mars. Emotions I then experienced can never be surpassed, except by the happiness of having been recently indebted to the national guard for the safety of the capital, and the purity of our revolutions. If a single department, Seine-et-Oise, has afforded me so much pleasure, what gratification have I not experienced on receiving reports of the formation, the discipline, the instruction and the good spirit of the national guards in different parts of our fine country, and in seeing myself surrounded by deputations from the whole of France, who brought to the king of their choice a second inauguration, and who by the affectionate confidence with which they imparted to me local grievances and general anxieties, rendered me, as you know, the interpreter to the government, of the

necessities of which the spirit of the great week demanded.

' This duty has been fulfilled. I have expressed every where, as well as in the tribune, my ardent, perhaps impatient, wishes for the complete realization of the programme proposed when the blood of 6,000 citizens was still reeking; and if I had desired that France should have as soon as possible a representation posterior to the revolution of 1830—if I have said that, in the future discussions relative to the other Chamber, I would prefer to its present organization, the principle of an elective presentation of candidates, to the nomination of the king—if I have felt some scruple to sanction by my name the postponement or the absolute neglect of things which in my opinion are necessary, it is not just to transform these opinions into demands for *coups-d'état*, and a dictatorship, which I no more desire to force upon other persons, than I wish for it myself, as history can attest on more than one occasion.

' But I love better, what it is right every one should know, Frenchmen of all parties, as well as foreigners of every country, viz. that if the constitutional order conquered during the great days, if the popular throne raised by our hands, should ever be menaced from any quarter whatever, the whole nation would rise to defend them.

' At this painful moment of a farewell, which I believed more distant, I offer my dear brothers in arms my gratitude for their friendship, my confidence in their recollection of me, my wishes for their happiness, my admiration for what they have done, my anticipation of what they will yet do, my hope that the calculations of intrigue or the interpretations of malevolence, will never possess any influence in their hearts against me; in fine, I offer them all the sentiments of affectionate regard, which will terminate only with my latest breath.

' LAFAYETTE '

This new order of things did not at all diminish the moral predominance of Lafayette; perhaps, indeed, his personal influence was much augmented by the disgraceful way in which the creatures of the revolution of July, now become his enemies, stigmatised the General's patriotic inflexibility. This species of ostracism reinstated him in all the dignity of his political life. Indeed, it was in the plain coat of a citizen that in 1789 he received Louis XVI at the head of 200,000 armed patriots; that nearly forty years after he traversed in triumph the twenty-four States of the American Union, passing in review the military bodies and the citizen soldiers, who thronged in crowds upon the route of the national guest; and that more recently he appeared at the Hotel de Ville at the head of the revolution of 1830. Finally, it is not to his title of General that the confidence and the veneration of the people of America and Europe have been given for half a century.

But if Lafayette's personal condition continued the same after his retirement, it was not the less unfortunate for public affairs that the national guard lost in him a rallying point, around which converged all the interests of order and liberty. And as to the throne, which, in the madness of ambition and fear, thought that it would strengthen itself by being removed from his influence, what has it gained by being separated from him? Where could it find more firm and more loyal support than in the man who had united it to liberty? the only man, also, who was capable of preventing the inevitable, perhaps the near-at-hand divorce, which for seven months has been sued for at the bar of the nation? A strange fatality hovers over royalty of every origin.

What, however, is not less curious than the blindness of the monarchy of July, is the difficulty which men who hunt for wealth, titles, and power, experience in comprehending such a character as Lafayette.

Contempt for these things passes the understanding of that sort of persons. They can very well comprehend, that a man may possess perseverance in principles, tenacity in determination, and confidence in results unforeseen by the most able. They readily acknowledge that cool courage which, in the interval of two terms of one of the longest political lives, placed him on the point most desirable to ambition. But that this man, who had only to desire riches in order to possess them; who enjoyed power; and was the dispenser of favors; that the hand in which the love and confidence of the people had placed all these bounties, had not courage to grasp them, is a circumstance which neither the ambitious nor the intriguers can understand. Such a character is to them a perfect anomaly, which they cannot explain, except by a radical want of judgment and energy. They interrogate themselves, and they find that there must necessarily be something wanting, though they do not know very well what, in that political spirit which, bold and ardent as it may be, appears in their eyes timid and weak, since after having trampled upon the greatest prejudices, it was foolishly checked by a scruple of conscience. What, in fact, could be hoped from a statesman who thinks and says on all occasions that *in great personal questions it is in general safest to decide against one's own interest?* Such a man, who placed his glory above vulgar ambition, who ranks among the objects of that ambition, thrones, presidencies, and conquests; for whom the inferiority of his fellow-men, the parades of court and of luxury possess no charms — Surely such a man does not belong to the present age.

Thus, wanting sense to comprehend this singularity of human nature, the *juste-milieu*, entertains profound contempt for this extraordinary man, who has been so often placed in a situation to gratify all the desires of ambition, and who has turned his back on fortune as a child allows a toy to slip from its hands.

Such are the traits in which the enemies of Lafayette have discovered the decay of his political faculties and his incapacity for governing. There is, however, another symptom which they have lost sight of, and from which they might adduce with equal justice: namely, the absurd monomania which constantly urges him to the defence of the interests of liberty and the public welfare; and also (here I speak seriously) the fault he has sometimes committed, of finding too much gratification for his self-love in the contrast presented by the conduct of a man, who having power to do every thing refuses to do anything for himself.

It now remains for me to describe Lafayette in his character of deputy, after the revolution of July, that is to say : during the nineteen months which followed the resignation of his command.

MEMOIRS
OF
GENERAL LAFAYETTE,

AFTER
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830.

THIRD PART.

CHAPTER I.

Lafayette after his resignation. — Commencement of re-action. The Spectre of the Republic adopted as a resource of Government. — Recriminations respecting the disturbances of October and December. — Lafayette disdains to reply to these accusations. — Dupont de l'Eure does him justice. — Lamarque, Lameth, and Audry de Puyraveau. — Struggle of Parties.

LAFAYETTE was now divested of his general command. This was a great deal towards the gratification of the hatred of his enemies; but not enough for the fulfilment of their projects.

Having once entered on the course of counter-revolution, the new royalty could not advance with any chance of success without removing the unfavorable impression which its conduct towards Lafayette had produced in all generous hearts, and explaining its signal ingratitude by the imminence of a great danger which no longer left fixed bases for the throne of

Louis Philippe, which the French still considered a patriotic result; for disaffection had not yet occurred; the disenchantment only was taking place.

At this moment a phantasmagoria of the Republic was adopted as the means of government, and the real advantage of the country was sacrificed without pity to a political object. It was not sufficient to have spoken of the general disorder of men's minds, and to have represented property as attacked; it was further necessary to personify anarchy and to exhibit it escaping with its scaffolds from the pocket of Lafayette, as Minerva formerly issued completely armed from the brain of Jupiter.

Scarcely had the ministers of Charles X. returned within the turrets of Vincennes, scarcely had the popular rising, at the sound of which the doctrinaires had, as it were, given themselves up for lost, suppressed, than the men of the restoration dared to drag forward the disturbances of October and December, in order to seek for proofs of republican conspiracy, in which they did not blush to implicate, indirectly, the very man who four months previously, when he had it in his power to give this form of government to his country, sacrificed the inclinations of his whole life to what he considered the existing interest of France.

The *juste-milieu* spoke now of secret engagements entered into with the agents of disorder; it insinuated that the Commander of the National Guard, the Minister of Justice, and the Prefect of the Seine, had possessed knowledge of certain conspiracies which they had not made known; that they were in possession of the means of exciting and appeasing tumults at will; that they were in league with anarchists, and that greedy of power they made a weapon of their popularity in order to obtain it. Finally, the Trissotins, who, during the danger, had been prostrated on the earth, had the temerity to accuse La-

fayette, Dupont de l'Eure, and Odillon Barrot, of having compounded with revolt, and spoken of confessions when it was necessary to speak only of repression. They afterwards referred to some proclamations addressed to the people during the storm by the first magistrate of the capital ; they disarranged the general tenor of these documents, and then measuring the bearing of each expression, they discovered with much sagacity that there necessarily existed a flagrant conspiracy, the object of which was to overthrow the king, the Chamber of Peers, and the Chamber of Deputies ;* or, at least to provoke insurrections in order to compel the government to assume a course conformably with purely democratic views.† Thence they inferred the necessity of establishing an inquiry respecting the late tumults, and of placing the crown on the two branches of the legislature under the safeguard of bayonets.

In the sitting of the 28th of December, was exhibited a strange array of bucklers evidently directed against Lafayette, who at the very moment was employing influence to calm men's minds, and exacting from his friends as a proof of their attachment to his person, absolute respect for the monarchy of the barricade, and for the men who assailed him by their calumnies and insults.

A long time previously to the opening of the sitting, numerous battalions of soldiers of every description were assembled around and in the interior of the Palais Bourbon, at the express request of the President of the Chamber of Deputies. The bridges, the quays, and the adjacent streets, were incumbered with troops destined, it is said, to prevent a new 18th Brumaire, and to defend the *doctrinaires* against the baton of Cromwell, the crosses of Bonaparte, or the

* M. Laurett's words in the sitting of the 8th of Dec. 1830.

† M. Bignon's opinion in the same sitting.

rod of Louis XIV. The anxiety of our brave representatives extended so far, that they even dreaded the forced ablution, for they said, they, anarchists, entertained the brutal design of throwing them in the water.

These affected fears excited great discontent amongst the patriotic Deputies, who perceived their real object. General Lamarque complained in the tribune of the military preparations which surrounded the Chamber, and required to be informed what danger it was menaced with. 'Do the modern Gauls wish also to hurl us from our curule chairs? or, have we gone back to the time of Philippe le Bel, when a king of the *Basache* could march at the head of 10,000 students? Instead of advancing in civilization, we are retrograding towards the past! And why should we thus fatigue so many worthy citizens, who, while we are comfortably seated on our benches, are exposed to the rain and the inclemency of the season?' M. Casimir Périer, who then occupied the president's chair, replied, that the government having informed him that formidable bodies of people would concentrate upon the Palais Bourbon, he had considered it his duty to suggest the means of securing the inviolability of the national representation.

This scene had been planned, in order to bring about the explanations which would follow, and, concurrently with the debate which would arise, to terrify public opinion by the phantom of a new revolution.

M. Rambuteau called upon ministers for some explanations respecting the disturbances of October and December, in order, as he said, to calm the provinces which were in a state of great anxiety. The president of the council, who, some days previously, had declared to the Chamber that conspiracies were hatching in secret, did not think proper either to deny or confirm that assertion. That minister, after having claimed for the cabinet a large share of the merit which was due to the re-establishment of public order,

and felicitated himself with having triumphed over anarchy by the arms of liberty alone, confined himself to attacking very vaguely the instigators who desired to profit by the *mistakes of certain minds*, and to announcing, that written documents would prove that the partisans of the system which had perished in July, had taken an active part in the events of December. 'We possess,' cried M. Lafitte, 'these words written by their own hands: *we must have a republic in order to drive out the Orleans family.*' The head of the cabinet of the 3rd of November, on the subject of the explanations which were demanded, said, doubtless by way of amendment to the growing alliance between the republic and Carlism, that all persons had performed their duty, the citizens, the government, the National Guard, and its illustrious chief.

The path, however, was opened; the idea of a monstrous union between Carlism and liberty was broached, and it became the daily theme of the men of the restoration, and of those, who with its mortal remains, wished also for the survival of its principles. Conventionalists, Imperialists, Carlists, Doctrinaires, all the vestiges of the five or six last regimes, whom the double vote of the electoral frauds had seated in the Chamber, and whom the revolution had imprudently allowed to remain there, treated this low accusation as a real fact, which would bring France directly back to the horrors of 1793.

As I have already said, M. de Lameth with difficulty crawled to the tribune, in order to denounce a conspiracy, tending at once to overthrow the king, the Chamber of Peers, and the Chamber of Deputies. The revolution was, he said, consigned to a *directory which endeavored to pervert the public mind in order to arrive at a republic.* Then he indulged in a violent sally against the republic, its guillotines, its requisitions, its maximum, its assignats, and its wars. The anti-

democratic hatred of M. de Lameth was not confined to the republic properly so called ; it also extended over those *republican institutions* which the people had dared to speak of at the Hotel de Ville, and which, most certainly were incompatible with the monarchy.

The monarchy and the republic ! These two systems howled at each other. Yet, what audacity ! M. Audry de Puyraveau declared on the 3d of August, that he had heard of a conspiracy to obtain republican institutions. 'It is necessary,' said M. de Lameth, in conclusion, 'that we should preserve *our institutions in all their purity.*'

This was the moral of the debate : to preserve the restoration in all its purity, to engraft Louis-Philippe on Charles the Tenth, and the shuffling of the doctrinaires on the violence of the men of Coblenz ; to prop up, at all points, the tottering edifice of 1815, without the temerity which rendered its counter-revolutionary measures in some degree amusing, and without the dynasty forced upon us, which, owing all to foreigners, had no country to betray.

Had not M. Guizot already explained that the characteristic of the revolution of 1830 was '*a change of dynasty, but that it was necessary to confine this change within the narrowest limits ; to interfere as little as possible with established institutions ; that it was desirable to accept the past, and to deal gently with it ; to respect all acts executed, and to make a compromise with all interests ?*' This is what they wished the victory of the people to end in ; this is the monster to which it was pretended the revolution of July had given birth !

The lists being thus opened, the doctrinaires boldly threw themselves into them, and nothing was heard but a hue and cry against the poor revolution on the part of all the insects whom it had allowed to attach themselves to its root.

An individual, who since has, in the tribune, nobly defended the rights of heroic Poland, but who then, perhaps, wished to distinguish himself in the conversion which was going on — I mean M. Bignon — concentrated in his turn the spectre of the republic, at the feet of which he beheld assembled *partisans of the child of Holyrood, and those of the Duke de Reichstadt*. He also asked whether there did not exist a fourth party, composed of rash men, who, without intending to overthrow the existing throne, wished to take advantage of commotions, in order to give the government a direction conformable to their views.

This accusation was repeated by M. Guizot, in the sitting of the next day. The ex-minister of the interior spoke again of certain men, full of the sentiment of human dignity; but habitually governed by some general ideas — by certain theories, which he believed not inapplicable, not exaggerated, but radically false; as false, when tested by the reason of the philosopher, as by the experience of the practical man. And, mark this well! — these men with false ideas, with perverted intelligence, composed the better portion of the partisans of the revolution: all the rest were merely the dregs of French society.

This insolence of a rhetorician — the incarnate type of a faction which France knows only for the obscurity of its political ideas, for the baseness and corruption of its character; this insolence decided the division which has since always separated the patriots from this bastard oligarchy, this stock-jobbing doctrine, this camarilla of to-morrow, which formed itself under the denomination '*juste-milieu*;' as if every thing, down to its very name, must convey an absurd and ridiculous idea!

Lafayette left to public opinion the task of doing him justice against imputations which, in conscience, could not be applied to him; but Dupont de l'Eure, Odillon Barrot, and Audry de Puyraveau, whom the

doctrinaires had confounded in their hatred, did not disdain to raise the gauntlet which had been thrown down by such hands.

The ex-minister of justice repelled the accusation directed against him, the Commander-in-chief of the National Guards, and the prefect of the Seine, of having assumed the supreme power during the late disorders in Paris, and profited by the irritation of the public mind to terrify the king, and to extort confessions from him. — ‘Never,’ said he, ‘will France believe that Lafayette, Odillon Barrot, and Dupont de l’Eure — to whom, thank God ! in spite of their secret accusers, it is grateful for their past lives — could become all at once the disciples of treason.’

‘Yes,’ cried M. Audry de Puyraveau, in the sitting of the 30th of December, ‘I was a conspirator on the 27th, the 28th, and the 29th of July ; I conspired to overthrow the throne which betrayed our country ; I conspired for liberty, and I am proud of having done so ; I conspired to re-establish order, and to restore the noble character of the great nation and the unrivalled city ; I conspired to establish the throne of Louis-Philippe at the same moment when I dismissed those who came to negotiate for Charles the Tenth — when I refused to receive the withdrawal of the Ordinances, and when, above all, the municipal committee declared that the eldest branch of the Bourbons had ceased to reign.

‘And, subsequently, when events and incapacity have conspired against all that generous men had accomplished, I again became a conspirator ; but, at the same time, I preached for the maintenance of public order ; I affirmed that the liberty we had conquered could not perish, and that our safeguard was in the king and the able men connected with the government.

‘Yes, we have conspired, and we still conspire, for the public good, and I regard the attacks which our conduct has excited, as reflecting upon us the greatest glory.

‘And who are those who have honored us by their reprobation? Look at their acts, examine the results of their conduct, and then say who are the real conspirators.’

Lafayette disdained to notice these accusations, which, notwithstanding their professed generality, were evidently directed against him alone.

In the mean time the principles of the different parties began to be developed, and the elements of a conflict, in which two classes of opinions and interests would again struggle for the possession of France, and the benefits of the revolution of July, were apparent. The parliamentary campaign of the restoration was in fact commencing. The cause of the contest, and the price of victory were the same. The only difference was, that the enemy had changed his ground, his password, and his colors. From this period is to be dated the appearance of the two parties, — the patriots who made the Revolution, and the intriguers who desired to direct the government which it had established : — the men of the resistance, and the men of the movement. The men of the resistance were those who endeavored to perpetuate all the errors of the Restoration ; while, on the other hand, the men of the movement desired to introduce popular institutions into the new order of things, which, by interesting the mass of the population in its preservation, might afford a guarantee for its strength and durability. This is the desirable object, which the contagion of the court, and the intrigues of *juste-milieu* have too often, alas ! prevented the nation from obtaining.

The post which Lafayette, now returned to the condition of a simple citizen, occupied, was at the head of those, who, having fought in the public streets for the triumph of the principles of July, became its natural defenders in the Tribune. It did not appear that on his retirement any interruption took place in the good terms upon which he stood with respect to the

King, the Royal family, and his colleagues of different shades of opinions. In the beginning of Louis Philippe's reign, he considered it a duty to comply with all the invitations he received from the Palais Royal, carefully avoided, in his answers to the numerous addresses which he received from the National Guards of the Kingdom, all idea of a division among the men of the Revolution, especially at a time when endeavors were being made to form a union against the intrigues of the Carlists and the design of foreign Cabinets. But in his interviews with the King, the Prince Royal and the ministers, as in his speeches from the Tribune, he opposed with no less energy than determination the deplorable system of the Government abroad and at home.

The better to understand the whole of Lafayette's political conduct, it is necessary to follow it from the first development of the Revolution of July, throughout the whole of that period, during which his influence seemed as a sort of arbitration, which no party dared to reject.

It will be recollected that the first ministry was composed of heterogeneous elements, which the King wished, as he said, to unite under the flag of the Revolution.* This desire on the part of the monarch was perfectly natural. It seemed, indeed, for an instant to be justified by the event ; for the minister,

* If the king is to be believed, the composition of his first ministry was not the object of any premeditated choice on his part. The following is the letter which he wrote to Lafayette, on the day after his entry into Paris : —

‘ I send you, my dear General, two copies of my proclamation, which I have not, in the midst of the crowd which surrounds me, had an opportunity of transmitting to you before. I have not yet been able to appoint a person to countersign this act, which is pressing, and personally regards myself. I am anxious to see you again, and to re-assure you of the deep respect of *so long a standing*, which I feel for you,

‘ LOUIS-PHILIPPE D'ORLEANS.’

whose opinions and previous acts were the most monarchical, M. Molé was precisely the person, whose firm and dignified attitude towards a foreign cabinet, particularly at the time of the Belgic revolution, indicated that he best comprehended the revolution of July. Still the discordance of opinion which prevailed in the heart of the Council, prevented it from possessing any long duration. This Cabinet was divided both with regard to men and measures. An unjust distrust, for instance, was manifested of the loyalty of the prefects of the Seine, and of the police. M.M. Odillon Barrot, and Treilbard, were daily subjected to the most odious calumnies, which passed from the Palais Royal to the saloons of the counter-revolution and the doctrine, where it was become the fashion to treat these worthy magistrates, to whom public order was so deeply indebted, as fomenters of confusion and anarchy. The Prefect of the Seine was not to be pardoned for having in some sort prepared the municipal elections, by causing the citizens of the communes to present the candidates to the different mayoralties; while Lafayette, on his part, established throughout France, the system of the election, by the national guards of the kingdom, of their officers.

With respect to measures, the first great subject of discord in the council was the question whether the elective qualification rate should be fixed at 250, or 200 francs. The doctrinaire part of the ministry having discovered, after a most careful calculation, that the elective qualification rate of 800 francs, and the deputy's qualification of 1000 francs, settled by the Charter granted by the sovereign's favor, had become reduced respectively to 240 and 800 francs, in consequence of the diminution of the tax on land, maintained that this diminution was exactly equal to the reduced rate of qualification which the nation desired; and that, therefore, it was not necessary to make any alteration in the existing law.

This was, likewise, the formally expressed opinion of the king, who, contrary to all constitutional propriety, employed all his influence to get it adopted by the Deputies, to whom he represented that any deviation from the above-stated principle would be fraught with ruin to the country. The other portion of the ministry consented to the reduction of the elector's qualification to 200 francs, and of the candidate's qualification to 500 francs.

Lafayette desired the elector's qualification to be reduced to 100 francs, and that all persons having that qualification, should possess the elective franchise for the second list of juries, and the magistrates of communes, whose nomination, he hoped, would be placed in the hands of the people, in such a way, that while direct suffrage was preserved, the mass of the citizens might participate, at least indirectly, in the election. With respect to a candidate, he thought that no pecuniary qualification ought to be required. But even those members of the cabinet who opposed the *statu quo* invoked by the doctrinaires, did not go so far as he. He, nevertheless, on the first schism which occurred in the ministry, declared himself in favor of Lafitte's plan. 'I am against you,' said he to the dissentient ministers, 'because you wish the qualification to be 300 or 250 francs ; and your adversaries consent to reduce it to 200. If I could find ministers so enlightened as to consent to its reduction to 100 francs, I should hasten to declare myself for them, in opposition to those whom I now support.'

The principles which Lafayette had professed some years before, on the question of the double vote, were developed with renewed energy in the speech ; in which, choosing the least of two evils, he declared himself for the quota of 200 francs, in preference to that of 250 francs.

Lafayette and his friends had made numberless efforts to supersede the magistracy of Charles X, which

was almost exclusively composed of counter-revolutionary notables. This magistracy had been defended and preserved by the influence of the court, joined to that of the restoration party, which had appointed the majority of the judges, and removed from the tribunals all men who were not notorious royalists. But when the admission of magistrates to the exercise of the elective franchise came under discussion, Lafayette protested against their exclusion, which a part of the opposition had committed the error of demanding, in a fit of displeasure against the majority ; a circumstance which led to the exclusion of the other magistrates, and vitiated the electoral law in one of its most essential principles. The opinion he expressed in the course of that protracted debate, was, that the perfection of political civilization on this point was, that each tax-payer should possess a direct vote in the election of the representatives of the nation ; and that that vote should be independent and free of all influence. ' That which in Europe is still regarded as Utopian perfection,' observed Lafayette, ' has existed for upwards of fifty years in the United States. There, every tax-payer is an elector ; and among those tax-payers is included the militia-man, the National Guard who has paid in the course of the year the personal tribute of a day's duty. There, no such thing exists as a pecuniary qualification, and yet all is managed without inconvenience or trouble. Such is the power of popular information, civic habits, and national institutions.'

On the 7th of March Lafayette expressed himself energetically against every species of pecuniary qualification, for which it was absurd to demand a new guarantee after having found exorbitant the electoral qualification at two hundred francs. He opposed the pretended authority of the example of England cited by his adversaries, who also supported their arguments on the remuneration of direct universal suffrage by the constituent assembly.

With regard to England he proved, first, that the electoral system of that country was condemned by an immense majority of the nation ;* and that, besides, the old electoral law of England, worm-eaten as it was, admitted a far greater number of electors and a qualification much lower than that stipulated by the French law on which the Chamber was deliberating. In England, he observed, every landed proprietor has a vote in a county election, by right, not of the amount of taxes he pays ; but of net revenue equivalent to about fifty francs, and in some towns and boroughs the suffrage is still more extended. He referred to the new bill presented to the English Parliament by which Scotland, whose population does not amount to three millions would have the number of her electors increased to sixty thousand for counties alone.

Alluding to the faults for which the constituent assembly is reproached, Lafayette observed :—‘ In renouncing direct universal suffrage, the members of that assembly looked for their electoral qualification, not in the privileges of birth or the advantages of fortune, but in the confidence of the mass of the citizens. It adopted election by two degrees, and the primary assemblies not of communes and villages but of cantons, which with reference to influence was very different from the proposition made the other day by one of our honorable colleagues, who, had he entertained the least expectation of success, would, doubtless, have first applied that principle to the elections of magistrates and the councils of communes. But I repeat that the systems of direct election which has been adopted ought to guarantee us against pecuniary qualification.

‘ My honorable friend, M. Augustin Périér, in blaming the constituent assembly for not having divided

* The passing the Reform Bill has fully justified this assertion.

the legislative body into two chambers (and I concur in that censure), cited as the perfection of the electoral system, the report of the first constitutional committee made by his honorable countryman, M. Mounier, to whose name he might have added those of M. M. Lally and Bergasse.

‘This profession of faith is premature since it encroaches on the next sitting, but, as Mounier and his colleagues in that constitutional committee proposed to the assembly not an hereditary peerage, not a peerage exclusively appointed by the king, (the arrangements against which they protested in their report), but an elective Chamber in which the king should choose among candidates appointed by the provinces, it may be supposed that such will be the opinions which my honorable ally and his friends will express in the electoral colleges for the choice of the deputies for the approaching Chamber.

‘As to the amendment which I defend, gentlemen, I cannot comprehend the repugnance to trust such popular measures and institutions, and to seek in them the only protection against anarchy. The three greatest public disasters that can affect mankind are despotism, aristocracy and anarchy, and to oppose these three scourges it is in the nation itself, (for we are all the French people), that we must find the sources of energy and power.

‘Gentlemen, look at the National Guard : it was spontaneously raised for the recovery of liberty, independence, and national sovereignty in 1789, and 1830 ; to defend not exclusively one power, but all the powers which the public will has founded, all the rights which it has acknowledged :—it forms a connecting link uniting our new social order to the principle from which it emanates, and assuring to both our common co-operation. But what has been the result of this institution so democratic, so republican—this arming of the whole nation with the uncontrolled power of

appointing its own officers. Do you find among those officers many time-servers and agitators? Quite the contrary; and I now see before me several of those officers who are men of honor, the friends of public order, and who cannot be reproached with any political extravagance! Is it not more natural to presume that if some of the electoral colleges nominated a deputy, not paying the required amount of taxes, he would be a man of distinguished merit and talent, rather than one of those extravagant or violent men, who may exercise some influence in a political commotion, but will never possess any in a Chamber of Deputies? Besides, it may be remembered that among the agitators of the most disastrous and criminal periods of the revolution, there appear the names of several public men, whose advantages of fortune afforded no guarantee against their excesses.

‘Gentlemen, I adopt without reservation the proposition that has been made to you, not to require any pecuniary qualification.’

In his two-fold character of a member of the legislature and Commander-in-Chief of the National Guards, Lafayette advocated in the Tribune as well as in the Cabinet, the system of non-interference; the equality of men of color in the eye of the law by which our colonies are ruled; and, finally, the recognition of the republics of South America and Mexico. In his opinion, the foreign policy of the revolution of July ought to have been the necessary development of these primary points. He continued to defend these principles in all the diplomatic discussions which arose in the Chamber of Deputies; but it was not enough to have secured the acceptance of the denomination of a system; it was more important to secure that system against perfidious interpretations by a clear and precise definition of its text and its spirit. This Lafayette endeavored to do on two or three decisive occasions. For example, in the sitting of the 16th of January,

1831, in which Lamarque, Mauguin, and Lafayette pointed to the nations of Europe rising by turns in the cause of liberty; Belgium presenting a cincture of fortresses, which the coalition raised against the French of 1814 and 1815; Poland incurring the fearful chances of an insurrection rather than march against us; and, in the face of these great circumstances, the government of Louis-Philippe plunged into the most inconceivable lethargy, acting as the ministers of Charles X would have acted, and struggling, without resolution and without courage, in the thorny path into which its predecessors had forced the restoration. In this same sitting, and after referring to the sacramental maxim of the Cabinet of Vienna, that ‘as long as one revolutionary dynasty should subsist the revolution would not be terminated,—that it was necessary that the principle of legitimacy should prevail every where: *without this there could be no peace, only a truce.*’ After quoting this maxim, an illustrious warrior, over whom the tomb has lately closed, energetically styled a *halt in the mud*, the peace which the restoration allowed to be imposed upon France, and which was disgracefully accepted as a legacy by the ministers of the Citizen King. ‘France,’ said Lamarque, ‘has never pardoned the Bourbons for the disgraceful treaties of 1815. The French would wish that the king of their choice should feel like them and share their national pride.’*

* A Belgian speaker affirmed in the Congress, that M. Sebastiani had replied to the Deputies of his nation, that France was obliged to reject the offers of Belgium because England would not suffer her to accept them. It was in allusion to this abject avowal that General Lamarque launched into one of those impetuous sallies, which imparted so much fire and animation to his speeches. M. Sebastiani merely replied, that the government would not shrink from the responsibility of its acts, nor even that of its silence. In the sitting of the 30th of December, the hero of Capri had uttered these remarkable words:—

Never, perhaps, was any public speaker more correct in his views, or more eloquent in expression than M. Mauguin, when, replying to the accusations directed by M. Guizot, and the ambition and spirit of proselytism manifested by our first revolution, he proved that revolutionary unity must necessarily be arrayed against the coalition of absolute monarchies. 'When,' he exclaimed, 'Poland shall have been sacrificed in her defence of liberty, do you think that the absolute monarchs will not come and attack liberty in France? Who checked the advance of Russia? Poland. It was intended that she should march against us. She became our advanced guard, and now we abandon her! Well, let her perish! It is not the first time that her children have perished for us!'

These words, which were uttered in a tone of sincere conviction and deep grief, appeared for a moment to disturb the quietude of the members of the centre. But what availed the conviction and grief of a patriot in the eyes of that majority of indolent approvers, who mistook indecision for prudence, cowardice for moderation,—who unblushingly declared that we must allow Poland to be sacrificed out of respect for her liberty, and that we must be deaf to the appeal of nations, for fear

'I should consider it an insult to our ministers if I gave the least credit to the design they are supposed to entertain of placing an English Prince on the throne of Belgium, and of tempering this shameful concession by uniting him with a young princess, who would connect him with France. Louis XIV in his pride may have sacrificed the interests of the nation to those of his family, and preferred placing his grandson on the throne of Spain to uniting the Netherlands to France, as was proposed to him. But our King Philippe, if he wished to follow the track of his ancestors, should rather have adopted the example of Henry IV, who could not rest until that union was adopted, and was on the point of effecting it when he fell by the poignard of an execrable assassin.'

of raising the coalition against us! The members of the centre applauded the doctrine of the minister Guizot; for it is impossible to make anything of the soul of a hypocrite, and as Rosseau observed, a reasonable man might have undertaken the conversion of Cartouche but not that of Cromwell.

M. Guizot attempted to justify the intentions of the ministry, and the retrograde march of its system. Being placed in the alternative of manifesting revolutionary activity, or a moderation consolatory to foreign cabinets, he and his friends, he said, had found it necessary to decide for the latter course. He accused the partisans of the revolution of July, of cherishing the insane project of subjecting all the nations of Europe to the unity of their principles. That fancy, he observed, was not new; for Louis XIV, the Convention, and Bonaparte, were by turns tormented by the thirst of revolutionary propagandism, ambition, and conquest. Louis XIV dreamed of forcing the French monarchy upon the whole of the world; the Convention, the French Republic, and Napoléon, the French empire. Now, what occurred at all these different periods? A powerful re-action, a general resistance, not only on the part of governments, but on the part of nations, who resolved to defend the liberties of the countries attacked.

It was General Lafayette's task to correct this unfortunate application of facts, to repel these forced comparisons, and to refute this theory:—

'Gentlemen,' said he, 'the habit I have long contracted, of ardently wishing for the liberty of other nations, as well as for that of my own country, and of helping to promote it, as far as lies in my power, may make me regard as personal the reproaches of propagandism which have been uttered in this tribune. I do not, however, intend to speak of myself, but of the Revolution of 1789; and the lateness of the hour obliges me to be brief

‘It is not true, gentlemen, that that revolution was, in its principle and intent, a conquest. Such was not the wish of the Constituent Assembly. Its security rested on the recognition, on the congratulations of the foreign powers, including those of Mr Pitt, when the coalition of Pilnitz was formed against us. Fortunately, France had then, as she has now, her National Guards. The nation rose in arms, and saved her independence. She was forced to conquests which were afterwards extended too far. It has been justly observed, that the re-action against us was the re-action of subjects, rather than that of kings. Kings, though no doubt the secret enemies of our revolution, nevertheless acted the part of humble and submissive courtiers. It was the nations of Europe who, weary of a conquering despotism, forced their kings and nobles to become patriots. Free constitutions were then promised them. They were deceived; but they will not allow themselves to be deceived again.

‘I am surprised, gentlemen, that the two administrations of the King have not, in this tribune, taken credit to themselves on a fact which is honorable to them. As soon as Belgium took up arms to reclaim her sovereignty, it was forbidden, in the name of the French government, that any foreign soldier should set foot on the Belgian territory. I should have wished that, acting on the same principle of non-interference, we had not taken part in their form of government, or the choice of individuals connected with it; but I leave to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the task of elucidating this discussion between the two tribunes.

‘With regard to Poland, gentlemen, it was impossible for the French nation not to feel the warmest sympathy in her cause. Not merely because the first partition of her territory was a disgrace to France; not even on account of the gratitude we

owe to that brave nation, whose blood has been shed so abundantly, so generously in the wars of France : our sympathy was claimed by a fact which no one will venture to deny: Gentlemen, the war was prepared against us. Poland was to form the advance guard : the advance guard turned against the main army. Can it then be matter of surprise, that this advance guard claims all our good wishes, our gratitude, and our sympathy ?

‘Gentlemen, a week alone has been requisite to alter the destinies of a whole age, and also those of future ages. Compare, I beseech you, the style and the doctrines of that address, which has justly conferred so much honor upon us, with the principles of the sovereignty of the people, (principles which no one will venture to deny, for they are now the necessary condition of our existence,) and then you will see what progress we have made.

‘We have been told of the eagerness shown by the courts of Europe to recognize our national government. Gentlemen, this assertion requires qualification. I shall not here speak of the Spanish circular of M. de Calomarde, published shortly after our revolution. It merits chastisement, and I regret that chastisement has not been inflicted on it.

‘I can recollect also certain acts of this Don Miguel, whose friends, in the late English ministry, thought they should be showing some mercy to his reputation, by merely calling him *cowardly* and *cruel*. I must, however, say one word upon my manner of understanding our principle of non-interference.

‘Gentlemen, if at any time a nation in Europe, let it be situated where it may, desires to recover its rights, and foreign interference is directed to prevent it, such a proceeding is a hostile demonstration towards us; not only because being a revival of the principles of Pilsnitz and of the pseudo Holy Alliance, it forms a precedent for a future aggression against

our liberty and independence; but because common sense proves that it would be the same as saying to us, "Wait until we crush your natural allies, the friends of liberty in other countries, and when they no longer exist, we will fall upon you with all our force."

'The advanced hour of the night prevents me from dwelling upon a point of some importance. I will, however, put the case thus:—In the event of an insurrection in the kingdom of Hanover, would not the German confederation consider as a foreign interference, the sending of an English army into that country? Now, Gentlemen, the Poles and the Russians, although subject to the same monarch, are as much foreigners to each other as the Hanoverians and the English.'

The honor of this admirable debate rested entirely with the minority, upon whom all the hopes of France, and of liberal Europe, were henceforth to rest. But what is worthy of particular remark is the foresight which led Lafayette to reason upon the hypothesis of an approaching revolution in Hanover.

The noble General perceived that if an insurrection should break out in this kingdom, which occupies in the north of Germany one of the foremost places among the states of the Germanic confederation, that event would exercise a vast influence on the destinies of the whole of Germany, in impeding the movements, and embarrassing the situation of Prussia. It is curious that Lafayette was charged with being in the secret of the insurrection of Gottingen, the news of which arrived in Paris only two days after the sitting in which he provoked the explanations I have just adverted to. However this may be, no one could deny either the seasonableness or the importance of this question, affecting as it does the interests of two countries which events might place in situations perfectly analogous. On its decision might depend the fate of Poland and the whole of Germany.

For two months the Belgians had been vainly seeking a king from all the reigning families of Europe. There was something humiliating to human intelligence in the spectacle of six millions of brave, rich, industrious, and, in some respects, the most civilized, people of Europe, ill treated on all hands, placed, as it were, under the ban of old chanceries, and impudently taxed with imposture, when they revealed the refusal they had experienced. What a fine lesson for a nation in a state of volition; who, before they look for a king, should accomplish the work of their regeneration, and secure their national independence; and instead of throwing themselves under the dominion of five or six satraps, should have the good sense to take a citizen, and crown, and obey him! For, as a learned statesman told the Belgians, 'The important point is not the race of the king you choose, but the respect you can pay him; and if you respect the monarch of your choice you have genuine royalty.'

The slavishness of our diplomatic policy, and its blind obedience to foreign injunction, obliged Belgium to compromise, along with her dignity, the dignity also of all the nations who sympathised with her. We recollect the addresses from all quarters, which called for the union of that country with France. Time will inform us whether this junction was not the only practical step. This at least is certain, that the similitude and the mutual dependence of the two revolutions required it. Besides, from the beginning, the Belgians were unanimous to unite themselves with us. They felt that there was more security and honor in sharing our fortune, our name, our civilization, our prospects, and our European preponderance, than in seeking and then submitting to humiliations from courts. But from this formidable union might have arisen a war, and the idea of a war produced on our citizen monarchy a similar effect to that which a drop of water produces upon a hydrophobic patient. Again, the Belgians had long

been in the full enjoyment of many liberties which we, Frenchmen of July, still want. And it is likely that the retrograde of the 9th August saw in this heinous fact an insurmountable obstacle to the union. In other words, the Holy Alliance did not wish it.

After having tied up the arms of Belgium, the Palais Royal also assumed the authority of interdicting her the right of taking a prince who was likely to sympathise with French ideas. We all recollect the letter written by M. Sebastiani to the Belgic envoy on the subject of the pretended reasons which excluded the Duke of Leuchtemburg. 'You cannot be united to France. England will never consent to it.' This was the language held to the Belgians by one who had fought at the head of our armies, and seen France conquer the world!

This forgetfulness of the dignity of a great people, this shameful continuation of a system followed up for fifteen years, did not stop here. M. Sebastiani declared formally to the Belgic Congress through our ministers at Brussels, that the French government could neither admit the junction with France nor the elevation of the Duke of Nemours or the Duke of Leuchtemburg to the throne; the first proposition from reasons of state, the two last in order to avoid war. And, indeed, through a base dread of France, the new monarchy has already abjured its revolutionary origin, and has deserted the sacred principle of non-intervention which she had only a little while before proclaimed in the face of the world.

Another question of the gravest importance was pending. It was the determining whether a government of whatever kind it may be, has the right of accepting or of refusing an augmentation of territory without the consent of the representatives of the country.

This question was put and spiritedly debated in the memorable sittings of the 27th and 28th January.

The ministry and their adherents, eluding the constitutional difficulty, applied themselves to prove these two points alone, 1st, that the confined circle in which our policy enclosed the Belgic Congress, abridged nothing of the freedom of the movements of that Congress; and 2nd, that the choice of the son of Eugene was rejected, not out of respect to the interests of dynasties but from national interests alone. As may easily be seen, these explanations explained nothing.

From this day no doubt could longer be entertained of the cowardly and base desertion which the monarchy of the barricades had determined on with regard to Poland. Some hypocritical regrets, some demonstrations of compassion for the fate of that heroic people, the empty apparel of grief, the forced homage to public opinion, were all that the patriotic appeals of Lamarque, Mauguin, Salverte and Lafayette, could draw from the egotistical indifference of the ministry.

Under these circumstances Lafayette placed the question on its true basis, viz: whether the foreign cabinets would be allowed to stifle by cunning or by force, while France remained an idle spectator, two revolutions induced by our example; and whether France was to be condemned to live for ever in terror of her own work. He maintained the principle, that if the revolution of July annulled the octroid charter, it also and necessarily invalidated the treaties of 1815, and that, among others, which united Belgium and Holland; that whenever an European nation, no matter how distant, should wish to exercise its sovereignty, every intervention on the part of foreign cabinets to oppose it, would constitute a declaration of war against France, a direct attack against the principle of our existence, an evident project to stifle liberty sooner or later in our own country; that if the free choice of Belgium fell upon the Duke of Nemours it was the duty of the king not to oppose that choice; and that, with respect to the junction with France, Louis

Philippe had neither the right of accepting or of refusing the proposition, which ought to have been submitted to all the branches of the legislature. He maintained that it was the duty of the king to require imperiously the execution of the treaty which was, as it were by chance, adopted at the Congress of Vienna, and which consecrated the independence of Poland; he demanded extensive and suitable limits for Greece whose regeneration had been paralyzed by the intervention of the maritime powers; lastly, he conjured the government of July, not to debase itself so far as to treat with the sordid and cruel tyrant who still oppressed Portugal.

This language, the offspring of honor and of national enthusiasm, was heard on this occasion without exciting the timorous passions. The majority, in fact, caught up some of its fire, and appeared to waver for an instant between the partisans of war and the advocates of peace. The denouncers of propagandism and of anarchy met with less sympathy among the benches of the Chambers, and the ministry itself seemed less estranged from the ideas of war and national regeneration than it had appeared during the preceding discussions. In fact, the same Cabinet, which two months later, humbly declared that France wished to prove to Europe, by every means in her power, that she wished for peace, dared now to avow, through its organ, Marshal Soult, 'that France commanded peace; — that she required it on the conditions which she was in a situation to impose, and that she would bring the powers at once to the point.' As for M. Sebastiani, he had the boldness to express, on the part of the government, its lively sympathy for Poland, and to avow that France was negotiating in favor of that nation.

These words, which, to say the truth, were extracted from the ministry solely from their fear of losing a still fluctuating majority, and one which testified its

sympathy with Poland, though it was far indeed from feeling for the courage and misfortunes of that nation, the sentiments which animated the rest of the people ; — these words, I say, might have taught the foreign cabinets that between the moral alliance and the effective coalition of France with Poland, the distance was small.

But did not our diplomatists, by the bluster of their language, called forth by their parliamentary situation, become a laughing stock in the eyes of the cabinets ? Of this there can scarcely be a doubt.

The object of the Cabinet, however, was to strengthen the hopes of the populations, and to make the sovereigns reflect. And such was, in fact, the momentary result of the explanations demanded in these two sittings, by the most energetic party in the Chamber.

After all, the most satisfactory point which was elicited during the extended debate, was, undoubtedly, the definition of the system of non-intervention which the new monarchy had adopted, and which it made a feint of wishing to impose on the other powers of Europe. Certainly, the principle, considered as an absolute basis, as a rigorous rule of European public law, would be inapplicable to a multitude of pre-ordained situations, as well as of possible contingencies. Perhaps, indeed, for a country at the issue of a revolution, which had just displaced so many national relations and political connexions, the only true, because the only applicable law, is the law of expediency and of force, subordinate, indeed, to the universal sentiment of justice and of civilization, which gives a tone to the public spirit of the age ; — a law, in virtue of which the republic re-conquered its natural limits, and withstood Europe coalesced against our independence and our liberty.

But since the principle of non-intervention, a very convenient one for those who deal only in words, and

never penetrate beyond the surface of things, constitutes the only protection under which the dynasty of the barricades consented to place the regeneration of the European nations, Lafayette rendered immense service, by defining this principle in such a way that its application to the Poles and the Italians would imply a prevention of the employment of a single Russian or Austrian regiment by the pseudo kings of Poland and Italy, to stifle insurrection among those people.

The consequence, then, to be deduced from this definition, thrice agreed to by the Government of July, was a security to the nations of Europe of national sovereignty within, and of non-intervention from without. But in conceding to the autocrat the full and perfect license to exterminate the Poles, for the purpose of compelling them again to submit to his iron yoke, the monarchy of July allowed the principle of its existence to be violated. I dwell upon this fact merely for the purpose of fortifying our future reserves, for it establishes the principle that treaties are binding no longer than the circumstances or the force which imposed them, exist. The day will come, and perhaps is not now far distant, when the people as well as the monarchs will form an authority of precedents for the regulation of their non-intervention.

CHAPTER II.

War declared between the Doctrinarians and the Patriots. — Sitings of the 19th and 20th February, 1831. — The Guizot Ministry attacks the Lafitte Ministry. — Difference between the two systems. — Unpopularity set up as a resource of Government. — Lafayette calls to mind the Conditions on which Louis-Philippe's Throne exists. — His Opinion on the Dissolution of the Chamber. — He Protests against the Profanations of Saint Germain l'Auxerrois.

THE Sitings of the Chamber of Deputies, of the 19th and 20th of February, proved that there existed a deep misunderstanding and a declared hostility between the men to whose hands the monarchy of the 7th of August was entrusted, and the *republican institutions* to which Louis-Philippe had taken the oath.

In the first of these Sitings M. Guizot vehemently accused the cabinet which had succeeded that of which he formed a part, of giving way to fatal concessions. 'It will go on still,' said he, 'courting popular men, it will sink deeper and deeper in this unfortunate system, until the obligations of a fictitious popularity have irretrievably destroyed it.' M. Guizot reckoned much upon the impotence, the feebleness, and the wavering character of the Ministry of the 3d November. And it was in allusion to them that he established the strange maxim, that it is necessary to be unpopular in order to govern well; and, searching for the causes of the misery and agitation which afflicted France, he found them in that craving of vain popularity, to which, says he, every consideration is sacrificed. In conclusion M. Guizot proved, without any difficulty, that the present Chamber could the better fulfil its functions the more unpopular it be-

came. In his view, France ought peremptorily to adhere to the system of 1814, minus only the dynasty expelled in July ; to introduce the people to the habitudes of the English Monarchy, to restore to royalty the powers of constraint which it borrowed from the principle of the right divine, of which the revolution had, without discernment, despoiled it. Such was the system, in substance, out of which the Doctrinaires plainly declared it was neither safe for the throne nor the state to direct their course.

The Ministers of the *juste-milieu* threw back upon their successors the responsibility of a system of which they themselves had laid the first foundation. They, in their own estimation, were infallible ; it was the nation that was in error in not comprehending that all its happiness was centered in being governed by such able men. But, unhappily, they had been embarrassed ; insurrections had been excited : the people had manifested its demands ; the zeal of the national guard had slackened : had it not been for these circumstances, they, good souls, would already have carried France to the summit of glory and prosperity.

This seems a fit opportunity for examining, transiently, these recriminations, and for explaining the causes of the difference which existed in public opinion with regard to the heads of the two first cabinets, which presided over the affairs of the revolution of July.

And first, what was the national opposition which formed an obstacle to the policy of M. Guizot ? France, says he, was not disposed to support his ministry. What ! with the power of managing an enormous budget ; with five hundred thousand troops of the line ; eighteen hundred thousand national guards, created as by enchantment ; seven or eight hundred thousand places to distribute ; a magistracy pliant to all your pleasures ; the legion of honor to be prodigal of ; the possession of every influence ; obedi-

ence to the laws ; the ready collection of imposts ; the discouragement of internal factions ; the inactive stupor of foreign enemies : were all these nothing in your hands ? What more did you require ? Moral force ? Each government must acquire that of its own exertions ; that failure is surely not the fault of France or of the revolution. Spite of all your resources and advantages you were not able to go on, simply because your doctrines menaced the moral and political energies of regenerated France — interests which necessarily surmount all others.

The Lafitte Ministry inherited all the difficulties created by the first cabinet. They took the government under circumstances the most critical that had existed for five months ; and whatever faults this ministry may have committed, it must at least be allowed the merit of having done some good. In the midst of the strongest political prejudices, they frankly laid down economical and legislative principles ; they planned out a new system of indirect contributions ; they discussed questions of public credit ; they relieved thirty millions from the burden of indirect taxes ; they desired peace, but they haughtily declared that it appertained to France to prescribe it to Europe, and, that if the honor of the nation required, it behoved her to carry on war by every means, not excepting propagandism ; they energetically protested against the London Conference constituting itself the heritor of that of Vienna ; they said ‘ we will not suffer the principle of non-intervention to be violated,’ and Austria remained upon the frontiers of Modena and Romagna. In short, the downfall of Lafitte was the signal for the invasion of the papal states, and for a complete submission to the London protocols.

These facts explain the reason of that honorable citizen’s repulsion from the councils of Louis-Philippe, and why, also, notwithstanding the errors into which his too easy character had drawn him, he retained his

popularity intact, and received even marks of the public esteem and favor. And those who had most strictly criticised the acts of his administration, and of that class I am one, felt they had neither reason nor inclination to cast a shadow of doubt over the uprightness of his intentions, or the purity of his patriotism. These facts will equally well point out the causes of the accusations which were directed against M. Guizot.

The secession of which I have just spoken, took place in consequence of the famous mass of St Germain-l'Auxerrois, which, on the 14th of February, brought the people in crowds to the public square, and forced the persons in power to grant them the reparation they required.

The question thus being placed between the doctrines of the Restoration and the principles of the Hotel de Ville, Lafayette thought it his duty to recall to the recollection of the throne, the republican conditions by which it came into existence. We shall presently see whether he fulfilled that duty with the freedom and firmness the occasion demanded.

But before representing the speech he pronounced on this occasion, I must remark to my readers, that in consequence of leaving the most important question of the revolution, to wit, the expulsion of Charles X, in some degree of doubt, the imprudence of the cabinet alone permitted silly protests to become insulting. Thence, on the one hand, the anger of the people, excited by odious provocation; and on the other, the humiliating necessity to which the government was reduced, of compounding with sedition, and saying, 'Be kind enough not yourselves to break up the attributes of ancient royalty and jesuitism; to leave us the task of profaning the churches, of demolishing the crosses and the fleurs-de-lis, since you require these!' What a spectacle! The monarchy of July descending to profanation, and strangling itself at the foot of

the bier on which Carlism had hung the lithograph of the Duke de Bourdeaux.

In this confusion of principles, it was the bounden duty of Lafayette to bring back things to the true condition of July, viz: to a popular throne, environed with republican institutions ; to show that that throne was not given by the Chamber of two hundred and twenty-one ; and that a sceptre received from the hands of the people, could only be defended by institutions which emanate from the people. In fine, it was essential to know, once for all, where the incompatibility rested between the contract of the Hotel de Ville and the recently avowed system of the palace.

Besides, another important question occupied men's minds. The approaching dissolution of the Chamber was talked of. M. Lafitte, the President of the Council, had even announced from the tribune, that he had taken the king's orders in consequence. But the doctrinarian majority wished that the new elections should take place under the influence of the transitory law of the 12th of September, and not under that of the electoral law, of which the discussion was adjourned *ad infinitum*. Lafayette felt it to be his duty to combat at the outset this proposition, which might compromise the future welfare of France, by prolonging the duration of the qualification of 300 francs for the electors, and of 1000 francs for the elected. In this chaos of contradictions, he mounted the tribune.

'Gentlemen,' said he, 'the discussion which has been carried on in this Chamber up to the present moment, refers principally to personal questions regarding ministers ; I and my friends would have preferred entering into explanations upon subjects more national : I might, indeed, claim the right of speaking as upon a personal matter, with reference to the motto presented by the Hotel de Ville — *a popular throne surrounded by republican institutions* ; but I will not avail myself of it. — (*Speak, speak !*)

‘ I thank the Chamber for its indulgence, and that I may not abuse it, I will restrict myself to remarking hastily, with reference to the discourse delivered last night in this tribune, that our mission was not *double*, as the orator said, but *single*, because liberty and public order are one and the same thing ; and if the formula of our motto appears to him the illusion of some generous minds, France will not be sorry to know, that amongst these generous spirits who have positively, and in proper terms accepted it, is the citizen king whom we placed on the popular throne, before having surrounded it with republican institutions.

‘ Gentlemen, these definitions of republican monarchy, are somewhat vague ; I prefer the distinction of *national government, or its exception*, established by my respected friend, M. de Tracy, in his admirable commentary on Montesquieu, translated by the illustrious Jefferson, and become a standard work in the United States.

‘ A constitutional monarchy might be really more republican than even the republics of Rome, Athens, and Sparta, and more recently those of Genoa, and Venice : and for example, it is a republican institution to have a whole people armed as National Guards, and appointing their own officers ; it is also a republican institution to have the admission of the principle of national sovereignty applied, not only to ourselves, but to the defence, against foreign interference of other nations, who wish to recover the same rights ; a principle, acknowledged and declared by our government, a principle necessary to our preservation, and to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs would, if he were here, once more give his assent.

‘ Finally, gentlemen, it is a republican institution, to have the throne itself founded by the sovereign nation, and the choice of the prince placed on the throne determined, not certainly by motives of quasi-legitimacy, or of quasi-restoration, (considerations of

this kind were only obstacles to the national choice) but because he afforded precious proofs of a patriot of 1789, of a tri-color soldier, and the guarantee of his domestic virtues.

‘ But permit me to say it was not a republican institution to refuse the Commons the privilege of electing their magistrates, as is done, not only in America and England, but in many parts of Germany, and even in Spain; and certainly the mention of these despotic and aristocratic countries may allay the fears of the most timorous minds. Neither is it a republican institution to exclude two thirds of the citizens in denomination of municipal councils; this is an aristocratic institution, gentlemen, for there are other aristocracies besides that of nobility, and I designate thus every privilege given to the few against the many, when the same right can be exercised by the many without the least inconvenience to public order.

‘ Gentlemen, I will not make any professions of hatred to anarchy; many years of my life passed as a national guard, and in proscription, attest this fact. I will, however, say, that the revolution of 1830, being distinguished, above all others, not only from having been the electric signal for European generation, but also from having appeared pure from all excess, and adorned with generous sentiments,—I experience on this account a susceptibility of patriotic pride, which alarms or afflicts me more than if my own honor were concerned, when I observe anything which is likely to detract from the purity, the generosity, which characterised our great week.

‘ It has been truly said that Paris, like the other capitals of Europe, contains a host of persons without honesty or principle, and corrupted by vicious or criminal habits; as there are also, under another guise, intriguers of all descriptions, and courtiers of all kinds. But besides this refuse of society, and in my opinion above all the other classes whose patriotism and disinterestedness I have had the opportunity of ob-

serving, there is a noble and numerous population, which effected the revolution of 1830: it is now in the ranks of the national guard, and in that portion of the laboring class which does not form part of that force.

In vain is it attempted to disturb the union; the national guard is the people, the people is ourselves: it is impossible to divide what has been cemented together by the blood of 6,000 citizens, under the tri-colored flag of liberty and public order.

‘ We hear much, gentlemen, of *moderation* and the *juste-milieu*. I, myself, have friends, who are not only impregnated, but furious with moderation. What are we to understand by these words? Is that moderation, which consists in maintaining the centre between too variable points? which, when it is said that four and four make eight, and an extravagant person pretends that they make ten, believes that it is more reasonable to maintain that four and four make nine. I cannot be astonished that there were men in the execrable reign of terror, who, when fifty innocent people were assassinated each day, and all persons are innocent who are arbitrarily condemned, thought themselves moderate when they said it was necessary only to murder a few.

‘ Gentlemen, true moderation consists in discovering what is true and just, and firmly abiding by it. And as to this *juste-milieu*, gentlemen, it is only two years since it smiled disdainfully in this tribune, at the idea of the sovereignty of the French people, and of a whole people formed into armed national guards, and appointing their officers. All this now exists; but I beg pardon for saying so to the *juste-milieu*, which does not like changes; the moment is not far distant when it will be necessary to place itself more in advance in the career of national institutions.

‘ Gentlemen, it is in the power of this nation itself, it is in the patriotism of its true friends, that a free

government ought to look for its own power, and the means of maintaining public order. Look at what happened in 1792. The dynasty now on the throne had been defended by us from 1789 against ambitious and disorganizing factions. It mistrusted its natural defenders; it even endeavored, by underhand means, to diminish their popularity. True, it had resource to them, and almost to them alone, at the last moment of danger; but it was too late.

‘ We afterwards beheld a powerful genius separate himself from the cause of the people. Under the shelter of his glory he destroyed the liberty of the press, individual, and civil and political liberty; he remodelled an aristocracy of nobility, and he deprived the Commons of their rights of election. The hour of danger for him and for France arrived; but the population which in 1792 rushed to the frontiers, having since been deprived of their vital privileges, now in turn retired, and in spite of the efforts of the greatest captain and the most admirable army which ever existed, Napoleon lost even the natural frontiers which had been conquered by the republican armies in the first year of the revolution.

‘ Before I sit down I will say one word on the great question which occupied all minds, namely, the approaching dissolution of the Chamber. We shall still, however, have an opportunity of discussing this subject, for I cannot believe that when the government of the king has informed us that it is necessary to increase the number of electors, when the commission appointed by you is of the same opinion, when its report is ready, I cannot believe, I say, under these circumstances, that any of my colleagues would wish to avoid this augmentation of electors; I will never believe that any of us, when returned to his district, he should behold himself surrounded by neighbors and friends, destined by the new law to become electors, would have sufficient humility to say to them,

"I feared that you would not select me, and consequently I wish to prevent you from participating in the electoral vote."

'No, my respect for the Chamber, and for each of you, my dear colleagues, will not permit me to think that you would be capable of such an act, not only of humility, but of want of patriotism, as would prevent a portion of our fellow-citizens from exercising the right of election already recognized by the government and your commission, and which would interrupt the expression of the opinion of a greater number of Frenchmen. It would be indecorous; it is impossible; and I demand that the report of your commission shall be made to-morrow.'

Being pressed by the opposition, the ministry determined on the 22d of February, to offer some tardy explanations respecting the affairs of Belgium. These explanations referred only to acts which were completed, with respect to which every thing was known. To this discussion, however, we are indebted for the admission of a very curious fact, considered with reference to the circumstances in which France was placed: the Chamber learnt from the mouth of a minister himself, that up to the moment the congress decided on the exclusion of the house of Nassau, French diplomacy had exerted itself to establish what, it did not fear to call, the rights of the Prince of Orange. Edifying solicitude on the part of a monarchy which was erected on the bloody ruins of a second restoration! This promised well.

Lafayette availed himself of this circumstance, to request the ministry to explain to the Chamber why the cabinets which had recognized the fact of the separation of the two states founded in the kingdom of the Netherlands, should obstinately consider Russia and Poland as forming one political and indivisible state; why the Italian patriots were detained in Austrian prisons; why, finally, Prussia and Austria had

impudently interfered in the affairs of Poland. To none of which questions, the ministers thought proper to reply. Finally, Lafayette, in explaining the real character of the late movements in the capital, furnished the world with a new proof of the inflexibility of the principles of public order and religious toleration which have invariably characterized the fifty-six years of his political career.

‘Permit me,’ said he, ‘to avail myself of this opportunity to refer to a painful subject which requires to be explained to foreign countries as well as to France. The disturbances which have latterly occurred, have been deplored by us all. The manifestation of public feeling on the subject of an insane enterprise, has proved once more, that no person, either amongst depredators or defenders desires the establishment of the late regime, but at the same time, some excesses took place which were grievous to the friends of liberty, and which unfortunately assumed an irreligious character, which might cause it to be believed in France and out of France, that the popular sentiment is opposed to the liberty of worship, which is so sacred a principle, that not even a whole nation is not entitled to deprive a single individual of it.

‘There was a time, I do not speak merely of the reign of terror, but under the constitutional regime, when the worship styled non-juring was quite unpopular. There was, perhaps, some merit in defending it; popularity, the most precious of all treasures, ought, however, like all other riches, to be expended for the advantages of the public or the discharge of obligations.

‘Now civilization is, I hope, too far advanced to allow intolerance to be a national sentiment: and for example, the mixture of signs recalling counter-revolutionary ideas, has been confounded momentarily with the true signs of catholic worship; but who could have any objection to these signs being replaced on these

buildings which are consecrated to this worship ? The question here is, not what are the articles of the concordat, but what is liberty and what is not. Doubtless, we have had, although there are many exceptions, cause to reproach our clergy, but do not let us inspire with a false idea of ourselves, the people and clergy, who, in Belgium and Poland have offered proof of their patriotism.

‘Gentlemen, I will conclude by repeating that which has already been expressed by many speakers, that notwithstanding differences of opinion and disputes of parties, ever the adversaries of our liberty and independence, we will all unite, yes, all, I like to make no distinction, to defend those blessings !’

CHAPTER III.

Parliamentary conduct of Lafayette in the discussion respecting the Electoral Law. — Indecision of the Majority. — Appointment of the Ministry of the Thirteenth of March. — Its System. — Complete abandonment of the Principle of Non-Interference. — Lafayette's efforts in favor of that principle. — National Associations for the perpetual expulsion of the Eldest Branch of the Bourbons, and the defence of the Territory. — Displeasure of the Government at these Associations. — They are defended by Lafayette. — First consequences of the abandonment of the Principle of Non-Interference.

LAFAYETTE, who, as we have already seen, had, in his communications with the court and ministry, declared himself decidedly in favor of the greatest possible reduction of the amount of the electoral qualification, and of the total suppression of the representatives' test of eligibility, opposed in the Chamber the proposition of the commission which fixed the first at 240 francs, and the second at 750 francs. 'Gentlemen,' said he, 'my opinions on the electoral right have been so often expressed in this tribune, that I do not intend to repeat them on this occasion. The right of election does not come from above, it belongs to all citizens, and the only ground of exception should be in capacity to exercise it.—The question we have now to consider is, which of the two rates shall be established, that of 200* francs, or that of 240 francs. We have heard an eloquent speech (laughter, this was an allusion to M. Jar's address,) and yet amongst all the flowers which he presented us with there is only this fruit, namely, the maintenance of the cypher of Louis

* The amendment of M. de Sade.

XVIII. and of the granted charter. Gentlemen, I do not need, like the first speaker, to return home in order to ascertain whether my neighbors and friends, who pay only 200 francs, are capable of choosing a Deputy. I am certain that not only they, but a mass of citizens who pay much less are as capable as we are of making a good choice. At present, in the alternative which has offered us between the rate of 240 francs and that of 200 francs, I will vote for the amendment, if it were only in order to get rid of the unlucky cypher of Louis XVIII.; but I confess I feel myself placed in an embarrassed situation at having it in my power to vote only for so high a qualification as that of 200 francs.'

The Chamber decided on that amount notwithstanding the opposition of the members of the centre ; so true it was, as M. Lafitte observed, that the majority was yet *variable and unfixable*. It might, however, have been said that that majority at least comprehended the necessity of extending, in a just proportion, 'a right which had been scandalously restricted by the charter of 1814, but when the proposed additions came to be considered, the Chamber excluded from the electoral colleges, physicians, advocates, licentiates, notaries, &c, and it was only by ten or twelve votes that the electoral right of members of the Institute, and of old soldiers, possessing a pension of 1,200 francs, was recognised.

It is but just to remark here, that one minister and one only dared to vote ostensibly, in the most liberal sense, upon all the propositions under discussion — this was M. Lafitte.

When in the sitting of the 7th of March, the Chamber discussed the conditions of eligibility, Lafayette supported the abolition of all qualification for the honor of the national reason, but without any hope of having his opinions adopted by an assembly composed of the advocates and possessors of high qualifications and

the double vote ; and, in fact, all that the opposition could obtain was the reduction of the qualification to 500 francs.

The ministry of the 3d of Nov. now retired before the men of the 13th of March. The declaration of faith, and the explanation of the system of the new Cabinet were anxiously expected. — Hopes were entertained that it would base its policy on some new and positive grounds ; although the despotic tendency of the new President of the Council was well understood, the known firmness of his character inspired hopes that he would liberate himself from the contradictions, the uncertainties, and the incongruous doctrines on which the destinies had turned during nine months.

The new ministry announced itself as the continuation of the preceding Cabinet, and as not wishing to differ from it, except by shewing greater severity to French patriots, and by a more complete abandonment of the principles of non-intervention, which protected foreign patriots. In a word, M. Périer resumed the task of M. Guizot at the very point when that minister had abandoned it four months previously ; and if in order to strike the imaginations of the people, the *exposé* of these principles was immediately followed by a project of law against tumults — a project filled with menaces and blood.

In this same sitting, M. Sebastiani abjured the principle of non-interference, which, during six months, he had undertaken to proclaim and support. He coolly announced that France had failed to fulfill the engagements, entered into in her name, in the face of the world ; that she would allow all her allies to perish without assistance, and that she would not defend herself except when her territory should be invaded. Such was the spirit of this manifesto, in which it was literally stated that France had never understood that the disavowal of the principle of non-interference should become for her a *casus belli* ; and that be-

tween *not consenting* and *making war*, there was a great difference. In short, there no longer existed a principle of non-intervention of any kind ; and if M. Sebastiani continued to speak of it under M. Périer, it was only because he had spoken of it under M. Lafitte.

Lafayette was deeply sensible of the national shame which would attach to such language.

He vindicated and supported the honor of France, and — thanks to the noble speech which he delivered on this occasion* — his fellow-citizens were relieved from the truly odious imputation.

The course which the government had pursued during three months, and the notoriously retrograde choice of the ministry of the 13th of March, proved to patriots the existence of an anti-national league. A great and imminent danger revealed itself to all eyes by symptoms which it was impossible to misunderstand. The declaration of the ministry that the government would wage only a defensive war on the French soil, without the assistance of the masses ; the parsimony with which the Cabinet and the Chambers sold to the people the exercise of the rights which they had purchased with their blood ; the baseness with which power crouched under the protocols, and exhausted itself in meannesses, in order to avert the displeasure of foreign cabinets ; the shameful transformations which the principle of non-intervention every day underwent ; the intrigues of London, and the keeping in the first post of French diplomacy a man whom the country considered as an incarnate treason ; the proposition for disarming, brought forward by the president of the council, as a guarantee of peace, which our friends exacted from us, and to which an imprudent wish to yield was expressed ; the presence of a parliamentary majority, which comprised 122 votes

* See Chapters xi, and xii, vol. i.

avowedly devoted to the order of things which was overthrown in July ; the first symptoms of a counter-revolutionary war breaking forth in La Vendée and the south of France ; the repugnance of the government to suppress these attempts with promptitude and energy ; the insolent parade of regret and affection which the Carlist deputies dared to make in the Chamber, upon M. Baude's proposition, tending to the exclusion of the eldest branch of the Bourbons ; finally, the recollection of 1815, and of the cause of the revolution lost in a battle ; — all these things impressed the patriots with a sentiment of the immense peril which it was their duty to avert by measures calculated to counteract the negligence or treason of the men in power.

Hence arose the idea of a vast national coalition. The patriots of the department of the Moselle — the advanced guard of liberty, who saw no means of defence amongst themselves but three or four thousand soldiers, in presence of seventy-five thousand Prussians in *échelon* from Coblentz to the frontier — were the first to form an association to secure the independence of the country, and the perpetual expulsion of the eldest branch of the Bourbons. The members of this association pledged themselves, by their lives and honor, to oppose foreigners and the Bourbons by every sacrifice, personal and pecuniary, and never to treat with them, whatever extremity the country might be reduced to.

The conduct of the citizens of Moselle electrified almost the whole of France ; sixty-two departments followed their example. The lists of associations were filled with the names of deputies, military men, magistrates, and the most considerable persons in all classes of society. But government (far from seeing in this powerful coalition an auxiliary of great efficacy, boasting the sanction of the Charter, whose 66th Article confided the defence of our institutions to the patriot-

ism of all citizens) considered it but as an assemblage of conspirators, instigated by a sinister desire to reverse that government, of which it nevertheless adopted the principles as its veil.

These associations were, besides, an immense cause of alarm for foreign diplomatists,* who saw no means of transacting with the nation, as they had hoped to do with the government, after a match lost on the field of battle. They recollected the fury of the *doctrinaires*, the circulars from all the ministers to their subordinates, the violence with which the President of the Council demanded why there existed citizens who had the audacity to coalesce against the government. They remembered, also, the attacks to which the members of the Chamber of Deputies (who had signed the associations) were subjected, during the sitting of March 29th on the subject of the law on the people.

‘These deputies,’ they said, ‘did not confine themselves to regaining the franchise of the people, they went farther ; they entered into an actual conspiracy, whose aim was to overthrow, not only the throne, but liberty. Such was the act of the mass they would fain introduce into public affairs. It was the 14th Article,

* A few days after this discussion a minister said to one of the subordinates, whom he wished to detach from the national association — ‘You know not what harm you are doing ; we have regained the good graces of powerful foreign ambassadors. The ministerial revolution of the 13th of March has almost satisfied them ; they consent to let us debate, at home, with our principle of national sovereignty, and we may call ourselves strong enough to guarantee them every species of security, on our part ; in the little severities they may judge useful with regard to such people as are tormented by a revolutionary spirit. This is what your associations will again throw into confusion. The ambassadors will not hear of them ; they tell us that we cannot be a strong government, while we support such associations, and till there is an established government in France, they cannot promise us peace.’

which, under another form, and in other terms, again threatened the fall of liberty.*

Lafayette took on himself to do justice to these sophisticated inquietudes, and to replace the question on its rightful footing.

‘Gentlemen,’ said the honorable general, ‘the discourse which you are about to hear, obliges me to mount the tribunal. They have qualified, as a conspiracy, the association against the return of Charles X and foreign invasion. Already I have run over this octave of ministerial circulars ; which, rising gradually to the highest note, has, for its avowed end, vigorously to devour the past, and intimidate the future subscribers to that association.

‘I do not recognize the right of giving others such rude lessons in liberty, public order, devotion to their country, perseverance in their political principles, engagements and affections ; but I think I have a right, at the end of my career, to receive such privilege from no person.†

‘I am astonished that government, instead of thanking this fresh testimony of patriotism, and love of order, instead of even associating with it, suspects it of evil intentions ; establishes a separation between the public functionaries and the mass of the people ; while the functionaries themselves are composed of two parties ; the adherents of the last *regime* which they have preserved, and the men of July, who hardly comprehend how the depositaries of actual power can arm themselves with sufficient strength, against an association, the very simple and very constitutional aim of which is, to my knowledge, that of opposing the return of the elder Bourbon branch, and the invasion of foreigners. Can it be that government is piqued into suspicion and mistrust, not of the association’s motives, but of its

* Such was the opinion of M. Pataille.

† Alluding to some expressions by M. C. Périer.

foresight and energy? Has then, Gentlemen, our diplomacy been so proud, so grand, so influential, as not to conceive the idea of saying once more to ministers — “Fear nothing, we will support you with all our means, and with all our power?”

“And what can we do,” they say, “for Poland?”

‘You may at least declare, were it only in the name of the Congress of Vienna, worse cannot be said — that Poland forms an independent nation, with right to a constitution, which has been unworthily violated. It has been said here, that Poland is destined to destruction. No, Gentlemen, she has not perished, she will live, I hope, as an eternal monument of heroic courage, and of what devotion to independence and to one’s country can effect.

‘As to Italy, Gentlemen, I have had, since yesterday, but to congratulate the government on feeling the necessity of opposing an Austrian invasion, and of taking steps conformable with our dignity and our promises.’

At these words the President of the Council, rising with vivacity, demanded what were those promises. ‘The king,’ said M. Périer, ‘has promised nothing, but to France; and France requires from the king no more than he has promised. The pledges of internal policy are in the constitution. If you speak of affairs elsewhere — there are no promises, save in our treaties.’

‘In replying to M. le President,’ resumed Lafayette, ‘I shall abstain from entering here into particular details, still more from confidential ones.’*

‘But I may be permitted to remind you that, three times, to this court, have I given a definition of our system of non-interference; which has not been disputed by the ministers, who were all present at those sittings.

* Alluding to the subsidies furnished by Louis Philippe for the interests of Christianity. See Chapter XIV. Vol. I.

‘It may be permitted me to recall the professions made by ministers themselves, and above all by those for foreign affairs, especially since it is agreed on to inform Austria that we will never consent to her interference with the insurgent states of Italy; but to day the minister is doubtless inclined to support this declaration; and, as he requires so much money for the purpose, we have room to expect great things at his hands.

‘Ah Gentlemen! too long have ambition and intrigue trampled on simplicity and fear; let us unite to check this mutual defiance; and to serve the independence, the honor of our country, and the principles of our revolution.

‘The honorable gentleman who first voted has brought to mind what has passed since 1789—the misfortunes which France has had to deplore, and knew not how to prevent. Oh, Gentlemen! who knows this better than I? Who, in opposing those excesses, and coming hither to defend the constitutional throne, found myself so ill supported by the crowd of all professing moderators, that I remained in an almost solitude, to which the history of the time gives evidence. I say this not from a vain sentiment of self-love, nor to accuse any person, but because it is rendered necessary for my own justification. We learn, also, that, after this long succession of fruitless attempts, we have found, in the revolution of 1830, the combination most favorable to our liberty, our situation, our security. Gentlemen! it appears to me that my friends and myself have not been entirely hostile to the finding of this treasure. It had the assent not only of the Hotel de Ville, the Palais-Royal, and the Chamber, but that of almost the whole French people unanimously; who, from all parts of the kingdom, in giving a full and complete adhesion to what we had done, imprinted on it the true character of that

national sovereignty, which my honorable colleague is so anxious to behold.

‘And it is because we were not strangers to it, Gentlemen, that we have, as much as any, the right to give our advice on the principles and engagements of the new order of things ; for the support of which we ought to do all that depends on us. ’Tis also in this spirit that I have set my name on the list of an association, of which the patriotic intention may be misrepresented, but in which I declare boldly, that I see nothing but what is useful and honorable.’

From this moment a terrible responsibility began to weigh on the Ministers who had compromised the honor, and, perhaps; the fall of France ; nothing was left but to sigh over the fall of the generous men who had seen, in the revolution of July, the dawn of their own deliverance. New-born royalty, in declaring that it would have peace at any price, that it had a horror of all energetic demonstrations of national feeling, had deprived its own diplomatic actions of all efficacy. What was there to hope from the timid negotiations of a Cabinet which protested, that even should those negotiations fail, it would never appeal to the display of arms? Nothing could occur but what the world foresaw — a contempt of the very powers it had solicited, and the malediction of the people whose rescue had been pretended.

After the great struggle of 1814, in which victory was declared against us, could France rest under a defeat followed by such disastrous treaties? Such was, however, her attitude, till the revolution of July sounded the hour of waking; and indeed a war might well be risked to raise her from such prostration. But when a government, degenerated to second childhood, and forgetting the conditions by which all new dynasties exist, opposes the principle of non-interference, ought we not, at least, to defend that principle by force of arms? Ought we to have nothing but despicable

diplomatic notes as the necessary succor of our allies? And these Cabinets, against which the monarchy of July found no legitimate motive for war, have they ever, during thirty-eight years, wanted pretexts for declaring it against France?

In 1830 they could not, they said, treat with a government weak enough to countenance national associations. But can they forget that, to deny the revolution peace, they have quoted the furies of the Convention, the weakness of the Directory, and the vigor of the Consulate?

What then is to be done? What more is needed to inspire our enemies with security? Forty years of experience and counter-revolutionary coalitions has deprived it of means. All other arrangements are but provisional; to reassure the absolute governments, who struggle against the liberty of France, she must retrograde to the old *regime*, abase herself to their level, or be disgraced by the invasion of foreigners, or a third restoration. This was the struggle commenced forty years since, and which will last for ever. France, by her geographical position, her civilization, her climate, her manners, the irresistible empire of her talents, is destined to impress Europe with her genius for liberty, or to quench it, in abject dependence on the old monarchies. Towards which of these two fates is she drawn by the power which has governed her for these two years? Events already speak plainly.

Hear the anathema recently launched from the Tuileries on the rising freedom of Germany; study the last protocol of the Germanic Confederation, and reflect! Does not the French world draw near a fall, like that of the Grecian or the Roman, though the revolution of July marked the epoch of our triumph? Alas, how have flown the days when the great people seemed called on to give all the freemen of Europe a precedent and example.

CHAPTER IV.

Prorogation of the Chamber. — Why prorogued, and not dissolved. — On the Speech from the Throne. — True State of things nine months after the Revolution of July. — Proceedings of the Republicans. — Deposition of Lafayette.

THE session of 1830 drew near its end. Forty thousand electors were about, by the most arbitrary curtailment of their rights, to be sacrificed to the interests of the parliamentary aristocracy. Distrust and fear had mutilated the electoral body. Nothing then longer appeared to oppose itself to that of the privileged men. The products of double votes, and ministerial frauds, were submitted to a re-election, which the exigencies of the times, and the vote of the country, loudly claimed. And, nevertheless, so inseparably linked was the existence of the minister of March 13th with the majority which had imposed him on the country, that he dared at first hazard no more than a prorogation.

The aim of this half measure was easily seen. The minister hoped that in the interval between the 21st of April and the 15th of June, things might occur in Europe to justify the system of his majority, and realize the chimera of a general-disarming, with which he had amused the country. Belgium divided or restored, Luxembourg given up to the Germanic Confederation, Italy again under the yoke, Poland crushed to ruin, the revolution of July on the ebb within, and disarmed without, by the annihilation of its natural allies, the Cabinets could no longer have any motives for entertaining a military force disproportionate to their respective wants and resources.

On the other side, if assembled in their depart-

ments, the members of the majority perceived that they could depend no more on the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, they would simply withdraw, at the expiration of the prorogation ; in the contrary case, they would again put themselves to the judgment of the country, which they might take care to pervert, before the reunion of the electoral colleges.

Such were visibly the calculations of the minister. The speech from the throne revealed this combination. The king dilated at full on the pretended services which the Chamber of 1828 was about to render the country, on the risks which had been incurred during the last eight months; on the victories which had been gained against the spirit of anarchy; but Louis Philippe said not a word on the state of the struggle between Poland and Russia, nor on the presence of the Austrians in Italy, nor on the Belgic question. The revolutionary monarch, the monarch of a day, deigned but repeat this hacknied formula :

‘ We receive, from all quarters, the best assurances of pacific dispositions in all the existing powers.’

It may be then averred that the efforts of the throne tended above all things towards entering into a communion with the Holy Alliance.

What was meanwhile the true state of things nine months after the people had, at the price of their blood, formed a monarchy and believed that they had accomplished a revolution ? It behoves us here to set the facts before our reader, and to explain the precise situation of affairs at the moment when the prorogation was pronounced.

Nine months, I repeat, had rolled by, since the king of July had sworn to consecrate his whole life to the triumph of the revolution, to protect the developments of liberty, and to watch with jealous care, the maintenance of national honor.

Well! theories and opinions apart, what had occurred in that short space of time ?

In the interior, Lafayette deprived of his command; the honest Dupont de l'Eure steeped in disgust, and reduced to desert the council; the first magistracy of the capital torn from the hands of a true patriot and thrown into those of a prefect of the empire. Of the laws promised by the charter some indefinitely deferred, others vitiated by dispositions injuriously restrictive to liberty. Our electoral law of the same sort; though the quota of contributions remained almost the only base of the electoral capacity. The increase of taxes left no room for the extension of rights. An association furiously persecuted, though formed for the expulsion of a family which had covered France with wounds and chains. An edict against the national guard, marked by the most inconceivable mistrust in the loyalty of the citizens; public functionaries, officers the most devoted to the order of things, which they had cemented with their blood, thrust aside, and replaced by the satellites of all past *regimes*.

In the foreign bureau none but men who had represented the fallen government were accredited by powerful foreigners; the principle of the non-interference, not long since proclaimed against with pompous assurance, openly regenerated, or left to more perfidious interpretations. A people who were thrown between France and the most powerful of her enemies — the Polish people — basely sacrificed, without a single act of good will, a single token of interest, *not even a courier*.* The states of Italy, which government had driven to an insurrection, given over under our eyes to foreign occupation, to pillage, confiscation, and the vengeance of contemptible despots. Belgium repulsed, insulted by our government, and obliged to

* It will be remembered that, in a report presented to the Diet of Poland, the minister for foreign affairs complained that he had not received one mark of interest in the cause of Poland from the French government, *not even a courier*.

throw herself on the arms of England—in a word the principles and interests of the July revolution maltreated and betrayed at all hands. Such were the events both at home and abroad, brought about by the policy of the new reign, at a moment when prorogation precluded the definitive dissolution of the Chamber of 1828.

Never did graver questions to resolve, greater perils to disperse, call on the solicitude of the electors. The safety of the country compromised, its liberties trampled under foot, its honor tarnished, its independence menaced, all was abandoned to their patriotism.

France saw the abyss half open beneath her feet. It was now essential to divert these fears by greater fears still. It was necessary, by force of calumny against the national party, and cleverly propagated terrors, to suspend the confidence of electors, disperse all pure minded and energetic men, and elect the enemies to the revolution of July, the partisans of the Restoration.

Then appeared the two formidable plots which the police simultaneously discovered. One, for replacing on the throne the perjured prince who had been hurled from it in July; another for restoring citizen monarchy, and erecting it on the wreck of a republic, fashioned after that of 1793.

The minister had proofs of both; above all he held in his hands the statutes of the republic. The members of a new committee for public safety were known and arrested.

Meanwhile the day of judgment arrived. The Carlist conspiracy resolved itself into a few extravagances acted by a valet de chambre, and an advocate, almost unknown, even to the tribunal of the corrective police; both were condemned for not confessing a plot, of which the existence was unproved, and the authors unknown.

Then came the great republican conspiracy, an-

nounced with much parade, to throw dismay into the departments.

It was no longer a domestic and an obscure advocate who had woven a net for the king of the barricades ; it was a knot of generous youths, who all bravely contributed to overthrow the throne of Charles X, and consequently to establish that, in the name of which they were required to loose their heads.

It was on the 9th of April, 1831, that monarchy demanded the heads of twenty combatants of July !

The Restoration had never imagined anything more scandalous, absurd, or imprudent than this process. The innocence of the accused was shown by their own explanations ; but under the influence of these strange debates, the authors of the scheme required some bug-bear to alarm the country, and not having due time for erecting their machine upon provocations, had collected from the dirt the common-place books of a three days' riot and demanded twenty executions from the consciences of the juries. They were refused ; but the imprudent government had created a tribunal for the promised victims.

'Yes, we are republicans,' they said, and this opinion they discussed, established, demonstrated with a talent and a courage which afflicted even those who had not yet despaired of the royalty of July.

Lafayette had been cited as a witness, at the request of the accused. At his entry into the hall of assize, the arraigned, the bar, the jury, and the audience all rose and saluted the noble general. His aim was to prove that a denunciation, made to the staff, of a Napoleon conspiracy, having for its end the seizure of pieces of artillery from the national guard, alone had caused the defensive measures which some companies had thought fit to adopt. The General established that such was the fact ; and he paid a solemn homage to the patriotism of the brave citizen artillery, against whom was exerted all the hate of

power. When Lafayette retired, the accused, the jury, and the public again rose and bowed.

My readers know the results of this process, from which power gained only the odium of having sought to erect scaffolds.

CHAPTER V.

Lafayette, after the dissolution of the Chamber. — Importance of the re-elections. — Letter of Lafayette to the Electors of the Arrondissement de Meaux. — The effect produced by this Letter. — Discontent of the Court.

THE dissolution of the Chamber speedily followed the prorogation. The destinies of the country were once more to be shaken in the electoral urn. The legislature which had just terminated, had left undecided questions of the highest importance to the social and political existence of France. The responsibility of members and of their agents, the constitution of peerage, the financial system, the establishment of organic laws, always promised, and always evaded, the safety of the country, its honor, its independence ; in fact, the life or death of the Revolution of 1830, depended on the exercise, more or less intelligent, more or less manly, which the electors were about to make of their political rights.

The trial must prove decisive. The popular party triumphed in the colleges : revolution re-entered into their views : the King presented himself afresh to the nation and to Europe.

Strong in the interests, the sympathies, and the confidence of the men who had borne him on their shields in the days of July, liberty had now some guarantees ; subjects of complaint vanished ; our politics again became national and proud ; and whether by peace or by war, the revolution was restored to the purity of its principles, and the nation to its legitimate influence in the affairs of Europe. No one then in France had a right to refuse his concurrence to a government un-

der which all the developments compatible with a state of civilization and the existence of a really citizen monarchy, were assured to the liberties of the public.

If, on the contrary, the majority which had drawn the government into so many faults, re-appeared in the Chamber as the expressors of the national will, it was evident that the insolence of the two parties of defection would increase ; that their hatred against the men and the doctrines of July, would revive ; and that these parties, drawn together by common interest, would drive royalty farther and farther from the principles on which it was founded. All our rights, suppressed but not banished, would arise as new born, at last, amid the convulsions of an intestine and foreign war.

To avoid these deplorable results, it was important that the electors should form a just idea of the difficult mission which they were about to confide to their representatives ; and that they might know, by the exposure of what had *not* been done, how much there still remained to do.

In this state of things, Lafayette, on whom nothing certainly called for a declaration of principle, made it his duty to render an account to his constituents, not only of the motives for his votes in all the great legislative questions which had occupied the session, but also of the thoughts and the hopes which had presided over his political conduct in the memorable events of July. In obedience to this custom, so conformant with the nature of a constitutional government, Lafayette rendered his country a still more important service ; he still more thoroughly dissipated the obscurity which power is fond of spreading over its primitive condition and existence ; besides setting his colleagues an example which, followed by many among them, produced those numerous necessities for voting against an hereditary peerage, which were imposed on the newly-elected, by almost the whole of the Colleges.

This document merits preservation for history, not only as a model of freedom and of propriety, but still more, as affording the most luminous point of view from which, at this epoch, one can look on the events of July. It is, above all, a perfect basis from which to appreciate the formal engagements which popular royalty then undertook.

This is why I consign, *verbatim*, to these pages, the letters addressed by Lafayette to the Electors of Meaux.

‘ Lagrange, 13th July, 1831.

‘ MY DEAR CONSTITUENTS,

‘ At a moment when, ceasing to be your Deputy, I again become candidate for an arondissement, whose goodness to me was ever, like its patriotism, independent of time and of intrigues, I wish to offer you a few observations.

‘ Long charged by you to reclaim the national guard of 1791, the censorship of the press, the municipal and departmental elections, the abolition of double votes, I have won from the tribunal nothing beyond an indulgent smile, at the tri-colored reveries of a veteran of July, 1789, still credulous of national sovereignty. Three days of July, 1830, have made these reveries the enforced doctrines of all the French, the sole basis of all powers.

‘ Glory to the noble and spontaneous population of the barricades! How have their prodigies of courage and intelligence in the combat, of generosity and disinterestedness after the victory, fixed them in my heart and mind, as the first rank of French society.

‘ Glory, also, to that general, and, in many places, simultaneous rush, which associated all France with the Parisian insurrection.

‘ Glory to the National Guard, who, reviving in 1830, as they were created in 1789, rallying round the Gallic Cock, our well-beloved colors, our holy

motto, have, by a great and recently repeated act, replied to the doctrines hostile to popular elections, and, outstripping our new institutions, have secured them an indestructible guarantee for liberty, order, and independence.

‘ And let me be permitted to add the gratitude of your old Deputy, for the place which public confidence deigns to afford him, in this grand and teeming movement towards the emancipation of Europe.

‘ Not that I had ever figured among the pretenders to the title of preserver, but for the energy, the magnanimity of the people. In *that* alone can safety or honor be found. The best deeds done were done by all; but, in disclosing my conduct to you, I cannot avoid speaking of myself. At the American era, when liberty was founded no longer on the vague denominations of republic or monarchy, but on a conscientious inquiry into the rights essential to all men, and to all nations, it was my fortune, on the 11th of July, 1789, to be the first in Europe to proclaim that declaration of natural and social rights, the fruit of my past life, the guage for my future, which, since I have been invoked by the oppressed of all parties, became at once my manifesto and my ultimatum. I see beyond this but secondary combinations, more or less perfect, but modifiable by circumstances, and the national will.

‘ ’Tis thus, after having, as a republican soldier of 1776, served until 1789 (against various factions) the order founded by the sovereignty of the people, I sacrificed myself in 1792, in my too just foresight of a criminal anarchy, to the defence of a constitutional throne. Republicanism, which I had avowed at all times, and in all places, did not prevent, after my captivity as a coalitionist, from prolonging my banishment, rather than accede to the violence of the anti-royalists, of the 18th Fructidor — and even as my constant devotion to public order created no illusion to make me,

under this pretext, second the successive usurpations of an ambitious consulate, so the *éclat* of imperial glory drew me not into the crowd of people and of kings, of warriors and of priests, of aristocrats, of moderators, and of jacobins, at all epochs slipping their necks into the links of the same chain.

‘ These sentiments I have professed and practised, under both restorations; and in the interval of the hundred days; and I deserved, that, after forty years absence, it should be solemnly declared to me, in the name of the United States, and from the heart of their National Congress, that each of my European actions had been worthy a disciple of the American school. Happy if from these reminiscences of more than half a century, I may claim some right to the actual attention of my countrymen. When, forty-one years after 1789, the Hotel de Ville of Paris again became the head quarters of liberty, my first thought, in the midst of the revolutionary commotion, and our measures both for battle and for public order, was that the national will should be regularly consulted in the forms indicated by the constituent assembly. Such was not the view of a great portion among the representatives of eighty thousand electors, some already called together, others arriving with more or less speed, with all their popularity of the time, nor was it the view of the majority in public opinion, eager for security and anxious to learn to what they should adhere. The words republic and Napoleon resounded about us. Truly it was not to me that the first of these denominations should recall the tyranny of 1793, which was no more republican, as I have often said, than the massacre of St Bartholomew was religious; not even an aristocracy, ancient or modern, adorned with the name of republic, could constitute one for me, who saw the republic almost perfected in the declaration of rights, and found it as complete as beneficial, peaceful and plenteous, in the institutions of the Uni-

ted States. Bonapartism, on the contrary, brought to my memory the destruction of the electoral system in all its branches, of the liberty of the press, and the legislative tribunal. The restoration of *lettres de cachet*, of the noblesse, titles and ribbands; administrative centralization, in a word, the most skilful system of aristocracy and despotism.

‘ But, in observing the various impressions left in France by past vicissitudes, as well as the actual nature of circumstances around us and with us, it appeared to me that the combination adopted by my colleagues, by the Hotel de Ville, and the Parisian population, particularly their choice of the Duke of Orleans, a patriot of 1789, a soldier of 1793, remarkable for his citizen manners, and domestic virtues, gave the best chance for liberty and public order which we could possibly attain. There will be seen in this step no ambition on my side, no hereditary partisanship in his favor, but a conviction, prior to all other ties with him, and I may add, with a clear conscience, that this determination, as well as the choice proclaimed in the name of the people, was confirmed by the assent of an immense majority of our fellow-citizens.

‘ You will ask, my dear constituents, what was the programme of the Hotel de Ville, so often quoted by me, contested by others, and the fulfillment of which it behoved me to claim. After the visit of the new Lieutenant General, (accompanied by the deputies) to the Hotel de Ville, I expected to find, in the popular authority and confidence with which I was invested, the right and the duty to explain myself frankly, in the name of the people, to the proposed king. “ You know,” I said to him, “ that I am a republican, and that I look on the constitution of the United States as the most perfect that ever existed.”

‘ “ I think as you do,” replied the Duke of Orleans; “ it is impossible to have passed two years in America without being of this opinion; but, do you

believe, in the situation of France, and after the expression of general opinion, that it would become us to adopt it? ”

“ No,” said I, “ that which is now required by the French is a popular throne, surrounded by republican institutions.”

“ That is just what I think,” replied the prince. This mutual engagement, which men may appreciate as they please, but which I am obliged to publish, had the effect of rallying round us both those who had objected to any monarch, and those who desired one in every way contrasted to a Bourbon.

‘ To characterise, once more, the sense of my expressions, this was prior to the intervention of Louis Philippe, a republican measure, for the popular overthrow of despotic ordinances, of a granted charter, and a dynasty of divine right, and to substitute for them the patent principle, and the choice of a monarch, an undisguised act of the sovereignty of the French people.

‘ This was a measure also to arm and to form into national guards all the citizens of France, in town and country, naming their officers themselves. The latter articles of the law restraining the formation of provincial battalions, and the election of their leaders, having been justly regarded as blots on that institution.

‘ I shall also call by this name, in our citizen monarchy, the censorship on the political press, the freedom promised to education, the abolition of the words “ religion of the state,” the initiation into the laws given to the Chamber, some ameliorations in the legislative and electoral forms, and the revision of the peerage; for I am not one of those who say that we have gained nothing in the revolution of 1830. It is not so with the municipal law, which took from one half of those who might be taxed, the right to elect members of council, and gave the king nomination of mayors and adjuncts,

while more republican institutions were found, not only in other free countries, but even in some despotic monarchies.

‘I will say as much of the electoral law, which, rejecting the greatest part of our intellectual capacities, or valuing them at a hundred francs, exacts a contribution of two hundred francs, to the exclusion of twenty-nine in thirty Frenchmen fulfilling the other conditions, and restraining their choice to the eligibility of five hundred francs ; while, without mentioning the illimitable suffrages of the United States, aristocratic England, with an inferior population, can boast seven or eight times as many electors. The system of direct election is doubtless preferable to that of two degrees, but let them then admit all capable of exercising that right, as I have said every time that I have been reduced to vote for the least of the two members in deliberation.

‘As I never had the humility to believe that crime and violence were necessary to encourage French patriotism, or that all national valor was concentrated in the genius of that great captain whose day it had so gloriously and effectively preceded, neither can I think that, unless a Frenchman pays two hundred francs contribution, he cannot possess sufficient probity to refuse the sale of his vote, sufficient good sense to choose an honest representative.

‘But I should wish to find our programme in religious liberty — if it puts worship out of the civil state, and frees conscience from an intolerance at once credulous and sceptical ; in the freedom of education — if, in giving the people that primary instruction which the country owes it, and the means of still better, it neither cramps nor extorts paternal education, and private establishments ; in the liberty of the press — if it be freed from the absolute shackles of printing, and taxes on newspapers ; in the responsibility of the agents of power — if they are given the means of exerting it ; on the departmental councils — if, elected

by the universal mass of our citizens; they are allowed the regulation of all local interest ; in the economy of the budget—if it even partially satisfies my well known preference for cheap government—in the settlement of the civil list, if it is in unison, I do not say with the 130,000 francs of the President of the United States, but with the existence of a popular throne, and the domestic virtues of a citizen-king. I would recognize it, in fact, in the additional article to the new charter, if we owed to it the abolition of hereditary peerage, and a second chamber, conformable with the spirit of representative government. You will ask me, my dear constituents, if we are always guided by the views of July? I think not. After the formation of seventeen hundred thousand national guards, and the happy issue of the crisis of December, I quitted my command ; with which Paris took part, (and which, had it been offered me separately, was not the less incompatible with the jealousies which provoked my resignation,) then, I say, there would have been a double satisfaction ; for besides the preservation of an equal confidence and affection with my brothers in arms, I think that if the maintenance of my situation could have deceived the public, on the deviations of the impulse of July, I could no longer have reproached myself for its errors. But in entering on these views, you will say, can we consolidate our work, our government, our liberty, our repose, and our honor ? I firmly believe it, and the approaching elections will decide.

‘No doubt there is no electoral indiscretion to assure us, beforehand, in our actual situation, of a candidate’s opinion on that which was not ill designated under the names of *resistance* and of *action*. I know not why we should intrench ourselves behind the insufficiency of our light on this constitutional and simple question. In a word, do you desire hereditary legislators, and representatives who represent but themselves ? At the epoch when that royalty was over-

thrown, which has again revived, the opposition, then united, was deemed legitimate, and sacred ; on one side men who had wished, served, or prepared to serve, the Restoration ; those accustomed to a former, and still less liberal system, aristocrats of various kinds, some Orleanists, whose timid dreams rested on the summit of social life ; all very respectable, doubtless, many of them my personal friends, but whose political bias accommodated itself better to the imperfections of a granted charter, than to the consequences of popular liberty, and whose desires, therefore, our revolution has more than fulfilled.

‘ On the other side, patriots hostile to the dynasty imposed on them, impatient for liberty, sympathising with the people, nor believing that the blood of six thousand brave men was adequately purchased by the success of an imperfect restoration, the doctrines of which they strove to restore ; and seeking for public order, not in the prejudices, privileges, and weakness of the few, but in the satisfaction and support of the national mass. Between these two systems it is for the elector to choose.

‘ Certainly it is not I, the old and faithful defender, the devoted victim and recent soldier of the order founded on liberty — I, who, without distinction of pretexts or parties, have at all times branded crime, combated oppression, and never bent before popular injustice or violence — it is not I, who, if they possess either memory or good sense, can they suspect as the enemy of that public order.

‘ It behoves me, then, as detesting anarchy, and deploring the disorders which have taken place, to rise against the party they would fain bring in, to render terrible the completion of that liberty, without which, on the contrary, public tranquillity, and the preservation of actual order will, in my opinion, be always and evidently in danger.

Thus, without limiting the social existence of France

to a political stock-jobbing, and a summons to a liquidation at the month's end, I set too much value on the welfare of our public funds, not to have often regretted that their credit has suffered even from the exaggeration of these domestic alarms.

‘ While lamenting their grievous effect on commerce and general industry, which I think will not be re-established by discouraging hope, restraining liberty, and monopolizing the profits of a revolution, entirely achieved by the people, I am surprised at the affectation which has made them forget that, long before this revolution, causes quite independent of it had produced, not only in France, but throughout Europe, straitened manufactures, erroneous speculations, and the failures of the most flourishing houses.

‘ In explaining myself thus on the question of war, it affects not your candidate personally, a veteran in the people's cause, whose devotion to his religion — liberty, has been worthy the honorable animadversions of despotisms and aristocracies of the world, and the touching confidence of patriots in various countries.

‘ This individual existence stands him instead of liberty in other lands.

‘ Perhaps we ourselves may be enabled, in revenge for the past, in precaution for the future, to send over the face of Europe the explosion of July, the electric shock of which has already opened craters in other lands. But reserving this stratagem for the event of the coalitions attacking again our independence, the French people had at least a right to persevere in the generous system, which has since been misrepresented and calumniated under the name of *war at any price*.

‘ The old diplomacy of Europe which, in former times, would quarrel and even go to war about the transfer of a village, or a claim of royal relationship, has now transformed itself into a sort of gendarmerie,

to destroy, first among us, and next in other countries, by rendering us their accomplices, the independence and civilization of mankind ! And will the French of July, 1830, so far forget themselves as to tolerate, in defence of every law of nations, ancient and modern, the armed interference of foreign governments in other countries, for the purpose of obliterating our example, extinguishing their sympathy with us, and, by the annihilation of the vital principle of our existence, by the destruction of our natural allies, justify and facilitate an invasion of our territory ? What has been the result of the protocols, the heterogeneous plans, and the diplomatic imbroglios, which were said to be for the interest of Belgium and France in our reciprocal relations ?—only to compromise the name of France in intrigues and menaces against that independence, the first offspring of our revolution, and in favor of which we had at the outset so loudly and effectually declared ourselves.

‘ When the Polish nation, triply emancipated by our principles of sovereignty, by the successive outrages of which she had been the victim, and by the last violation of the compact made with her, checked the march of the Russians against us by shedding the remaining drops of the blood she had long and lavishly spilled for France, what prevented us from openly declaring ourselves in her favor, receiving her representatives, instead of observing towards her conduct worse than that which constituted the disgrace of Louis XV’s reign ?

‘ As to the late misfortune of Italy, the interference of Austria, the horrors that have ensued since the violated capitulations to the atrocities of the tyrant of Modena, the vile assassin of the virtuous Menotti, to whom he owed his life, where does the fault lie ? Not certainly with those who in the exercise of their rights as deputies, brought the Chamber and the Ministry to a clear and precise definition of the French system,

non-interference; nor with our legations who signified the *non-consent*, and gave timely warning to the King's Council. Still less can blame attach to the Italian patriots, who must have regarded this publicly avowed definition of *not-consenting* as equivalent to a promise of *preventing*.

'The fault is to be found in one of those deviations from the noble impulse of July, which I in my turn shall call *peace at any price*, — at the price of our interest, our respect — nay, even at the price of peace itself; for if firmness of conduct would have sufficed to check Austria, I must also believe that pusillanimity could only serve to embolden and encourage invasion.

'One word more, my dear constituents, on the hereditary peerage.

'Informed by the experience of what had occurred prior to 1789, I regretted that the Constituent Assembly should have preferred the unity of the legislature to its division into elective Chambers. But without at present entering upon a discussion of the senatorial conditions, formerly consigned by the revolution of 1830 to the care of the representatives whom we are now about to elect, I cherish the firm conviction that the principal question is not a matter of doubt. In the present enlightened age, and in our country of equality, neither old aristocratic prejudices, the interests of existing, nor the ambition of future peerages can plant in France two or three hundred petty legitimacies, which, instead of supporting the constitutional throne, would be likely, at no very distant time, to drag it with them in their own downfall, and which are alike repugnant to good sense and the representative rights of a free, independent, and sovereign nation.

'Such are the observations, which at this critical moment of the elections, my conscience urges me to publish. If I have ventured to allude to personal circumstances, it was only with the view of obtaining

greater confidence for what will doubtless be styled *theory*, as Napoleon styled it *ideology*. I have also endeavored to separate the sacred cause of liberty from the heresy which deforms it, the excesses which have retarded its advancement, the crimes which have profaned it, and the apologies which would injure it still more, if it had not a refuge in the pure recollections and sublime sentiments which characterized the great work of the people.

‘Receive, my dear constituents, &c.

‘LAFAYETTE.’

This profession of faith produced a salutary effect on the public mind. It turned the electors to an investigation of the questions of moral and political order, from which the ministry of the 13th of March had endeavored to direct them by fixing their attentions on points of pecuniary interest and prosperity.

During the past session, that ministry had announced that all the solicitude of the government was directed to the redressal of the people's grievances; and that if once freed by the suffrages of the electors from a vexatious and systematic hostility, the government would not fail to adopt measures for raising public credit, imparting a new impulse to trade, and opening the flood-gates of national prosperity. The *Moniteur* of the 1st of May contained the following remarks:—‘The warehousing and canal systems will be discussed, and the reform of the laws pursued with ardor; speculative policy will give place to practical administration, for liberty is but the instrument of civilization, and nations pursue the conquest of ideas only to answer the satisfaction of their interests.’

The ministerial circulars enjoined all the agents of government to keep public attention exclusively engrossed by discussions on political economy, commerce, agriculture, and trade. On the other hand, the king's journey into Normandy was marked only by disserta-

tions on the dangers of political theories and imaginary systems. In short, the coterie which had assumed the control of the revolution, and who were resolved at any price to save the hereditary peerage, as the most essential guarantee of the independence and dignity of the *Upper Chamber*, exerted every endeavor to prove the radical illegality of electoral pledges. Even many of the Deputies indignantly repelled the idea of a pledge which should engage for the abolition of hereditary peerage. They were offended at the idea of having their opinions asked on any particular question. It appeared as though they sought the suffrages of the people, only to secure the triumph of their own doctrine.

Lafayette's letter, however, immediately placed the matter in its true light. His revered voice easily convinced the electors that if, in questions purely administrative, an imperative pledge might sometimes be attended by inconvenience, it is always allowable, nay, even indispensable, in reference to the organic points of the constitution. In almost all the preparatory meetings, it was therefore determined that, it being the duty of the Deputies to express the opinions of France, and not to impose theirs upon the country, the pledge of voting against the hereditary peerage should be exacted from them as a *sine quâ non* condition of their election.

Would it have been credited? — These proud 221, who had determined to rely solely on their own wisdom, and whose delicate consciences had repelled an electoral pledge as a thing incompatible with the moral freedom of the legislator — these very men, pressed into the colleges in emulation of each other, foreswore their doctrines of yesterday, and gave their constituents even more promises than the latter had required of their political docility.

These men so suddenly enlightened on the vices of hereditary succession, were nevertheless the identical

individuals, who, sixteen months previously, had in their furious address to Charles X solemnly proclaimed the pure doctrine of legitimacy, and professed the principle that *antiquity of possession*, is, on the question of authority, the *most sacred of all claims*. What could have effected this metamorphosis, unexampled in the history of political apostacy? The voice of a man, who for half a century had regarded chambers of whatsoever denomination, only as the instruments of the national sovereignty;—and by the influence of the press, which proved that to merit the national confidence, it was necessary to concur in the opinions of Lafayette.

The letter to the electors of Meaux, or rather to the electors of France, raised against Lafayette all the hatred of the court. From the moment that the Palais Royal and its doctrinaires shook off the constrained respect they had assumed towards him, open war was declared between the man of July and the man of August.

CHAPTER VI.

The new Deputies arrive in Paris. — Troubles occasioned by the anniversary of July. — Arrangements of the new Chamber. — The first alarms. — The speech from the throne. — Uncertainty of the Deputies. — Discussion of the address. — Debates on the affairs of Poland, Romagna, and Italy. — Lafayette's speech. — Motion for the Order of the Day.

THE Chamber of the restoration had ceased to exist. One half of its members had been left dead on the election field of battle, and the majority of those returned had been re-elected only on condition of adopting a new line of conduct for the future.

The electoral purification had been principally directed to the men who composed the last ministerial majority, in whose favor, however, all the provisions of the new election-law had been planned.

France might therefore hope for a national representation, composed of elements salutary to the destinies of the revolution. Unconnected with all past measures, ignorant of parliamentary dishonesty and ministerial machiavelism, these young men were calculated to impress the discussions of the tribune with a character of good faith, candor, and integrity. Such was the hope of the country; and for a moment the result appeared to justify this hope. The *new deputies* gave an entirely novel character to the first debates, and it cannot be doubted that they would have secured the triumph of reason and general interest, if the ministers who knew the influence of first impressions, had not diverted the new Chamber from its original mission, by directing its attention to the contest exerted by the animosity of which both Ministry and Chamber were the objects.

The troubles which broke out, or as I ought rather to say, were stirred up in the capital on the occasion of the anniversary of the 14th of July, marvellously aided the policy of the minister by exerting alarm and indecision in the minds of the new deputies whom the opening of the session had called to Paris. Every one recollects the history of the brigades of workmen formed by the police to oppose the young men who had conceived the horrible project of celebrating by the planting of a tree of liberty, the great day which had commenced the revolution of 1789.

According to the clamors of government, three factions were coalesced for the purpose of making a desperate effort before the meeting of the Chambers. A solemn sentence had already decided the victory gained by the ministry of the 13th of March over the spirit of disorder, tricolored cockades, grey hats, and a young poplar tree destined to aid the designs of the conspirators. However, it is certain that the military measures adopted by government, its proclamations, the visits of the police to the houses of a great number of citizens, and a little bloodshed, contributed to fill the minds of the Deputies with an alarm very favorable to the views of the ministry, who, on the other hand, artfully affected to invoke the tranquillity and union necessary for surmounting the great difficulties which presented themselves. 'Let us renounce,' said the *Moniteur*, 'the old denominations of right side, left side, centre, royalist, and constitutional, which have now no exclusive application, and serve only to perpetuate the maxims of the restoration.'

This skilful manœuvre occasioned some perturbation in the elements of the Chamber, which, I believe, had assembled without any pre-arranged system. It was not easy to foresee how far it would divest itself of the accusations of the past, and the serious alarm of danger with which ministerial cunning incessantly assailed it. From that moment it was evi-

dent that the Ministry was not destined to die at the foot of the tribune; for it was impossible to attack it in the face of the imaginary dangers which kept the public mind in panic fear.

The speech from the throne and the discussion of the address, afforded new indications of the direction which the government of the 7th of August wished to give to the new legislature. The most characteristic feature of the speech, was a decided tendency towards the predilections of the late regime, and manifested ill-disguised intentions of commencing a conflict between the crown and the Chamber on all the fundamental questions, such as that of the organization of the peerage, relative to which, the very nature of the subject and parliamentary etiquette, placed the Deputies under a constitutional pledge.

In this state of things, it was evidently the duty of the communes to declare themselves in the vote of the address, in such a way, as would at once broach the ministerial question which was to take the precedence of all others. The Deputies shrank from this necessity, because they were possessed with the fear, that the enemies of the Cabinet of the 13th of March, were also the enemies of France. The address was good in general spirit, and proper in expression; but it bore a character of indecision and apprehension, which indicated that the new legislature did not comprehend that its mission was to create a system, and to express resolutions rather than generalities obscured by the most circumspect forms of language.

The elective Chamber spoke of the imperious necessity of economy; demanded the reduction of taxes which heavily burthened the poor; took for granted the promise of a disbandment, which it regarded as the *most gratifying conquest of French loyalty*; and, finally, expressed sentiments of sympathy for Poland. But all this tumid phraseology was no direct censure on the system which the ministry had hitherto followed, and in which it announced its intention of persevering.

The nomination of a President to the Chamber, a post which the public wish had assigned to M. Lafitte, was represented by the Cabinet of the 13th of March to be a ministerial question. Strange to say! the very men who affected to regard the late President of the Council as the founder of the system which they approved, peremptorily ejected him from the Chair, and declared that this first trial should be decisive to them. Now, in this scrutiny, the first which revealed the character of the Chamber, the power of the two parties was balanced. A single vote imposed upon France the continuance of the system of the 13th of March: M. Gerod de l'Ain was elected President by 177 votes against 176.

Surely, in every country in which the constitutional regime is not a mere empty word, a ministry supported by a single vote, would have been considered as killed on the spot. Besides, it must be remembered, that at that period forty elections remained to be decided; thirty of which returned patriots to the Chamber. Accordingly, in anticipation of that result, M. Périer had affected a wish to retire, when the denunciation of the armistice by the King of Holland, the renewal of hostilities in Belgium, and the march of a French army to the aid of King Leopold, furnished him with a pretext for continuing at the head of affairs. In the serious circumstances in which France was placed, it was said to be impossible to hazard a dissolution of the cabinet. Such, at least, was the argument with which M. Périer presented himself to the Chamber, to announce his continuance in office, and to express the *unreserved opinion of the government*.

This farce was performed on the occasion of the debates on the Address. The language of the head of the cabinet was haughty and decisive. His domestic policy acknowledged no other programme than the Charter of 1830; and his foreign policy was reduced to the maintenance of peace, and the denial of the

necessity of a war founded on the opposition of the principles of July to the doctrines of absolute monarchies.

Vagueness and indecision were, on both sides, the characteristics of the discussion maintained on this occasion. Public opinion was held in suspense, by what may be termed the sterile fertility of these debates. There was obviously a general disposition to pronounce censure; but it was tempered by the circum-spection of an inexperienced assembly, which fear withheld from fully expressing its sentiments. France knows by how many machinations and intrigues the ministry succeeded in obtaining from these contradictory elements the majority which secured its continuance in office.

I now come to the plans of law on the subjects, of the peerage, the departmental institutions, primary education, finance, &c. These questions, which brought Lafayette into conflict with the adversaries of the revolution, proved him to be invariably consistent with the immutable principles of his whole life.

The report of some petitions presented by the Polish committee, and by several towns of France, praying that the Chamber would recommend the throne to make an official declaration of the nationality of Poland, introduced a discussion on foreign affairs. It was on this occasion that M. Bignon delivered the remarkable speech in which he so justly appreciated the respective situation of the powers of Europe, recommended that the petitions should be referred to the President of the Council, as an act of high importance, and demanded the immediate recognition of Poland.

Two extraordinary events had, M. Bignon observed, accelerated the moment for that recognition. One was the circumstance which had led our troops into Belgium; the other, the dreadful progress of the disease, which, having ravaged Austria and Prussia, rendered war impossible for a considerable time. 'On

the day,' said M. Bignon, 'when our troops entered the Belgian territory, after considering the advantages which we ourselves might derive from that measure, my second thought was to look to it for the means of saving Poland. But alas ! when our ministers were in a situation to make their voices heard and respected, they became the obedient instruments of the declarations of the Conference, and advanced, returned, or halted, just according as they were permitted. In fine, should Poland fall, it would be an advantage to France to have acknowledged her before her fall ; for she would then be authorized to speak more loudly in her favor.'

As it will readily be imagined, the minister for foreign affairs replied to this reasoning by common-place observations, such as the assurance that France had neglected nothing to save the nationality of Poland. The policy adopted by the government was, M. Sebastiani declared, the most conformable to the honor and interests of France, and the Chamber could not in conscience refuse to approve it.

Lafayette rose after the minister, and spoke as follows : —

'After the excellent report you have just heard on petitions to which the members of the Polish Committee, of which I have the honor to form a part, were not strangers ; after the luminous and noble speech of our honorable colleague, who has implored you immediately to recognize the independence of Poland, — the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs you that there is a want of connection of ideas in the proposition that has just been made to you. For my part, Gentlemen, I attach less importance to the connection of diplomatic ideas than to moral ideas, in this question ; and, I must say, that in two various circumstances the conduct of the French government has been very different.

'In Italy (and I have often affirmed this) the con-

duct of our government was marked by weakness; consequently, we have seen Austria take possession of another portion of Italy. But the measures of our government, either in demanding the restoration of the prisoners, who were *pirated* (if I may use the expression) by the Austrian navy, and in giving institutions to Romagna; — all these measures, in consequence of a first weak step, have been attended with none of the success that might have been expected from them.

‘In fact, gentlemen, these persons, who have been re-demanded, are not yet at liberty; and I have reason to believe that revelations are required of them, which would dishonor them if they consented to them; and these amnesties of which we are told, supposing them to be complete, are no hindrance to declarations being demanded from those who proposed to profit by them; which none of you, gentlemen, would be willing to submit to.

‘Let us glance now at what relates to Belgium. She was attempted by the counter-revolution; the patriots were discouraged, dispersed; the danger was pressing, and had not been foreseen. I am not making this a subject of reproach to the Ministry, but rather of praise; for the moment the peril became known, prompt and vigorous measures were taken.

‘Well, gentlemen, let us return to a policy conformable to that of the commencement of the Revolution. Let us speak the language which we spoke to Prussia, when we prevented her entrance into Belgium.

‘Undoubtedly, I ask, as I always have done, the recognition of Polish independence; but a still more imminent danger now assails her — the avowed and practical hostility of Prussia.

‘Poland is strangled by Prussia: it is in Prussia that the principal confidence of Russia is reposed: by Prussia, her lines of communication, which had been interrupted, and would be so still, have been re-established.

‘ The Minister for Foreign Affairs has spoken of the Belgian frontier, fifty leagues from our capital ; and of distant frontiers, which render negotiation difficult. Well, there is also a frontier near enough to us ; and, since Prussia has thought fit to declare herself the enemy of Poland, I entreat the Minister to employ all his means, not only of remonstrance, but of actual protection. For, when we say, we will not suffer such and such things — but if you do them, no evil consequences will ensue to you — we might as well make no remonstrance.

‘ I am far from believing in Austria’s good will towards Poland. In all circumstances, I believe in the ill will of all these powers towards whatever is connected with our revolution. I have a right to believe it, enlightened as I am by the experience of past times ; but I am now pointing to the most pressing danger — the hostility of Prussia towards Poland. All the Polish communications are intercepted by Prussia and Austria : the Prussian government is at this moment wholly devoted to Russia : the police of Berlin and Breslau is a Russian police.

‘ It is, gentlemen, only by strong language, by a language suited to the first days of our revolution, that you will throw an effectual obstacle in the way of this state of things : there is not a moment to lose.

‘ We hear of recent great misfortunes : I deplore them, gentlemen. Truly, it is not for me to seek to excuse popular disorders or violence. To do so, I must, permit me to say it, forget my personal history. But I may remark, that these tidings have yet reached us only through enemies.

‘ I stand, then, upon the Proclamation of the new President, who has given us the details of these events. Although we have as yet no proofs of its authenticity, I am willing to take this Proclamation as the basis of my argument.

‘ But here I find another proof that the Poles have

determined to conquer or perish. They have declared this resolution more loudly than ever. All the chiefs, whether retired or newly installed, express the same sentiment. Gentlemen, the whole of France is Polish, from the veteran of the great army, who speaks of his Polish brothers, down to the children of the schools, who daily send us the produce of their little savings, to aid the Polish cause. Yes, all France is Polish.

‘The French government, I like to believe, is Polish also ; but why, in the name of heaven, does it not manifest its predilections in an energetic manner ? for, after all, it is by energy only that we can succeed.

‘The Emperor of Russia is certainly distant from us ; but he had prepared his armies against us ; this has since been conceded.’ I asserted it at the time, and in doing so made use of an expression too weak for the purpose ; I said that his vanguard had turned upon his order of battle. This saved Europe from an impending war.

‘I know not how far the Emperor of Russia could injure us at the present. Great excitement is spoken of in his military colonies ; of two hundred of his officers having been hanged. We are assured that the Emperor of Russia has compared the conduct of the insurgents of Novogorod to that of the Polish rebels, and the French rebels, who are all alike in his opinion. You know how he treats the Polish rebels ; you may judge how he would act by the French rebels if the means were in his power.

‘I insist then on the immediate recognition of Poland, and can only adhere to the noble proposition of my honorable friend, M. Bignon, who has told us that it is this day, or rather at this very instant, that the independence of Poland should be proclaimed.

‘But a point at the present moment still more urgent, is to prevent Prussia’s stifling Poland ; not that I believe Austria to entertain views at all more favorable to this heroic population, but the danger which

presses the harder upon Poland comes from the quarter of Prussia. I therefore conjure the ministers to display their strength upon this point ; and to speak to Prussia in the language which, in the infancy of our revolution, she could understand, since it prevented her intervention in the affairs of Belgium.'

Warsaw, the last bulwark of the liberty of the north of Europe, fell presently after. This great disaster aroused the just indignation of France ; and all her representatives, who possessed the hearts of men, called to account in the Chamber that servile and cowardly diplomacy which had rendered itself an accomplice in the work of destruction. Tumultuous movements expressed the grief and indignation of the people of Paris on the events in Poland ; and from all parts of France and Europe arose an unanimous cry against the infamous policy, which sacrificed without pity the dearest interests of humanity and civilization at the shrine of aristocracy and absolutism.

Every one may remember the numerous meetings in all quarters, whence issued the simultaneous cry of *Poland for ever, down with the ministers*. It was in the midst of this fermentation that the great debate of the 19th and 20th of September opened. M.M. Mauguin and Lamarque had announced that they would demand explanations on the proceedings of government relative to our foreign affairs. Never had M. Mauguin's eloquence been more forcible. Never, on the contrary did the ministry have recourse to more miserable expedients. Preconcerted ebullitions of choler, passions coolly enacted, pamphlets raked out of the mud, extracts from newspapers, such are the arguments with which it staved off the inquiry demanded upon the influence and results of its systems.

This miserable scaffolding, sustained with a very unfortunate talent by M. Thiers, Lafayette destroyed piece by piece. The Minister for foreign affairs had warmly defended himself against the accusation of

having advised the Polish government to prolong the struggle during two months, in order to give France time to interfere in its behalf. Lafayette convicted him of falsehood, by producing the documents which attested the fact. The discourse which the honorable General pronounced on this occasion, is one of the most remarkable which illustrate our parliamentary history ; the following is its text :

‘Gentlemen, it is not usually for the purpose of parliamentary opposition that I ascend this tribune.

‘However honorable these political struggles, I neither find in my situation nor my taste, motives for consecrating to them the seventy-fifth year of my life. But when I see, or believe I see political institutions diverging from the direction which the revolution of July has given to France ; or when I believe that we are made to descend from the elevation on which that revolution had seated us, I feel that it is my duty to express myself upon such circumstances, not with a petulance that I pity, nor with insinuations to which I have only been accustomed to ascribe their just value, but with frankness and sincerity.

‘The revolution of July had placed us on a proud elevation ; it had not been a revolution ambitious of power, to that truth it had borne sufficient testimony ; and it is perhaps extraordinary, that at the moment when France might, with such fair excuses, have conceived ideas of aggression, she should have thought only of the happiness of the world ; in a word that her triumph has only secured the independence and the liberty of Europe.

‘But the revolution desired that the great work should be accomplished, not by wars, not by battles, but by a system, and the system adopted was that of non-intervention.

‘We are accused of desiring war. Well, it is not true that we invoke it. Commotion and war are two watchwords which have been adopted to vilify us.

But I am bound to assert, that neither our conduct nor our language has given just cause for such attacks and allegations.

‘ But at the same time that we were not bent upon war at any rate, neither did we desire peace at any price ; we did not ask peace at the expense of peace itself. For I aver, (at least it is my opinion) that it is not enough to be prudent according to the definition of foreign powers, but that it is necessary to be firm and energetic in order to preserve peace, and I have sometimes had reason to complain that we have not been sufficiently so.

‘ Gentlemen, after the oration you have just heard, you will excuse me if I reply at some length. I did not anticipate the necessity of refuting, I will not say a scaffolding of history or policy, this expression would not exactly suit ; and I think that even my age would not afford me a dispensation for the use of it.

‘ Nevertheless, I ought to rectify some errors of the last speaker. He has told us that war was not declared till after the 10th of August ; that is till after the disorders which took place on the 10th of August.

‘ The war, or the purpose of making war, dates from the year 1789. The war commenced from the day when foreign cabinets, the cabinets of despotism understood that liberty and equality were the objects of France. War was already in the heart of the celebrated English minister, Pitt, who while pronouncing an eulogium on our revolution, was establishing communications amongst us, and endeavoring by underhand means to provoke disorders in France.

‘ War was the principle of the treaty of Pavia as the memoirs of the times have revealed. Does not all the world know that it was the object of the Treaty of Pilnitz ? That the partition of France there contemplated ? That the proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick contributed more than any other cause to the commotions of Paris ? Was not that proclama-

tion anterior to the epoch named by the last speaker ? Was it not Louis XVI himself who declared war ? Have we not proofs that the enemy was already marching upon our frontier ?

‘ Let us not deceive ourselves on the dispositions of foreign cabinets : democracy is impetuous, and commits the errors of imprudence ; but aristocracy is patient ; it waited three years before declaring war against Spain. Perhaps these recollections should make us uneasy respecting the dispositions of foreign cabinets ; not that we should provoke war, but we should suffer no intervention against our future allies, our brothers in opinion.

‘ We have asked nothing else ; and I should here recall to your minds the words which the ministers for foreign affairs pronounced on the 27th of January. “ The Holy Alliance rested,” said he, “ upon the principle of intervention destructive of the independence of nations. The principle of our revolution should, on the contrary, secure the independence of all.” These sentiments are fine, gentlemen, and we have never professed any other.

‘ I am now come to the observations advanced by the honorable speaker, M. Thiers, on the subject of our regular armies, to which alone he attributes our first successes. I had the honor, during too short a time for my wishes, to belong to these armies ; and I affirm, that two-thirds at least of these armies were composed of battalions of volunteers from our national guards.

‘ It is not, then, correct to say that the first successes were due to the army, which, it must be confessed, had been greatly disorganized by the desertion of its officers, who, after having engaged upon their honor to remain with us, hurried to Coblenz, under pretence of defending the king, who was at Paris.

‘ Truly, I am not the party to deny that discipline is necessary in an army ; but I do not like to hear it

advanced that we must not have recourse to national masses, especially when invasion is possible. We have a fine and brave army — an army of citizens. But calculate the number of troops kept on foot by the powers which differ from us in opinion, and you will acknowledge that the armed intervention of national masses — that the general armament not only of the towns, but of the country — for it is in the country that men most suited for war are to be found — may soon, perhaps, not be a useless plan, nor a plan that should be discouraged.

‘I endeavor to remember the reasons of the last speaker ; but one among them I cannot forget. He has believed, he has ever said, that the crimes and the violences of 1793 were necessary to defend the soil of France.

‘I know that, while they deplore these crimes, many persons, and, perhaps the last speaker himself, have said that these crimes were necessary : the honorable speaker has at least said, that the recurrence of them for the future should be feared.

‘It seems to me moreover that, in a History of the Revolution, of which the last speaker is the author, and in which I have reason to take pride, for he has spoken in it of me in a very obliging manner, it seems to me that, in this history, he deplores the unfortunate necessity to which he supposes the country reduced at that period of the revolution.

‘I do not reproach him with these opinions ; I merely wish to understand his prejudice — but I have a decisive answer to it. The nation at that time was formed by the education of the old *regime* : the existing nation consists of very different materials. Not but that I wholly disown the idea that, in case of attack, we should be in any need of extreme expedients. Liberty neither desires anarchy nor tyranny ; and whatever differences of opinion may exist on other points, I venture to believe that on this one I express the opinions and feelings of the entire country.

‘Here so many assertions present themselves at once, that I am embarrassed in the choice. I must say, however, gentlemen, that seeing with grief, I will not say the dissensions, but the divisions, which exist among the followers of the tri-colored banner, I seek an explanation of them in a difference of opinion, which I do not blame, because opinions are free. But upon this subject I may cite an opinion which is not mine. “Our habits,” said a member of the administration, “are behind-hand with our laws;” which signifies, in other words, that France possesses more liberty than she has a right to require. “Happy,” added he, “if it should not be discovered that there is a necessity for a retrograde movement !”

‘I respect this opinion as I do all opinions ; but it explains our great differences in the discussions held here. With such ideas, it must be acknowledged we run a risk of proceeding to a *quasi*-restoration : these notions are carried to the extent of fearing to permit the number of electors to continue at its present point — that very limited number which sent us to our benches.

‘The same feeling may honestly extend to our exterior relations.

‘I have often thought that, considering the position in which the Revolution of July has placed us, when all the surrounding powers, profiting by our misfortunes, had established themselves in such a manner that there appeared nothing wanting to their convenience, if, instead of granting them peace, we had requested it of them with a humility unworthy of our pride ; if, moreover, we had virtually said to these powers, “Do what you will, you may give us temporary offence, perhaps — but no harm will result to you ;” if, I say, such a line of conduct has been adopted, I think I am entitled to blame it, and to say that we had a right to expect something better of our government.

‘It is therefore that, in our uneasiness, we have demanded an explanation of the minister. But observe, that not being in possession of the documents, all that we can do is to come to the tribune and say, “Here is what we learn from our correspondents; it is for you to produce the official papers;”—for, as M. de Villèle observed, though he did not act upon it, it is with our charts upon the table that we ought to debate upon these points.

‘Gentlemen, the state of Poland has excited the most lively interest throughout France; it is quite plain that the misfortunes of that nation, the taking of Warsaw, have filled France, and all the friends of liberty in Europe, with grief, with sympathy, and with fears that they have not done all they should to prevent those misfortunes. Such fears were natural to those who had proposed, in any case, the recognition of Poland.

‘We have been told that it was a thing impossible: I do not think so. I believe that the recognition of Poland, at the period to which we required it, was not a cause for war. The insurrection in Lithuania being then more complete, their vessels sailing in the Baltic, it would have been easy to forward supplies to Poland, by a port which has been spoken of with some contempt, and which is, in fact, but inconsiderable; and by another, that of Liebau, of which the Lithuanians might undoubtedly have possessed themselves.

‘Unhappily, this can no longer form the subject of our debates!!——’

After some explanations respecting the conduct of the French consul at Warsaw, who, previous to taking the oath to the new government, had presumed to ask permission to do so of the Emperor of Russia, Lafayette entered upon the particular motives which, independently of his private correspondence, had induced him to reproach the minister with having paralyzed the defensive measures of Poland.

‘The public report in Warsaw,’ said he, ‘was that the recommendations of the cabinets of London and Paris would greatly influence the determinations taken by the Poles upon their proceedings and plans of defence.’

‘Besides what I learned by private correspondence from Warsaw, I found in the official publications the following observations by the late government of Czar-torski :

“We have depended upon the honor and wisdom of foreign governments ; confiding in them, we have not made use of all the resources which might have been available from within and without. To gain the approbation of these governments, to merit their confidence, and to obtain their support, we have never for a moment withdrawn from the strictest moderation, which has paralysed many efforts which might have assisted us in this last struggle. Had no promises been held out, we should have struck a blow which might perhaps have proved decisive ; but we thought it necessary to temporise, to leave nothing to chance ; and we have at this moment the *certainly* that nothing *but* chance can save us.”

‘It has been said,’ continued Lafayette, ‘that this was but an article from a gazette. I asked an explanation of the Polish legation ; and here is the answer which I received : —

“In reply to the letter which we have just received from you, Monsieur le Général, we hasten to assure you ; —

“1st. That it was the Minister of Foreign Affairs who influenced us to send, on the 7th, a messenger to Warsaw, the expenses of whose journey he paid ; that the object of this embassy was, as his Excellency the Count Sebastiani had desired, to induce our government to hold out for two months longer, because that time was necessary to complete the negotiations on foot.

“ 2dly. That the circular of our Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 15th of August, signed by the minister *ad interim*, Andrew Horodyski, as well as another circular of the 24th of the same month, signed by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Morawski, reached us by post on the 14th instant; that they are the same which we have already communicated to Count Sebastiani, with our official notice of the 15th of September, and which we immediately transmitted to the public journals, where they appeared on the 17th and 18th; and that these two circulars explain the effect which the errand of the aforesaid messenger produced at Warsaw.

“ LE GENERAL. KNIAZIEWICZ.

“ L. PLATER.”

“ Paris, 20th September, 1831.”

‘ There might be a mistake,’ continued Lafayette, ‘ but you will acknowledge that this matter afforded no pretext for the imputation of evil intentions; and, to conclude the affair of the courier, he is said to have been arrested on pretence of quarantine. But, gentlemen, quarantine regulations are applied to persons coming from infectious countries, not to those who leave a land untouched by contagion,’ &c.

* * * * *

‘ I have always been persuaded, gentlemen, that Prussia might be intimidated by a persistence in the tone first maintained after the days of July. Is it true, the minister can inform us, that Prussia has declared in a diplomatic note, that if she had refrained from armed intervention against Poland, it was because she felt satisfied that the power of Russia was sufficient, unaided, to quell a handful of factious insurgents, but that she should continue to furnish the Russians with succors of all kinds, and would personally act, if necessary, against the Polish rebels ?

An expression I shall find no fault with, having long taken pride in its application to myself by the English in another hemisphere.

‘Is not this a case, gentlemen, for calling on Prussia, not to intermeddle in a cause foreign to her interests? Gentlemen, the Polish nation will still exist; she may be overwhelmed, vanquished; yet, that she will still retain her existence I have no doubt; the noble Polish nation will once more become the barrier of civilization. You see, gentlemen, the partiality with which Prussia has always acted. When the corps of Bartholomé took refuge in Prussia, it was supplied with provisions and ammunition, and only two days afterwards, its rear being still at Memel, its advanced guard was pushed to Polangen; the following day Polangen was carried by assault and destroyed.

‘The minister wishes to inspire us with hope from the disposition of the Russian Emperor; and I would willingly believe the present language will rather fulfil the *decrees of Providence*, than that which declared that the nobles shall be beheaded, the commonalty transported to Siberia, and children to Russia for their education. Assuredly, such expressions were not dictated by Providence.

‘Unhappily, it is now too late to discuss the affairs of Poland, but I please myself with the belief, that so noble a cause is not wholly lost, and that the ministry will yet do all that is necessary to redeem it. I rely on their good intentions, but for a long time I have felt no confidence in the firmness of their tone; and I tell them so with frankness, in perfect good will.

‘If I find that their system, with no ill intention, but through error or blindness, compromises the revolution and the government, to which they will do us the justice to believe that every one of us is attached in proportion to the share we have contributed towards its establishment; — If I find all this, I am

bound to declare, I see in it no cause of hostility to individuals, but a sacred duty to fulfil towards my country.

‘ The last speaker alluded to Italy; he told you it was fortunate that we had not interfered in favor of Italy.

‘ Great service we have doubtless rendered her, by permitting Austria to regain possession of a portion of that beautiful territory, and to re-establish upon it her institutions, her troops, and her magazines !

‘ We have been told of the miseries formerly inflicted on Italy by the French armies. This is not correct. Whatever sufferings the Italians may have been subjected to, their nationality was always respected. Modena, Parma, and Ferrara, do not constitute Italy. It is affected to speak of Romagna instead of the Roman states. Italy would appear to be an empire too vast for us to concern ourselves about its entirety.

‘ Italy aspires to its regeneration in full integrity ; this is the object our armies sought to accomplish ; and they successfully achieved it : the creation of the Cisalpine republic, and subsequently of the kingdom of Italy was its result. Who then can say that our countrymen were the bane of Italy ? That country, on the contrary, still cherishes the remembrance of the benefits we have conferred upon her. Behold the monuments we have left behind us, the roads we opened ; behold the success with which we subdued the system of *brigandage*, which has since been resumed with more audacity than ever ; and must, indeed, ever exist in a country governed by priests and by an aristocracy adverse to every liberal idea.

‘ I cannot, then, think that the Austrian occupation is beneficial to Italy ; and I think that we were censurable, extremely censurable, in suffering Austria to enter that country.

‘ My opinion, I must repeat, is founded on docu-

ments transmitted by the minister himself. This principle of non-intervention has been published; it has been communicated to all the French legations.

‘ If, as it has been insinuated, the Italians have been deceived, it was not by private correspondents. No, gentlemen, no such correspondence has taken place; if such letters, or their answers do exist, let them be produced.

‘ My first correspondence of that nature is of the date of 1776. This correspondence may be proclaimed to the public; nothing would give me more satisfaction. The letters had far better be read here than so frequently referred to.

‘ It is true, that some Italian patriots sought me out, and inquired of me whether they ought to place confidence in the promises of our government. I answered them : *I know nothing about it*. You may, therefore, perceive that my own confidence was already diminished.

‘ Three times did I demand from the tribune, in the face of the Chamber, whether the system of non-intervention was that adopted by the ministry, and I need not remind you, that each time I obtained on this point the unanimous assent of the Chamber and of the ministry.

‘ Well ! do you think, gentlemen, that the Italians were not deceived by these evidences. Do you think that men, who, entrenched themselves behind barricades erected against despotism, that men who took upon them our likeness, (if I may be permitted such an expression) that men who have claimed institutions similar to ours, could fear being abandoned by us ?

‘ It was, probably, the weakness we had shown in regard to Italy which authorized the Dutch to anticipate that we should, with like weakness, peaceably suffer their re-occupation of Belgium. I am willing to believe, that should foreign powers attack us, should they force us to a propagandic war, we should

appeal to the people against despotism and aristocracy. While we leave them at peace, so long as they do not endeavor to destroy the principle of our existence; and provided they will quit the profession of European *gendarmerie*, which we took upon ourselves under the restoration, in the Spanish war; if the people are content, they will be quiet; if not, they will make themselves heard; but we cannot suffer the destruction of our own pillars; we cannot suffer liberty to be extinguished in a small state any more than in a larger, for it is a manifesto against France. Let the right be once established, power will be wanting to enforce it.

‘And that power will be sought and found, if you discourage national masses.

‘It is supposed that an exchequer war must be entered into. No, gentlemen, it is a war of principles, a war of liberty that we must wage.

‘Whatever may have been the representations of the government, is it true that the ameliorations, the amnesties promised have received their fulfilment? The ministry may, perhaps, prove this, but till then I cannot believe it.

‘I must add, that since the amnesty of the Roman States, Rome still contains from forty to fifty prisoners. I speak not only of what is passing in Romagna, but in all the Roman States.

‘It is not true, gentlemen, that all the fine institutions which have been described, are enjoyed by the Italians; neither is it true that the amnesties have been effective. With respect to the persons thrown into irons at Venice in defiance of a capitulation, I have seen an authentic note, by which it appears that they were released only on terms of infamy. I remember, for my own part, that while a prisoner at Olmutz, General Bonaparte requiring our deliverance, the entire embassy waited upon him, and told him — General, we give you our word of honor that the prisoners are at liberty.

“I would lay any wager that that is false,” observed Napoleon; and false it actually was. A declaration was at that very time required from us, which none of us would comply with.

‘I do not suppose that the same game is now playing towards the Parmese prisoners; but I entreat the government to hold, once for all, a language which will enforce attention.

‘I will add a fact, which I hope will be disproved; it relates to some passports, to the delivery of which was annexed conditions quite inadmissible, and to which none of you, gentlemen, would have chosen to submit. In my opinion, we ought to require that passports shall be delivered in the ordinary form; but it is further stated, and I will not do the ministry the wrong to believe such an assertion, it is, however, asserted, that in case of refusal to sign those conditions, the Italians will be expelled from our hospitable land. No, gentlemen, I am not so unjust to our ministry as to credit such a rumor; but I confess that to tranquilize the proscribed refugees, I would wish for a formal denial on the part of ministers.

‘Such declarations cannot be required under any government whatsoever, at least under any tri-colored government, for I do not answer for others.

‘I have long occupied the tribune; nevertheless, I have still a word to say respecting Belgium. It is very certain that when we entered that country, the counter-revolution, the Orange restoration was organized, and that, whether by the banishment of the patriots, or by the cooling of their enthusiasm, but for our timely arrival, the restoration would have been effected.

‘I believe the promises which the Minister of War pronounced in this tribune; I hope also that our troops, whether they remain or are withdrawn, will be at all times ready to repel the invasion which the Prince of Orange’s order of the day announces, and that we

shall again deserve those thanks which with pleasure I acknowledge do honor to King Leopold, because they were sincere, and nobly expressed.

‘Belgium must be what she was, what the revolution of July made her: this deserves the attention of government.

‘Having made these observations, I have only further to express my wish that the official papers which throw light on our religious affairs may be laid before the Chamber.’

The accusation of ministers, an inquiry into the results of their administration, and an address to the king, were the three propositions referred to the examination of the bureaux of the Chamber.

The proposition for inquiry, the most appropriate to the emergency, appeared the more necessary, as it was that which the ministers most dreaded, and contested with the greatest animosity.

Nevertheless, these three propositions were thrown out by an order of the day, the motives of which will be long remembered in France; and the sole result of all these memorable debates was a complete sanction of the system formed since the 13th of March, and an indemnity given to the ministry by a majority of eighty-five votes.

Eighty-five suffrages, in a Chamber which returns a hundred agents of authority, independent of military officers!

A hundred and thirty-six deputies at that time refused their confidence to the ministers: a hundred and forty refuse it at the present day.

In the course of this long discussion, Lafayette had been charged by the President of the Council, of entertaining relations of sympathy with patriots of various countries, and these relations the ministry imputed to him as a crime.

Lafayette eagerly embraced the accusation.

‘I have been reproached,’ said he, ‘with holding

correspondence with the friends of liberty. I have already avowed that my first letter of the kind bears the date of 1776; I have written many since; if any of those letters are supposed to compromise me, I beg those who consider them in that light will print my correspondence; I shall be far from complaining.

‘I am reproached with interesting myself in the Spanish refugees. Gentlemen, in this tribune, and under Charles X, I have loudly proclaimed my sentiments of the constitutional Spaniards, and of the monarch who reigns in Spain. I have, consequently, only to repeat here my fervent wishes, that liberty may triumph there as elsewhere.

‘One circumstance I ought to mention: amidst the regret I experienced from the scenes of violence which occurred yesterday, I was astonished to see two ministers come down and report in the tribune confidential conversations, in which I shall not enter farther; but I cannot forbear representing that it must have appeared very extraordinary to an august interlocutor, that the Chamber should be entertained with conversations of such a nature.*

‘There is one point, however, which was repeatedly reverted to. It was said that the king had been counselled (such was the expression) to destroy the constitution, to seize a dictatorial power, and other similar absurdities.

‘To this I shall make the same reply, as in 1792, when, being at the head of an army, I was impeached in the name of the Legislative Assembly, upon a denunciation made by the Jacobins to that Assembly; my reply was in these three words; *that is untrue.*’

* See the fifth chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

Discussion upon the re-organization of the Peerage — The hereditary system is defended by Messieurs Royer Collard, Thiers and Guizot — The ministry wish for it, and yet wish it not — The constituent question discussed by Lafayette — He draws a sketch of the real services rendered to the people by the aristocracy — His principles upon the hereditary system, &c.

THE great question of the re-organization of the peerage came at length before the chamber of deputies. In abandoning with regret the hereditary principles, the ministry, who had usurped from the communes the initiative right, which in the nature of things devolved upon them, left to its friends the care of defending that principle, to which it plainly manifested its inclination to rally in case the parliamentary majority had shown itself more relenting on the subject than the majority of the nation.

This ground was, therefore defended, inch by inch, by the aristocratical functionaries. Messieurs Thiers, Royer Collard, and Guizot pleaded the cause of the hereditary peerage, with the incontestible talent by which they are distinguished.

Both contended that this question affected, not the mere form, but the very foundation of our government.

‘With the hereditary system,’ said Mr Royer Collard, ‘perishes the peerage; with the peerage the hereditary throne, and in the republic itself the principle of stability, dignity, and duration.’

Messieurs Thiers and Guizot, did but develope and reinforce this argument. M. Guizot, especially, foresaw anarchy in all things, all authorities contested, all

rules of action questioned. The nation was threatened with a universal avalanche against whose distinctive course no other possible barrier could be opposed than the hereditary principle of the peerage.

All the creations produced by the revolutions of July, all that was elective, and by its nature participated in the exercise of popular sovereignty ; the throne, and the national representation, all was mortal, and perishable. Society thus disorganized required for its support something anterior to the revolution of July, something foreign to the will of the people ; this panacea, in short, was the hereditary peerage of the granted charter.

The theory of these three orators, supported by such arguments, was easily overthrown, by the energetic and rational opinion which the ministry of the 13th of March called the national prejudice against the hereditary nature of the peerage ; a prejudice to which, from pure devotion and patriotism, they sacrifice their private conviction. But it was not enough for the adversaries of the legislative privilege to gain a triumph which admitted not of doubt ; it concerned them to explain themselves openly upon a question prejudicial to an order still more important than that which the principal question affected ; viz : whether the claim of the chamber of deputies was well founded, that to it alone belonged the right of constituting the peerage.

Lafayette undertook to maintain the question of the constitutional power, together with the various means of organizing the peerage on the double base of abolishing hereditary right, and admitting the elective principle. In the whole course of this momentous debate there was no speech ; the close reasoning, the logical, though simply deduced, inferences of which more radically overturned the combinations, and disconcerted the calculations of the partisans of the hereditary principle.

‘The committee,’ said he, ‘has invited us to offer our opinion on the question of competency. I shall

argue as a witness might do in a court of justice, by reminding you of facts. But I have first occasion gentlemen, to an attack just made by a respectable orator,* whose voice we have recognized with pleasure from this tribune, against the doctrine of national sovereignty, that imprescriptible right of the people, that vital principle of our social existence. His superior talents, prejudiced by English notions of parliamentary omnipotence, I will not say with him, could not, but would not, comprehend the constituent right. Habits of nearly half a century have familiarized with that idea, and rendered it easy of comprehension.

‘I grant it, gentlemen, and I agree with our honorable colleague, that there is nothing just but justice, nothing reasonable but reason, and it is therefore that the school to which I belong has thought it right to preface its statutes by a simple statement of the rights of men and of societies, rights of which a citizen cannot be deprived, even by an entire nation.

‘But at the same time it has been thought that instead of referring, for the application of these truths, to statutes which are the result of secondary combinations ; instead of referring, I say, to a single individual, were it Plato himself, or even to a society of philosophers, it were better to refer to deputies, chosen expressly to enact, what would thenceforth become the law of the constituted authorities.

‘Gentlemen, I confess that our proceedings have not been so regular, but I am far from admitting that what has taken place has been the produce of physical strength.†

‘After our glorious and eventful days of July, there survived only the national sovereignty and the victori-

* M. Roger Collard.

† This opinion has been warmly possessed by the *Doctrinaires*, and particularly by M. Guizot. The consequences of the argument are apparent ; justice would have defeated that which had been the produce of mere force.

ous people. It was in their name that the nation with one accord took to arms, and appointed its officers ; and that it was signified to the royal family that they had ceased to reign, even before the deposition had been regularly pronounced.

‘ It was in their names that the deputies resident in Paris, seeing the urgency of the circumstances, thought it their duty to seize, for the public benefit, the constituent authority ; confirmed the deposition, erected a popular throne, and called to that throne, notwithstanding his affinity to the fallen family, from a feeling of confidence and personal esteem, *him*, from amongst our citizens, whom they had already named Lieutenant-General of the kingdom.

‘ Perhaps, gentlemen, they ought at this period to have had recourse to a constituent assembly ; this, I acknowledge was my first impression. (Various demonstrations of opinion.)

‘ But the necessity of re-assuring the public mind, a multitude of circumstances, upon which it is easy to pass judgment after the events have taken place, a conviction that the victorious people had a right to demand, and had frankly received, all these motives combined to reconcile us to the order of things that had been established.

‘ In the meantime, gentlemen, the chamber of deputies had deposed one portion of the house of peers, reserving to itself to decide the fate of the other peers, and of the peerage itself, which she adjourned to the next session ; and whatever may have been the adhesions of the chamber of peers, when recalled to our memory ; whatever may have been the royal words or expressions, it is still my firm conviction that to the chamber of deputies alone was bequeathed the remaining constituent power relative to the 23d article of the charter. ‘ The creation of a throne, the foundation and confirmation of that throne, which are achievements accomplished, may establish relations between

the throne and the peerage, even as regards the objects we are now discussing ; but the arguments of an honorable colleague, who spoke in the sitting of yesterday,* were unnecessary to convince me that judgment in its own cause does not belong to the chamber of peers. It would become neither that chamber nor ours ; neither would it consist with the events which marked the commencement of the revolution.

‘ Gentlemen, engagements have been alluded to the nullity of which has been declared : engagements that each of us is under to our constituents. The example of 1789 has been cited,* but the example is still selected. The fact is that in 1789, when many members of the noblesse found themselves engaged against their will to instructions which coincided not with their views, they abstained from voting. The bailiwicks were then convoked to remove our scruples. I considered myself so essentially a member of the Assembly as to propose on the 11th of July the first declaration of rights, and to accept the honor of the presidency during the nights of the 12th, 13th, and 14th of July.

Several deputies pursued the same course. I admit at the same time that those imperative mandates were afterwards annulled by a decree of the constituent assembly. But, gentlemen, what connection is there between those mandates and the declarations which each of us has thought it right to make to our constituents, of our opinion and intended vote upon a question that every one has more or less examined, and upon which opinions appear to me to have been pretty well determined beforehand ?

‘ And let me ask you, is there in the English House of Commons a single individual who has not been required formally to explain what he thinks and how he will act upon the great question of parliamentary reform ?

* M. Berryer.

* M. de Lameth.

‘And supposing some of the members to have refused these explanations, do you think their constituents would have accepted in commutation a theoretical dissertation upon the right of demanding it ?

‘Gentlemen, the great question about to be submitted for your deliberation* appears to me to claim priority over the organization of legislative power. That question, whatever may have been said of it, is the re-establishment in France of the giving root in our soil to an aristocracy.

‘I declared my opinion from this tribune, in the early days of the revolution : aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in our policy. We have heard much of the independence of the aristocracy, of the essential services the throne has derived and may yet derive from it. I have discovered nothing of all this. The Swedish and Danish aristocracies sufficiently oppressed the people, but they were not independent, for they were under the influence of the several courts of Europe which in a manner ranged them under their banners.

‘You have been told that the English aristocracy has been the source of all the prosperity of England ; it has been ascribed as a merit to that aristocracy that it has retarded for fifty years catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform. Gentlemen inquire of the Irish who have suffered so many grievances, so many miseries, what satisfaction they have derived from this service performed by the English aristocracy ?

‘Ask the British people who have so long groaned under the weight of exactions and eternal wars, especially the war against our revolution, ask them if they do not think a better directed House of Commons would not have warded off all the evils of the country ; whether it would not have prevented the enor-

* The amendment upon the proposition of the committee, tending to perpetuate the hereditary principle.

mous increase of paupers who see the propriety of land all accumulated in the hands of the aristocracy ?

‘ And reverting to ourselves, was it not from the aristocracy that our ancient throne received its first blow ? I know it well, for I was of the number, but my friends and I struck on behalf of the people, others to serve their private interests.

‘ And when the third class, for so it was then called, joined the states’-general full of love for the King and of ardor to destroy an oppressive aristocracy, if the King, instead of re-allying himself, pardon me the term, with the aristocracy, had voluntarily co-operated with the real nationality of France, we should have had no cause to dread seeing the interests of the court in unison with those of the emigrants.

‘ In short, had Louis XVI placed himself in the position now so advantageously occupied by Louis Philip, of opposition both to that aristocracy and those emigrants, then the throne and the royal family would not have swallowed up that aristocracy. I will say one word on the comparison drawn by one of the previous speakers, describing the great prosperity England has derived from her aristocracy, and which she would not have enjoyed under a democracy. But the United States are a democracy. Now, let me ask, is less prosperity enjoyed under the influence of the American democracy, than under that of the English aristocracy ? Does industry suffer greater depression in the United States than in England ? On the contrary it is certain that commerce is more active and flourishing in the former than the latter country, and the export tonnage far more considerable in proportion to the population.

‘ We have heard much of the military character of the English aristocracy. Far be it from me to deny the homage due to their valor, their talents, or their glory ; but it seems to be forgotten that during the war, not that of independence, but that of more recent

date, and which has entirely slipped the memory of one of my honorable colleagues,* there was not an instance, or but one at the utmost, in which, when they met on equal terms, the British flag did not strike to that one of the United States.

‘Have we lost sight of the glorious peace, which the American democracy wrung from the English aristocracy at the very time when after the pacification of all Europe she alone remained in hostility with England ; and that that peace was consummated by the battle of New Orleans ? Democracy then triumphed over aristocracy.

‘I now come to the advantages of the hereditary legislation of the peerage. Gentlemen, I have always advocated the system of the two chambers. I know that high authorities have espoused the contrary opinion. Turgot and Franklin were of the number, and I might quote eminent civilians of our own day.

‘It has been observed that the Americans at first, in imitation of the English, adopted two chambers, but afterwards reduced them to one. But this is the reverse of the truth. The states began with a single chamber, and experience made them sensible of the advantages of the double system of representation ; none of them, however, would admit either an hereditary chamber or a combination of different elements.

‘Our respectable colleague* has observed that this chamber divided by a partition-wall would answer as well. To this, I answer a partition would not suffice, but the possession of two distinct chambers separately and alternately discussing the same laws would in itself be a main point gained ; it would be easy to attach to each qualifications which should impress it with a distinct character. I will not specify those qualifications, but they might have reference either to age, to rent-roll, &c.

* M. Guizot.

* M. Royer Collard.

‘ But, say others, an hereditary chamber will be the pillar of the throne, and numerous civilians are cited to that purpose. Permit me, gentlemen, to quote one who will certainly not be arraigned as an enemy of thrones ; or the advocate of democracy republicanism : I mean the celebrated historian and philosopher, *Hume*.

‘ Well, when this eminent illustrator of the rights of nations attempts in his essays to construct the visionary edifice of a perfect monarchy he is brought to the avowal that if in England the commonalty was actually represented, the hereditary chamber would not be sufficiently strong because it would not possess the public confidence ; it would no longer therefore retain the power of supporting the throne or even of supporting itself. He then proceeds to propose the means of securing that confidence to his senate, his house of peers.

‘ I may not coincide in his views of those means, but it is enough for my purpose that he considers an hereditary senate deficient in strength, an extraneous combination necessary to impart that strength.

‘ What has been advanced in favor of the hereditary principle on the score of the education given to young nobles, may be equally applied to notaries, advocates, or judges ; for they may equally educate their children to the prospect of exercising their own profession ; and yet, if any of us should by our own wills direct our children to employ for ever the same advocate or notary, the will would be set aside on the ground of insanity. The argument therefore is not well chosen.

‘ I shall not enter into the detail of the amendments proposed, or to be proposed ; but confine myself by declaring simply and absolutely against the hereditary principle.

‘ I declare also my resolution of voting against

lodging the elective power solely in the King, seeing that such a second chamber representing no party would not be essentially a legislative power, and would not accord with my idea of representative government. I shall support the amendment most in conformity with my own individual opinion. Perhaps, if the cause prove desperate, I may vote for the opinion least at variance with my own that may offer any chance of success.'

The majority against the hereditary system of the chamber of peers in the new elections, augmented as if by enchantment, under the influence of this solemn discussion ; and in the memorable sitting of the 10th of October, three hundred and twenty-four of four hundred and eighteen pronounced against it. So decided a result surpasses the most sanguine hopes that yet remained to the most determined partisans of the revolution ; it opened a series of the most important consequences, for through it France was destined to escape from the yoke of the doctrinaires, from the traditions of the abolished regime, and from the influences created by foreign conquest and occupation.

The serious question however on whom, whether the crown or the nation, the right of nominating peers was to devolve, yet remained to be decided. Was that nomination to lie in the royal pleasure, or was the electoral principle to be applied to it ? Was the peerage to be for life or temporary ? After balancing the advantages of these several systems, M.M. de Brigode and de Ludre presented an amendment to the effect :

1st, That the nomination of members to the chamber of peers belonged to the electoral colleges, meeting in the chief town of the department, in a general assembly susceptible of division into sections :

2ndly, That the number of peers should be fixed at 230, that they should have completed the fortieth year of their age, and should contribute a thousand francs clear to the public taxes ;

3rdly, That the dignity of the peerage should be conferred for fifteen years ;

4thly, That one third of the chamber of peers should be renewed every five years ;

5thly, That the number of peers to be returned by each department should be fixed by law.

Lafayette supported this amendment as that most agreeable to his own opinion. He represented it as also the most favorable to the royal prerogative, since the greatest and most salutary exercise of that prerogative is the right of dissolution. ' If the election is not temporary,' said he, ' you cannot avail yourselves of this right. I am then of opinion that the proposal made to you is advantageous to the royal prerogative, and provides at the same time for the primary design of a representative government, which is the popular choice.

' In short, if you adopt the principle of the absolute royal nomination, you know that that nomination will be multiplied *ad infinitum*. You have just been reminded of persons who put themselves forward for election ; but the government cannot seek out men who conceal themselves ; you must therefore see pretensions plentifully displayed.

' You will find that every ministry has its creatures. Perhaps even the office of the ministry itself may be made subservient to the pleasure of obliging one's friends. Every change of ministry will afford new pretensions, and you know that such changes are not unfrequent in France ; I know not to what amount your royal nomination is likely to extend. Some say, we will fix an additional number ; but when that is filled, what will you do next ?

' If you adopt a senate for life, this again will produce serious inconveniences ; for you will not know how to rid yourselves of an opinion that is prevalent in that chamber ; you may indeed resort to batches, but they are a sorry resource.

‘On the other hand, I conceive that the mode now proposed would confer on the second chamber greater permanency than a general renewal every ten years.* The renewal of a third every five years would tend greatly to strengthen the chamber of peers. There are examples of some standing in favor of this system, in the senate of the United States. We are told of democracy; but all the old diatribes against democracy are annihilated since the invention of representative government. Many objections may still be advanced, but the same arguments no longer apply. We should disencumber ourselves of the habit of pinning our faith upon the opinions of by-gone ages.

‘I allude to Montesquieu, among others, great as his authority is; it has long since been understood that the portion of liberty to which a nation is entitled is not regulated by climate; and that no meteorological observations are necessary for ascertaining the constitution best adapted to a country.

‘I think then that by determining the re-election of the chamber by thirds every five years it will acquire firmness and stability, while the King will retain the right of dissolution. We shall thus obtain not perhaps the best chamber possible, but the least imperfect.

‘I would willingly render it more aristocratic, but really while thirty of our citizens of mature age afford but one elector for the democratic branch of the legislature, it would be difficult to give greater aristocracy to the second chamber.’

This amendment obtained only a hundred and fifty votes, and was rejected.

* This was the original proposition of M. de Brigode.

CHAPTER VIII.

Discussion upon the allowance of a sum of 500,000 francs for the refugees — The ministry wish it to be granted in the light of alms — They attach disgraceful conditions to this aid — Lafayette raises his voice against such infamy — His speech.

FETTERED in the most degrading dependence, the ministry of the 13th of March made rapid strides in the career of humiliation. Every day foreign requisitions branding their foreheads with some new disgrace, compelled them to compromise the revolution by renouncing some national, noble, and generous sentiment. It was not enough they were driven to a breach of promise towards the friends and allies of France; they were further required, as the guarantee of their entire subserviency, providentially to insult from the national tribune those millions of noble fugitives who took refuge on our once hospitable soil from the vindictive wrath of kings.

The ministry demanded of the legislature an allowance of 500,000 francs for alleviating the miseries of those foreigners whom political events had driven to take refuge in France. But as the holy alliance peremptorily required them to insult the brave men they had not dared to defend, they did not blush to declare from the tribune that the assistance would *be granted only from motives of humanity. It is, said they, humanity alone which solicits, and will grant this subsidy.* France had never before listened to so infamous a proposition. Even the restoration gratuitously succored the outlaws who demanded an asylum from it; such succor was not coupled with insult. But the monarchy of July puts a new construction on the

rights of hospitality. Not satisfied with attaching to the noble sufferers who seek her protection the stigma of mendicity, she would stamp them besides as the betrayers of each other ; brave men must pawn their honor for a morsel of bread, or perish of want upon French ground.

The ministerial proposal was to the effect that the prefects, charged with the distribution of this grant, should admit to a participation of it such foreigners only as should engage themselves in writing, to oppose by every means in their power any future attempts that might be made by their fellow-citizens to burst the chains of their country. For themselves, neither shelter nor bread was to be obtained, but on condition of swearing to act as spies and informers against the friends and brethren with whom they had fought side by side in the common cause of their country. In short, the ministry deemed none worthy of their compassion, but the wretches who would consent to their own degradation.

Lafayette opposed himself to this shameful subversion of principle. He maintained that the succor demanded should not be granted in the name of humanity, but in that of justice, of morality, and of true policy; and challenged in the following terms the rights and dignity of courage in misfortune:

‘ I do not ascend the tribune to dispute the avowal of this grant, but the motives assigned by those who, sheltering themselves under the humble pretence of a work of charity, come here to deny and degrade in the face of the French nation the noblest and most obligatory of national sympathies. If the question related to unknown sufferers thrown by accident on our soil, I would subscribe to the alms; but in this case I claim fraternity.

‘ Gentlemen, the fugitives under consideration, are our brothers in liberty; I will assert it with pride: they are our disciples of 1789, they are disciples of the

doctrine proclaimed in France respecting the rights and sacred duty of resistance to oppression.

‘They would have been the most devoted of our allies, whenever the counter-revolutionary power unable longer to conceal its designs, advanced against us, had it not been previously arrested by that heroic Poland, whose name should not be uttered without remorse, or at least, without bitter grief, if it was in our power to have served her more effectively than we have done.

‘The Poles, gentlemen, were shedding their blood in torrents for us at the very time that it was triumphantly proclaimed from this tribune, as a political axiom of profound sagacity: “French blood belongs to France alone.” As if, gentlemen, the protection of allies, the national honor, provision for the future, was not in many cases France herself!

‘Gentlemen, I regret that in the explanation of motives, so much consideration is shown, (for it can proceed from no other cause) for arbitrary governments. We owe them none, and I will take the opportunity of avowing that I have often heard with regret from this tribune, when our domestic measures have been under consideration, reference made to the light in which foreign governments would view them. We have been recommended to be *prudent*; let us be prudent for ourselves, but not for them.

‘It was with pleasure that I heard the minister for foreign affairs, the other day, repel with indignation the suspicion of under-rating to foreign powers, or to their representatives, those persons who do not participate in the ministerial sentiments; but the tribune has its echo, and by dint of repeating there that the opposers of your opinion are the provokers of disorders, and thirst for the blood of Europe, you are indirectly guilty of that which is acknowledged to be on the part of any government, an unpatriotic act and a species of treason.

‘Several honorable members, and especially the Attorney-General Joly, by reminding you of numerous facts, have much abridged what I should have to say; some of them nevertheless I must recapitulate. M. Joly has spoken of Spain; it is true that our duties towards that country are important. You will remember the events of a war of which I fully as much disapproved as of the royal war; I mean the Imperial war and the pilfering of the Spanish sovereignty, at which so many of our citizens were indignant.

‘But at that period many Spaniards believed that a close connexion with us would be an additional means of civilization to their country; they have taken refuge in France and we ought to protect them: this is not the concern of a certain ministry; it must not be said: *I was not minister then.* France was France; and the engagements entered into with those persons are as sacred as the treaties of 1815 of which you take so much account, although they were entered into entirely against our interests and tend to our ruin.

‘At the head of these *Josephinos* gentlemen, may I not rank the Prince who has sworn allegiance to King Joseph, who annually illuminated on the fête of St Napoleon, who congratulated the Emperor on the taking of Madrid; I mean Ferdinand VIIth now King of Spain? He also has revenged the *Josephinos* and Napoleon against the Cortes who had fought for him, and without him, for if he had been there, undoubtedly they would not have fought. He has incarcerated them, sent them to the galleys, and in fine has made these courageous men to whom he was under the most sacred obligations, the victims of every possible atrocity.

‘A second emigration took place gentlemen, on the declaration of that war so perfidiously prepared, when Louis XVIIIth, with that thorough hypocrisy, of which I had former experience, when he went to the Hotel-de-Ville to deny having had any communication

with the unfortunate and discreet Favras, came here to assure us, that it was a frightful calumny against his government to suppose that the *cordon sanitaire* could have any political object.

‘ The same man did not blush to come here, a year afterwards, to boast of having formed a *cordon sanitaire* for the destruction of Spanish liberty.

‘ That was, gentlemen, an era of grief and shame for us, which I do not like to recall. I am however, bound to say in homage to the memory of the illustrious and unfortunate Riego, that he was delivered up to the Spanish authorities by a French detachment, acting under the order of the Duke d’Angoulême. And that Riego, to whom Ferdinand VIIth said, when he kissed his hands, *I owe my life to you*, perished on the scaffold!

‘ Ferdinand VIIth commanded his punishment, and on the day of his execution the streets of Madrid were lined with French troops who seemed to have presided over it. These, gentlemen, are the injuries we have to repair; it is not our fault, it is not the fault of the President of the Council, nor of my honorable friends of the opposition; but it is not less true that we have reparations to make, and that these duties are not simply works of charity.

‘ With respect to the more recent affairs of Spain, I have already had the honor of observing to you, that I shall but slightly notice them from this tribune. Nevertheless, as one of our honorable colleagues has had the discretion not to name the one of his fellow citizens who took a lively interest in this movement, I am come here to claim the responsibility of it. At the moment when the minister of Spain, M. Calomarde, published a most insolent official proclamation against our revolution, and against the King whom we had chosen, I renewed the vow which I had previously taken, and which under the late government, I had come to proclaim from this tribune.

‘Our obligations and duties towards Italy are also great.

‘It is not my fault if, after repeating the same things eight or ten times, I am always answered with the same objections. No, it was not [the leaders of liberal opinions in France who induced the Italians to commence their revolution. I have already had the honor of mentioning, that some refugees came to ask of me whether they might confide in the government, and that I replied to them: I know nothing of the matter, I cannot answer for it.’

Here the President of the Council exhibited signs of anger.

‘M. President of the Council,’ resumed M. Lafayette, ‘I am not speaking of you personally. I am speaking of the ministry of that day. I could cite several of your colleagues to whom my doubts applied. I said then to these refugees: The existing system is no longer mine; all that I can do is to come to the tribune, there exhibit my system of non-intervention, and maintain that this principle consists in not permitting a foreign armed intervention against other nations. I came here, in fact, to say, what the minister for foreign affairs himself said, and what has been repeated a hundred times by as many different persons. Well, I repeated it three times from this tribune, and three times I had the assent of the chamber, which has not recalled its assent; I had also that of the ministers who signified their acquiescence in my opinion, as far as I can remember. I endeavored to obtain as general a consent as possible in this principle, and I make no exceptions.

‘I fully believed, I acknowledge, that when Austria threatened to take possession of Italy, this engagement would be fulfilled; this engagement made in the first instance by the revolution of July; for when we effected this revolution, it was neither an event, nor a simple revolt of the law against a viola-

tion of the Charter; it became a popular revolution, a revolution in which happily no one interfered except the conquering people, until that people recovered certain rights, certain institutions, amongst others for example, that of a national guard naming its officers; an institution, which even the men who persisted in their exclusive preference for standing armies alone, can no longer wrest from the people.'

The President of the Council, with warmth: 'For my part, I protest against this explanation of the revolution of July.'

'I give to the President of the Council the full benefit of his personal protection,' continued Lafayette.

'Has not the government officially declared to the ambassador at Paris, and has it not caused our ambassadors at foreign courts to declare that it would never permit the armed entrance of the Austrians into Italy? Was not this giving to the insurgents an assurance that they would have only Italian troops to combat? Could they have attempted to make war against the power of the House of Austria, if your words pronounced in this place, and the despatches addressed by you to your ambassadors had not satisfied them that the Austrians would have been withheld from marching upon them to overwhelm them? Did they not know that every thing was prepared for opposition to Austria, and that a marshal of France was destined to take a command? In fact, all was ready, when the government stopped short, I neither know why nor how: I will not cite dates, but facts only.

'Could any one divine that a letter, announcing the movements of the Austrians would be kept three days without being communicated to the council?

'Since that time we have heard much of amnesties, of methods taken to soften the lot of the Italians. I do justice to the government, gentlemen. Whenever

it is not restrained by a timidity which for my part I do not share, it has done its utmost to ameliorate the fate of the insurgents. But when our ministers demanded an amnesty, when they obtained one, do they themselves reckon much upon its execution?

‘ Thus they honestly and frankly demanded the deliverance of the unfortunate prisoners of Venice,* prisoners taken in contempt of a capitulation, by an act of meanness and piracy of which the disgrace will never be effaced. Their liberation was promised you, and you have not yet obtained it. It is not your fault I know that when you make requisitions, you are answered with falsehood, and that they make promises the execution of which you have no means of enforcing. Arbitrary governments possess an ingenious means of ridding themselves of obnoxious persons included in an amnesty; it is to receive them into favor and three days after to deliver them up, under I know not what pretences, to be judged by I know not what tribunals. Thus in 1823, a Cardinal Rivarola, in a single day, arbitrarily condemned to death, to the galleys, to perpetual imprisonment, and to exile, more than six hundred inhabitants of the unfortunate province of Romagna.

‘ Who does not know the fate of the unfortunate Palavicini, the companion of the virtuous Count Gonalonieri, whose interesting wife has lately died of grief? Compromised in that conspiracy, which did not confine itself to designing for Italy the blessings of the Austrian yoke, he escaped from Milan. His unfortunate mother applied to the government to know if he might be permitted to return; the government passed its word; she wrote two letters to her son, who at length rejoined her; he wished to interest himself on behalf of one of his friends. He was arrested and

* The same unfortunate men, who after twelve months of the most horrible captivity have just disembarked at Toulou.

condemned to death! He is at the present moment undergoing a punishment worse than death, in the prisons of Spielberg, of which you know the horrors.

‘Gentlemen, I have been speaking of past times, but in truth when the question relates to death, the galleys, exile and other torments inflicted on men who have committed no offence, except that of doing as we have done, of desiring what we have desired, it is worth while to inquire whether the promises made to us have been kept.

‘But we have other proscribed patriots to think of who are not yet arrived. I hope they will be objects of the government’s solicitude, as they have already been of that of the country. I have reason to believe that of the members of the government, diet and army of Poland, none, or very few have taken the oaths of allegiance to the conqueror. They have preferred the misfortune of exile and all the evils they are likely to suffer from the animosity of the neighboring governments to such submission.

‘I shall only say, that if I am well informed the confiscations have already commenced and already they speak of sending the suspected to Siberia. And why should they not, since for fifteen years it has been the practice of the Russian government? We know how many thousand Poles have been exiled to Siberia. But the present is not the time for entering upon the details of this subject; I hope that we shall be unanimous when they come to be discussed.

‘I feel, gentlemen, that it is difficult for diplomatic negotiations to hinder these cruelties of vengeance, and for this reason it was that we were anxious our government should have employed not prayers only, but more energetic measures to save Poland, (murmurs from the centres.) I do not wish to excite fresh murmurs in referring to what is past respecting Poland; I merely say, that we were at least entitled to object against the violation of the treaties of 1814

and 1815 with respect to Poland ; for during fifteen years, Poland endured this violation. We had a right to recognize the Polish government : we had a right to send vessels to the Baltic and to favor the exports of commerce in performing an act of strict justice and humanity. Who could deny the right of French commerce to carry munitions and succor to Poland ?

‘ It will be said that that was impossible ; we have proved the contrary ; a report of our Polish committee will prove to you that a vessel sent by us with arms and amunitions, reached the coast of Lithuania. It was too late ; but all the Poles assure us that if this measure, so loudly demanded by us had been taken earlier, the Lithuanian insurrection would have been sustained and Poland would not have perished ; yet we should not in this case have done what the Prussians did in opening the port of Dantzick to the Russians.

‘ I have thought it necessary, gentlemen, to protest against those testimonies of christian humility, which consist in declaring to the arbitrary powers, that we have no sympathy with the refugees, and that we only wish to perform by them an act of charity. No, gentlemen : we owe our sympathy to all who desire liberty ; this is not armed propagandism ; you know very well that armed propagandism was not proposed for Italy.

‘ We propose to you to defend against foreign aggression, the vital principle of our existence, the principle without which we should all be usurpers, criminals without which Louis-Philippe and Leopold would not be Kings, without which we should deserve the designation of rebels, which has been given to our imitators and to which, for my part I have no objection to, for I had the honor to receive it long since, from the English in the American war.

‘ One word more, gentlemen. I wish to make

another protestation against that ordinance, in virtue of a law which has been exhumed from the archives of the republic and which confers upon the government the right of enforcing an *alien bill*. Truly this is not one of those republican institutions with which I could have wished to surround the throne of July. It is a weapon of despotism, one of those laws which I regret to see revived.

‘Foreigners, they say, have been compromised in the *émeutes*. I have had occasion to collect information on that subject. I have seen that two or three foreigners have been arrested at Paris and that they have been released for want of evidence against them. But, let us suppose, gentlemen, that some one or two of these strangers should be compromised; the refugees are more than five thousand; would this be a reason for subjecting them to arbitrary measures, for forgetting the laws of hospitality, the rights of gratitude.

‘It is justice here to recall a circumstance honorable to the late government. M. Hyde de Neuville, then minister of the marine acted excellently by the Portuguese refugees, when, driven from Terceira by the cannon, I will not say of England, I will not do so much injustice to the English people, but by the cannon of the Wellington party, they were received in France with a generous hospitality.

‘I cannot mention Portugal without speaking of the monster under whose sway it groans at this moment. If this monster is not speedily overthrown, there is no knowing to what excess he may resort. But they tell us, Lisbon may deliver herself. She scarcely can in the state of terror in which she is plunged. Her dungeons contain twenty-four thousand prisoners, who are hourly menaced with death; and twenty-five thousand estates are threatened with confiscation.

‘I know that it would be unjust to reproach our

ministers with this state of things ; but I cannot descend from the tribune, without expressing the most ardent desire, that if the people of Portugal rouse themselves to shake off this horrible yoke, they may not be prevented by their neighbors.

‘ But notwithstanding the serious errors with which I charge the ministry in departing from our true system, I do it the justice to believe, that if certain neighboring countries should interfere to assist Don Miguel, while England would not forget the faith of its treaties, neither would France forget, in this particular, the obligations of its non-intervention system.’

The instruction to be gathered from this debate is, that in the secret opinion of the government, the revolution of July has been but a fortuitous event, without cause, without object, without moral effect, and in the name of which, the nation had no right to demand consequences which it had never been commissioned to produce. M. P  rier’s protesting with warmth against Lafayette’s opinion, that the occurrences of July did not constitute a single event, but a vehement revolutionary struggle, denoted the point to which the retrograde movement of the 13th of March had already brought us.

It remained to be proved whether M. P  rier or Lafayette was invested with the more efficient character for describing the true nature and object of this revolution. Posterity will decide whether, in the absence of that formal expression of the national will, which Lafayette had required at the Hotel-de-Ville, the agreement of the immense majority of electors to overthrow the hereditary principle of the peerage, and to introduce, by this act, an immense change in the system of government, is not sufficient to annihilate the ministerial doctrine, and to give the sanction of the country to the principles of Lafayette.

The men of the 7th of August pretended again to have found the approbation of their acts in the multi-

tude of addresses and deputations which came from all quarters of France to salute their accession. But it is precisely by consulting these cotemporary testimonies of public opinion, that we discover the certainty, that the entire country understood the revolution of July, in the sense which Lafayette attributed to it. Is it not, in fact, well known, that all the deputations sent to the Palais Royal, during the three first months were, above all things, commissioned to express to our first citizen, the sympathy of their constituents ? It is then precisely from these deputations and these addresses, that the man of the Hotel-de-Ville derives his most incontestable right to consider himself the organ of the revolution of 1830.

CHAPTER IX.

Debates on the decorations, and promotions granted in the expedition to Lyons — The ministry is accused of having desired a restoration in Belgium — Lamarque, Manguin, and Lafayette demand the formation of Polish legions — M. de Saint Aulaire and the Pope.

ON the 1st of February the chamber of deputies was required to employ itself, to the exclusion of all other business, in discussing a supplementary vote of credit of eighteen millions, destined to settle the expenses not comprised in the military budget of 1831. These expenses arose out of the campaign of Belgium, and the expeditions to Ancona and Lyons; and, according to the minister, any delay in voting this law, would be a serious reflection on the credit of government, because the funds required were destined to the acquittal of debts already contracted, established by a royal ordinance.

This incident, thrown into the midst of the discussion upon Kessner's affair, produced an animated discussion on the excessive expenses of the general staff of the army, and particularly upon the sum of one hundred and sixty thousand francs, allowed to the commander-in-chief of the army of the north. The minister attempted to justify the extravagance of this appropriation, by the persuasion he entertained, said he, that a war was impending, and by the necessity of furnishing Marshal Gérard, with the means of *acquiring secret* information, and becoming acquainted with the movements of the *enemy*.

This was bringing back the discussion to the subject of our foreign policy.

General Lamarque summoned the minister of war

to explain those sinister combinations which had authorized the chief of the British cabinet to declare, only a few days before to the throne and to the peers in England, *that the French government was desirous of seeing the Prince of Orange re-established in Belgium, and that this desire had been cordially and sincerely expressed.** Then, proceeding to the expedition to Lyons, the illustrious deputy of the Landes severely blamed the expense and the profusion of decorations and promotions which this expedition had caused. 'Triumphs, recompenses, and decorations in a civil war!' cried Lamarque, 'are they ignorant then that the bayonets of our soldiers thirst only for foreign blood;† this they shed without regret as without remorse. It gives brilliant colors to our decoration; but French blood, shed by Frenchmen, can but give a black tincture, and your decorations should be suspended to crape.'

Marshal Soult rebutted, as an insult to government, the accusation of favoring a restoration in Belgium. But Lafayette changed the subject of the debate by calling the attention of the chamber to what was passing Italy, where a French ambassador‡ had just affixed his signature to one of the most insolent manifestoes which the Holy Alliance had yet fulminated against the rights of the people.

* Expressions of Lord Grey in the house of peers on the 26th of January.

† However fine this piece of declamation may be as a passage of oratory, the friends of humanity cannot participate in the opinion of the illustrious general, that the effusion of foreign blood should cost neither regret nor remorse: No! the bayonets of France, intelligent as they are become, do not thirst for foreign blood. This blood they will shed with their own for the good of the country, but in deploring the blindness, which, to the disgrace of civilization, still arms the different branches of the human family in the interests of some miserable despots.

‡ M. de Saint Aulaire.

‘Having,’ said he, ‘afforded the ministry an opportunity of explaining itself upon its alleged agreement with the English government respecting the interests of the house of Nassau, he must now be allowed to make the still more necessary disavowal of a declaration which we have seen in the official journal of Rome ; a declaration in which a French ambassador, imitating the language of the congress of Verona, and the principles of the Spanish counter-revolution, has dared to designate as factions, men who have only claimed the just exercise of a portion of those rights which France has re-conquered.

‘I wish to believe that the government which has emerged from the revolution of July has had no part in this declaration, and that it will not acknowledge the words of an ambassador, who could say that France will employ in concert with those who are called her allies, (meaning without doubt the congress of Vienna and Verona) all her means to reduce to obedience these factious subjects, whose conduct cannot be too much admired.

‘I have now an opportunity of alluding to what has transpired in Italy. I shall not recur to our former subjects of complaint respecting the non-execution of the principle of non-intervention which we had announced ; I shall only confine myself to recent events. The government may have reposed confidence in the infallibility of the holy see ; but I have no hesitation in affirming that the holy see has departed from the truth, when it pretended that it granted certain rights to the inhabitants of Romagna.

This is not the case ; the inhabitants of the Roman states have not had granted to them what they possessed previously to the congress of Vienna, but have been deceived by the promises which were made to them — promises which have been totally disregarded.

‘New judges, they say, have been nominated : but let us suppose that under the dominion of a despotic

government, their decisions can be sound, which I do not believe possible, have not the inquisition and every other species of deception and vengeance been suffered to exist ?

‘ I am not an admirer of protocols, and conferences, but however, the powers which we called the great powers, had expressed certain intentions, which intentions, I state in direct terms, have unfortunately never been fulfilled — the pledges which they gave have been violated.

‘ I am happy to think that our government will regret having been deceived by the court of Rome ; but how can I rely on the success of its steps, near that court, when I see that the promise of liberating the prisoners brought to Venice through the means of Austrian piracy, has not yet been carried into effect, and that they are still incarcerated in Venice ? But, hold, I am deceived, for fifteen of them have been just sent to Milan to be tried by a special commission, and, gentlemen, you all know what special commissions are at Milan.

‘ Every one is acquainted with the recent events in Romagna. The Italians are accused of want of perseverance : alas ! nothing could be more persevering, and, at the same time, more wise and firm than the conduct of the citizens of that country.

‘ But they have been surrounded by the Austrian troops, they have been attacked by the army of Rome, which was raised at great expense — I know not at what expense, and composed of I know not what. Forces far superior to those which the Romagnan militia could have displayed.

‘ It is certain there would have been greater resistance in Romagna, if the declaration of the powers to which the French ambassador was a party, had not disorganized their operations of defence.

‘ When the Romagnan troops were surrounded in every direction, and after this declaration of the pow-

ers of sound judgment and discretion, men were found who maintained, that under such circumstances, resistance was unnecessary.

‘ Just as if, gentlemen, before a threat of restoration made by the coalition of Europe, there were persons in France who gave the wise and prudent advice not to resist a disgraceful transaction !

‘ But happily for us the French people would rise, to a man, in order to stifle this dastardly advice ; because they are numerous and powerful, and especially if, in the defence, there was no fear in the people, the nation is in a condition to resist all Europe combined against it.

‘ It was not so even with the wise and prudent people, whose moderation may perhaps be praised, and who thought it their duty to compromise with the troops of the Pope, and combined Europe ; for the declaration made at Rome is merely a combination of what are called the great powers.

‘ Alas ! while the wise conducted themselves in this manner, the rash and foolish, amongst whom I should consider myself honored in being numbered, resisted, and resisted with very inferior forces. And let it not be said, they offered no defence — that they did not fight : such an assertion would be to join calumny and falsehood to the slight interest which has been manifested in their behalf. Blood was shed ; more, perhaps, than we imagine ; for all the statements have not yet come to our knowledge.

‘ I do the government justice in saying, that when they heard of this misfortune, they despatched a courier to do all that was in his power ; but I must add, that the only means of re-establishing tranquillity in that country, and of preventing Romagna from being deplorably subjected and distracted, is to secure to it free institutions — to preserve, more particularly, its civic guard, which alone can maintain public order against the depredations which will be excited there

from Rome and other places. In a word, it is by liberty alone that you can repair the evils which have arisen.

‘I am of opinion, therefore, that the most formal disavowal of the declaration, made at Rome, and the influence of France to secure the Romagnans a sincere and unrestrained liberty, are the best means of repairing the disasters under which they groan.’

The keeper of the seals, in defending the conduct of the ministry in the affairs of Italy, having said, that it was generous on the part of the general to wish to establish everywhere the French charter and national guard — but that in respect to foreign countries, we could offer nothing more than advice, — General Lafayette replied in these terms : —

‘I have no inclination to trespass on the time of the chamber ; it is, however, impossible for me to suffer one of the assertions of the minister of justice to pass without making a reply. It would seem, from what he has said, that we have had only advice to give. We have, nevertheless, declared here, in this tribune, on the bench of ministers : — in short, everywhere that we would not suffer the intervention of Austria, in the affairs of Italy, and that we would be faithful to our system of non-intervention. We have declared it to all the powers — we have made it known to their ambassadors, and also to our own. We have not kept our promise — we have, then, failed in sincerity to ourselves ; for our honor required that we should keep the promises which we had made. In confiding in these manifestations, the Italian patriots have done us greater honor than we deserve ; for they believed we should be faithful to our own declarations. I regret being under the necessity of recurring to this subject ; but, I repeat, I am compelled to it by the assertion of the keeper of the seals.

‘I only wished to speak, (and I explained myself frankly,) on the steps taken near the court of Rome,

and the declarations made at this tribunal, that measures had been taken to secure the liberty of the Romagnans, and for the Roman states enjoying, at least, the rights which they had before the congress of Vienna, and before that unhappy and disastrous period at which an infamous conspiracy of the powers against the human race was formed. It is not less true, that trickery is manifest in all this. The Romagnans have not obtained what was said to have been granted them. Every person who is acquainted with that country, can say so; the liberation of the prisoners detained at Venice, although the French government has not relaxed in its demands, has not even been obtained. A number of these prisoners, I repeat, is, at present before special commissioners at Milan. I am inclined to believe, that in this second affair, the government of the King has been deceived.

‘I have rendered ample justice to the government; I have given them my thanks for having done, at this moment, all that was in their power to soften the horrors of this counter-revolution; but I conceived it incumbent upon me to inform them that it was their duty—that it concerned the honor of the French nation—publicly to disavow the declaration which has gone forth in its name. This resemblance, this homogeneous form of language of the French ambassador, with the principles of the holy alliance and congress of Vienna, are unworthy of a government that emanates from the revolution of July, and from the barricades—and I think I do the government a service by allowing them an opportunity of making this disavowal.’

All sympathy for Poland had forsaken the heart of the government. It would seem that the more the misfortunes of this heroic people increased, the more the conduct of the ministers became towards them harsh and vexatious. The frightful disaster of Warsaw, instead of rousing in them any of those generous

sentiments which had burst forth from the bosom of the nation, seemed only to have been a fresh signal of persecution against those illustrious remains of the holiest of causes. To some, who were anxious to escape by flight from the knout of the Muscovite, passports were refused; to others, the rank of office, which the national government had conferred on them, was an object of contention because some few *sous*, more or less, attached to such or such a grade. 'Was it,' the clerk of the ambassador coldly inquired, 'before or during the assault of Warsaw, that you were named lieutenant or captain? Was the ink, with which your commission was written, dried by the cannon of Groschow, or that of Praga? Was the Russian, one, or thirty leagues from the walls of Warsaw, when your country decorated you with the insignia, still black with powder, which I perceive upon your shoulder? Let us examine minutely; for if, when you were made officer, Paskewitch could discern the smoke of your dwellings, you are, according to the government, constituted by the barricades of July, only a soldier, to whom France owes no other asylum than a barrack, and no other charity than a *ration*.'

Then, on their arrival upon our frontiers, all these unfortunates were driven back, as if infected with a plague, from the roads to Paris, and directed to places, where, it was supposed, their scars and noble misery would find the least sympathy.

These vexations, odiously gratuitous, had produced in France a general indignation, when, in the discussion of the budget, the minister came forward to ask the chamber for an allowance of 600,000 francs for the relief of *Spanish, Italian and other refugees*. This demand gave rise to a warm discussion, during which M. Mauguin placed upon the bureau a petition from the Polish refugees requesting to be admitted into the legions organized under the national standard. It is easy to conceive what a ferment this petition occa-

sioned amongst the *doctrinaires*. M. Dupin, in a speech which a deputy qualified as the language of the Holy-Alliance, sustained that it was asking France to abdicate her nationality — that the constitution, laws and all the advantages of the political association were reserved for the natives — that the Poles came amongst us as conquerors, dictating to us laws and considering themselves as *a people in the midst of a people*, whilst they ought to invoke in their favor the simple benefit of the right of nations. And was there not a great number of those proscribed persons who abused the title of exiles into France for the purpose of mingling themselves with the civil troubles of the country, to disturb the populace and foment disorders?

Lafayette could not remain insensible to so many outrages against the children of Poland.

‘I shall reply,’ said he, ‘in only a few words to the species of denunciation which has just been made from this tribune, and say that if there are foreigners who take part in these conspiracies they must be named.’

‘In the mean time we have sacred duties to fulfil towards foreigners of several nations. Recall to mind what Spain was when the French army entered it; it was tranquil, order reigned and civilization was making progress. The French army went there to destroy that civilization, and to raise again the despotic and sanguinary throne of Ferdinand VII. I shall not recall to mind the murders and crimes committed since that period, and which have been followed by the abominable massacre recently perpetrated.*

‘When the Spanish refugees came into France, do you suppose that there was not some particular duty to be observed towards them? Do you think that

* Alluding to the assassination of General Torrijos and thirty other proscribed persons.

they were mere travellers to whom you should refuse the rights of hospitality as the orator who has just descended from the tribune has affirmed ? These advantages belong to every one, and there are certain natural rights of which foreigners ought not to be deprived.

‘As for Italy, I spoke some days ago of that pontifical army which has just entered Romagna under the auspices of a new Holy-Alliance, of which the French government formed a part. Do you know what was its first act ? It was to sack a church and to make a mark of the holy vase to fire at. You know besides all the murder of which it has been guilty.

‘I shall not enter into the details, for of those I shall be able to speak in the discussion of foreign affairs. Nevertheless I shall observe in respect to Italy, that upon the faith of the amnesty you sent back many Italians to their country ; and do you imagine that among those who have just been massacred there were not some who had returned to Italy through confidence in your promises of amnesty ? There are still men towards whom we have sacred duties to fulfil and a reparation to make : I say reparation without adding any thing to it — you know to what I would allude.

‘As to the Poles, you have all in this place answered for the nationality of Poland. Alas ! where is that nationality. Poles come to you ; remember it is your duty to make as many of them come as possible. I am inclined to think that the government sends aid and facilitates the means of their arrival ; for every Pole whom you bring is snatched from Siberia and the scaffold ; and observe above all, that it is the heroic Polish army, which has received just praise, has preferred expiration rather than submission to the yoke of its oppressors, that we hesitate to form into Polish battalions.

‘Yes, gentlemen, it is our duty to draw here the greatest number possible of those heroic soldiers who

were to have been the advanced guard of Russia against us. But as I have already stated on another occasion, this advanced guard has turned against the body of the army, and adverted the war which threatened us. This was at first denied ; but I have proved it ; and it is acknowledged.'

The president of the council having made from his place a sign of disapprobation.

'Do you still doubt Mr President of the Council, that Russia had the intention of making war upon us ? The Poles have averted the war from you, that war which was so much apprehended and which it was so much our interest to avoid ; and certainly your gratitude ought to be great, it ought to be unbounded towards them.

'Under existing circumstances you cannot yourself refuse to form Polish battalions. A part of them ask to have a Polish standard. The sovereignty of the French people would not suffer any loss ; and the nationality which you have promised to the Poles would be again found under the standard which they would bear in France. And if I thought that the principle of national sovereignty would suffer from it, you know well that I would not ask it. Besides it is only a secondary demand.

'In order to organize these Polish battalions, it would be necessary to modify the law in some degree as it respects foreign regiments in the service of France ; and you would inspire the whole nation with the liveliest enthusiasm.

'If you think that I exaggerate, ask not only their old comrades, but every generation of the French people, wherever the noble remains of the Polish army has passed ; ask them if the name alone of a Pole has not awakened in them the liveliest sentiments ? Fear not to form Polish battalions.

'If there exist any foreign jealousy that can take umbrage at this, it would be another reason for insis-

ting on this point ; for there would be cowardice and a failing of French honor to yield to such exigencies.

‘ This is the demand which is made on you ; I support it with all my power, and boldly declare that it will be supported by the whole of France.’

CHAPTER X.

The minister avows his counter-revolutionary principles—Lafayette brings to recollection the principles of July—A dispute on this point between Lafayette and M. Casimir Périer—He refutes the accusation directed against the opposition of having given bad advice to foreign patriots—The part which our soldiers acted in Italy.

THE chamber proceeded in the discussion of the budget. The ministerial committee, named by the bureau, hurried through the financial operations with a rapidity so scandalous that the discussions of the Chamber offered no interest except in the political explanations to which the firmness of the opposition each day constrained the ministry. These explanations rendered conspicuous the errors which had been committed by a system that was narrow-minded, grovelling, ungenerous, and unpatriotic, and also the evil which it had produced and the embarrassments which it entailed on itself for the future.

These last debates impressed on the termination of this session a character which will distinguish it in history as the most lamentable obstacle that has retarded in France the march of liberty and civilization. One and twenty months have elapsed since the revolution of July, and the throne, based on that glorious event, announced in triumph that it had just been admitted in the alliance of the great powers. This was the mission of the thirteenth of March; but was it also the destiny of France? And at what price moreover had the ministry fulfilled this sad mission? It was enough to have assisted with arms in hand at the funerals of Poland, the nationality of which Louis Philippe had guaranteed in the discourse at the opening of the

session ; it was not enough to have given Belgium to England, and to have allowed the liberties of Italy to be exterminated ; it was not enough to have beheld without emotion the sufferings of the patriots, to have them arrested on our frontiers, harassed upon our territory, and insulted at the tribune ; but it was necessary even in sight of the hecatombs of Warsaw for the ministry impudently to declare that France had done for Poland all that she could, and all that she ought to do. And then said the minister ' it is to you, it is to this memorable session that ought to be attributed the honor of having made the revolution of July triumph in the interior without reactions, without *exceptionable* measures ; in the exterior without war, without *sacrifices*.'

And this bitter derision he himself permitted amidst enormous charges, complots, and civil war, which within had already so deeply compromised that revolution ; and concessions, weaknesses, humiliations, which without made him undergo in the bosom of an insecure peace all the burdens of a war the most disastrous to the public fortune.

This was not yet all. M. Périer wished before the termination of the session to resume all the task of government in respect to the object of the revolution of July, and the result which ought to emanate from it. The minister then declared haughtily from the tribune, that all the revolution had in view, and the consequences resulting from it was to secure the triumph of the parliamentary opposition which had existed for fourteen years against certain ministers of the restoration. We see that from the *quasi-legitimacy* the *doctrinaires* were rapidly arrived at complete legitimacy ; for M. Périer took care to add lest any one should be deceived as to the nature of his principles, that before taking oath to the received charter he had always remained faithful to that oath — faithful to the government of the foreigner. In a word, he remain-

ed positive, and even avowed, that the revolution of July had been given to men who had only made part of the restoration.

Lafayette again brought to mind the disacknowledged principles of the revolution of July, and qualified with singular justness the system of the quasi-legitimists, for whom those three great days were reduced *that evening, during which the retraction of the ordinances, and a frank and sincere return to the charter of Louis XVIII was proposed as the only expiation of the blood of six thousand citizens.*

‘Gentlemen,’ said the general, ‘the principal organ of the government yesterday repeated, that the revolution of July was merely the accomplishment of the principles and intentions of the opposition under the reign of the existing charter.

‘Now, gentlemen, these assertions, these interpolations, these definitions give a formal negative to assertions, definitions and engagements, which it is neither my duty, nor does it concern my honor to regard as a personal fact.

‘It is incorrect, gentlemen, to declare that the revolution of July was subsequently divided into two systems, issuing from one source. Doubtless, at the moment of the révolution, there was not a mind so preoccupied, there was not a political fiction so tenacious, as, that the sentiments of enthusiasm and of a future time should be introduced in the narrow circle of the doctrines of the restoration.

‘But the revolution of July, gentlemen, is the national sovereignty; it becomes the base, and the vital principle of our existence; it is the whole of the French people arming themselves to a man, and democratically naming their officers; it is the tri-colored standard throwing down the standard of legitimacy, the reigning dynasty, the principle of its granted charter; it is, in short a return to the ideas, principles, sentiments, and hopes of ’89.

‘ Well ! gentlemen, it must be confessed, these essential elements of the revolution of July, each time, during sixteen years, that we would willingly have recalled them, had been repulsed, despised, declared visionary and dangerous by the supporters of the restoration and of the granted charter.

‘ I also acknowledge, gentlemen, that it was not without foresight, without design, that these essential elements were, in the first instance, in the name of the conquering people, proclaimed, established, but out of the reach of danger, before the secondary combinations of royalty and the legislature had had opportunity to modify and disjoint them.

‘ The natural results of these first principles, the exacted debt of the revolution of July, are registered in the ameliorations presented by the new charter : the initiative right, restored to the chambers, the jury, in political matters connected with the press, the promise of liberty of instruction, equality of religious worship, and the abolition of the hereditary peerage.

‘ It is not then correct to say that the revolution has been but the accomplishment of the principles and wishes of the opposition under the granted charter. What is actually the fact ? It is that the men of July, whose popular notions most strongly sympathized with this revolution, and whose confidence in the national masses had been still augmented by their admiration for the sublime conduct of the population of the barricades, were anxious to proceed in the enlarged views which the revolution had opened before them ; but they even saw in them the means of most speedily establishing the union of liberty with public order ; for, if there has been some perversity in those who have pretended to believe that we did not ardently wish for public, personal, and individual security, and also for the security of popular industry, there has also been, I must say, a strange blindness, and a great want of memory in those who have allowed themselves to be

imposed upon by such assertions, whilst the men who had always seen the *beau idéal* of a political system in the restoration with its granted charter, were naturally desirous to return within its limits. And, as we have been told from this tribune that our opinions are but the dregs of the errors of '89, we may with equal justice reply, that the errors to which we are opposed are but the dregs of the bad habits and bad doctrines of the empire and of the restoration.

' If there is a repugnance to admit that the revolution of July and the late *régime* are two totally different things, I may say opposed in their principles and results, if it is pretended that it was for the principles of the other charter that the blood of six thousand brave men was spilt, and that to have re-established those principles would have sufficed, this is in truth to transform our three glorious days of July into that night during which it was proposed to retract the ordinances, and to return with frankness and sincerity to the charter of Charles X.'

Treating of the ambassadors in the discussion on the budget, Lafayette urged, that most of our diplomatic errors proceeded chiefly from their desire, after a revolution teeming with the national sovereignty, liberty, and equality, to refer to opinions and circumstances altogether opposed to ours. He asserted that there was not a word of truth in the accusation, of a desire to excite a war, which had been brought by the partisans of government against those who did not agree in their opinions. It was not war that these demanded, but that noble and dignified tone, in accordance with the revolution of July, which had been successfully adopted in the first moments of that revolution.

In approving the Belgic expedition, Lafayette expressed regret that France, already embarrassed by the protocoling influence, had not made a longer sojourn in Belgium, as the presence of our army *would*

have gone farther towards settling the affairs of that country than a dozen protocols. He could not but think, that if we had declared, for instance, that our soldiers should not quit the country till the citadel of Antwerp was evacuated, that fortress would not have been at this moment under the influence of Dutch cannon, and that after having excluded our diplomats from the discussions as to which of the fortresses should be demolished, it was strange that the four great powers, our allies, should think of commencing with Philippeville, which had nothing in common with those erected as a check against France.

In reproaching England with her coldness respecting Poland, Lafayette did not neglect the opportunity to tie our government by the recollection of a solemn engagement. 'The Chamber,' said he, 'as well as the King and the government, has bound itself in honor, not to permit the Polish nationality to perish. God forbid that I should believe either of those parties capable of weakness, and I depend upon their faith in redeeming their word.'

The ministry had suggested that the French patriots had given to the Poles the bad advice to shake off the yoke of their tyrant. Lafayette repulsed this idea which seemed to imply that petty ambition had been the ground work of those great patriotic and national emotions which we have seen burst forth in various parts of Europe, especially Poland, since the ignition of the electric spark by the revolution of July. 'But,' added he, 'if they have received bad advice, it should rather be referred to those timid counsels of which I have frequently spoken in this chamber, and which caused it to be signified to them through the Polish legation, *and under the dictation of the French government*, that in two months their affairs would be satisfactorily arranged, and that they must hold out till that time.'

Lafayette adjured the government to repair at least

a portion of its wrongs towards Poland, by giving instructions to our ambassador at Berlin, to require that the Prussian government should no longer arrest or ill treat the Poles, when they supplicated not to be replaced under the dominion of the knout, but to be allowed the liberty to seek amongst us that hospitality which France was unanimous in offering them.

Lafayette rose once more to censure the part which our soldiers played in Italy, where the Pope treated them as *Saracens and Vandals*, whilst the ambassador of the France of July signed, in concert with the representatives of the Holy Alliance, that unworthy manifesto by which the patriotic Italians were enjoined to submit unreservedly to the army of brigands, which the Holy See had let loose against the legation, and to bow, without murmur, under the tyrannical decree of the Cardinal Albani. If our troops were not landed in Italy to insist that the inhabitants of Romagna should at length enjoy their rights, and that the Austrians should evacuate Romana, Parma and Modena, Lafayette entreated the government to inform the chamber for whom and against whom, for what and against what objects our soldiers were at this moment at Ancona.

Lafayette also demanded that an end should at length be put to the unhappy state of things at present existing in Greece, and above all that pains should be taken to detach that country from the Russian empire, which from the time of Catherine, had incessantly exerted itself to beguile its unfortunate people. He concluded by soliciting the interest and support of government in favor of the generous enterprise of the Portuguese, who struggle at the moment these lines are written to snatch their country from the execrable tyranny of Don Miguel, that worthy brother of the King of Spain ; for, said Lafayette, *there is as much fraternity of feeling in their biography, as there is relationship between their families.*

CHAPTER XI.

The Cholera bursts out — The deputies alarmed — Last acts of the Session — The most important laws voted without examination — One only law, a law of proscription, undergoes a legislative discussion — The battles of Lafayette against the law.

THE scourge which for five months had decimated France, at last burst forth at Paris. After having reaped a large harvest amongst the lower classes, the cholera began to seize upon victims from all ranks in society. Nevertheless the most independent citizens, the most eminent-functionaries, made it a point to remain at their posts. In the midst of these afflicting circumstances, France had a right to expect from her representatives an example of impassibility and courage. She might have hoped that in the alarm which engrossed the public mind, our deputies would have found cause for bringing to their labors an accession of calmness, of uprightness, of steadiness; for proving that a transitory calamity had no power to derange the regularity with which the affairs of state are conducted; and for encouraging the terrified population, by a dignified and manly presence. The slightest feeling of the propriety attached to their exalted station, social and political, would have induced the deputies to present the country with a spectacle, the popular influence of which would have been immense: the opportunity was grand, it was unique; they had not the fortitude to appreciate it, and the tribunes fled before the epidemic.

The blow which struck M.M. Périer, Lamarque, and some other distinguished deputies, was the signal

for a disgraceful *saute qui peut*, in the moment that death hovered equally over all.

From this hour, reports of commissions lay heaped upon reports, laws upon laws, and the ministry left to itself, carried through this chamber desolated by fear, almost as many triumphs as the cholera carried off of sick ; to such an extent indeed, as to produce the remark from a patriotic journal, that the laws which issued from this extraordinary session, ought to be separately classed in the bulletin of the laws, under the denomination of cholera-laws, to be provisionally executed, till from having been newly discussed and voted in the next session, they shall have obtained a definitive character.

It was thus, for example, that were successively smuggled through, the law upon the whale fishery, without even the trouble of consulting the chamber, whether they would adopt the original project of the government, or the project modified by the tardy proclamation of the ministry ; The law upon promotion in the army, the chamber of peers having rejected the amendment by the chamber of deputies, which put some check upon ministerial arbitration in the choice of officers ; the law upon the pay of the veterans ; the law upon the reform of the penal code ; the articles of which were declared accepted without a single person rising either for or against them ; the law upon the appropriation of 1,500,000 francs for the expenses of the secret police, carried with breathless haste ; finally, that most important law, which nullifies almost all the others, the law of the unappropriated receipts, carried in two sittings ! And all this in the midst of the noise and confusion, which but for the sadness of the occasion would have been laughable, of orators, of reporters, of secretaries, rising and speaking pell mell to the tribune, and voting *en masse*.

It might be said in short that that spectre of the cholera, had hastened the elective chamber to the

close of this melancholy and disastrous session in shameful terror, when suddenly she appeared to awake, for the purpose of terminating it in the unpopularity of a measure, the most cruelly exceptionable. The ministry came to propose to the trembling centres the adoption of the law against foreign refugees. This time, however, the general had beaten up the faithful to the scrutiny ; all the ministerial dependents were convoked ; the sitting was tumultuous, important ; and worthily crowned a session, which history will rank amongst the most unfortunate.

The ministry of the 13th of March had seen with extreme discomposure, the lively and patriotic sympathies with which the populations of the frontiers had received the noble wreck of the Polish army. They feared that the mighty Nicholas would take offence, and possibly also, that the presence of these brave men would maintain in France the generous sentiments of liberty. The ministry were anxious therefore, to place these noble strangers under an exceptionable legislation, by the help of which they might watch them, surround them, banish them as condemned criminals. For this purpose in the midst of human misery, which displayed itself in melancholy spectacles around us, and at a time when so much public calamity ought to have opened their hearts to feeling of affectionate sympathy, these lord keepers of France, had the pitiable courage, to come and demand against these unfortunate proscribed beings, already decimated by the rod of a tyrant, a law of ill usage, an abominable law, of which the restoration itself, would not have dreamt in its most gloriously despotic days ; it was the edict of proscription of the 28th vendémiaire, year '6, exhumed from the chests of the directory, where it had fallen into the desuetude of contempt, to smite the peaceable refugees of 1831. It has been already observed, that this law will prove to M. Barthe what the law of love (*loi d'amour*,) was to M.

Peyronnet ; his name will descend with it to posterity ; it is his title to glory.

A discussion sustained with disgraceful inferiority was followed by a still more disgraceful victory. But the opposition nobly sustained this last combat. Lamarque, Pagès, and Odillon-Barrot met the question on its political side, with a lofty expansion of views, and an exquisite generosity of sentiment. Lafayette, faithful to the inspirations of his whole life, painted in the most lively colors the misfortunes of Poland, the tendency of German nationality, the sympathy of the people for men of patriotic affections, who were pursued by the hatred and suspicions of arbitrary power, the simple and cordial hospitality of the towns and hamlets of our frontier.

After recognizing the existence of national rights, which imply in certain respects an inferiority in foreigners, Lafayette proved that prior to these political rights there exist national rights inherent in society, and of which neither a particular nation, nor all nations united, can without injustice deprive an individual.

‘There are,’ said he, ‘rights of which no one can be deprived, and which are not dependent upon the circumstances of nationality. It is important not only to foreigners, but also to the citizens of a free state, that these rights should not be violated with respect to any persons whatsoever by arbitrary acts.

‘Certainly you will think with me, that liberty of conscience, judicial guarantees, the right of expressing one’s opinions, and of coming and going, are amongst those I have described, and of which consequently we should not deprive foreigners.

‘Besides, gentlemen, I think, and have long since said, that the revolution would not be really ended, that the career of political changes would not be closed, till we have exploded that arsenal of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary laws, that we are all agreed on proscribing in the mass, but which are afterwards

resuscitated in detail, whenever one of them can be made to serve the interests of the party in power for the time being.

‘ Among these laws I reckon that of the year ’6, of which advantage is now taken, a very anti-republican law, in my acceptance of the word, though enacted under a republican government.

‘ This law had for its excuse, (a bad excuse in my opinion,) that it was applied to adversaries, the enemies of French liberty.’

Lafayette blamed the expulsion of some Englishmen, who had entered themselves among the Trappists of La Meilleraye, and which had been represented as a measure of wise and good administration. ‘ Do not,’ said he, ‘ mistake harshness for strength, and tyranny for power, and the Trappists of La Meilleraye, will be no more dangerous to you, than the jesuits of George Town, are to the government of the United States.’

He then passed in review the duties which France had to fulfil towards the Spaniards, from whom, by the most guilty of wars, she had wrested their liberty and their country ; towards the Poles, whose nationality the King and chamber had guaranteed upon their honor ; towards the Italians, who were in France only because they believed, because they did us the honor to confide in, what was declared from the tribune by the president of the council and the minister for foreign affairs, upon our system of non-intervention. And these duties of France towards all these proscribed patriots, he represented as rendering the proposed law more especially infamous.

Lafayette traced the picture of those cruelties, which in breach of faith the Russians had inflicted on the unfortunate Poles. ‘ This breach of faith, these abominable cruelties,’ said he, ‘ have merited for the Emperor of Russia, not the title of despot, it belongs to his avocation, but that of tyrant, which I feel my-

self justified to give him here, because no motive of diplomatic convenience will ever prevent my calling things and men by their proper names.'

He referred to the guilty violence by which Austria and Prussia prevented the Polish soldiers from reaching the hospitable soil of France. 'What I am saying,' added he, 'does not apply to Germany! once escaped from Austria and Prussia, the Poles were every where received with a noble and generous hospitality.'

'They experience the benefits of this new direction which German nationality is taking; that respectable nationality which, notwithstanding all that has been said, is as dear to France, as to Germany herself.'

'There they find all the sympathies which meet them on the soil of France, which they experience so many difficulties in reaching, that I ask again of the ministers, by what means they have given them to understand that the soil of France is hospitable to them.'

He represented the measures adopted against the Poles as incompatible with the national will, with that will which *ought to be the rule of government*. 'That will evidently is,' continued he, 'that you should receive them as brothers, and that you should do all in your power to relieve them from the persecution and tyranny of which they are the victims elsewhere.'

Already, at this period, the project which the ministry has just now put in execution of forcibly conveying the Poles to Algiers, was spoken of. Lafayette who felt the necessity of guarding against such a scheme, took advantage of the report to tell the chamber, that having spoken of it to the minister of war, he had replied that the supposition was false, that it was infinitely absurd, and that he had his authority to contradict it in the most unequivocal manner. Well! three months have not elapsed since this ministerial denial, and already a detachment of four hundred Poles, who

have not even been permitted to touch the soil of France, is transported by us to the coast of Africa. And why this new annoyance? Because the Russian ministry has, we are told, warned our cabinet that some Polish soldiers, have professed that their purpose in proceeding to France was to overthrow the throne of Louis-Philippe! such is the incredible pretence for a resolution which M. de Rigney has declared to be irrevocable.

Lafayette, in alluding to the servility with which the government had obeyed the orders of the Pope in removing the tri-colored flag from the ramparts of Ancona, closed in the following terms his last parliamentary speech:

‘If our banner no longer floats over the walls of Ancona, it still floats at the head of our battalions; and to the present time, its only result has been the abominable execution of the tyrannical decrees of Cardinal Albani, whom I can only compare with Bernetti; I can make no distinction between them, for they are alike in my eyes. But at least, these unfortunate Italians of the Roman states, whose prudent conduct has refuted all the calumnies which have been so industriously spread against them, must obtain their institution; their civic guard must be restored to them, that only protection against the spoliation of which they have been the victims; and I must repeat that it appears to me very extraordinary to see such methods adopted, as those which you propose, with respect to the Italian refugees, who ought, on the contrary to find so much sympathy and affection in France.’

The ministry terminated this discussion, so fraught with incidents and contradictions, by an incident which marked the abject state to which its policy was reduced. M. Barthe represented the principle of the non-surrender of the refugees, as a concession to the liberality of Louis Philippe’s government. What did

this government suppose for a moment that it was within its option to deliver the Poles to Russian executioners, and that all France would not have simultaneously risen to oppose so infamous a transaction! this is what confounds the imagination.

Such has been Lafayette's political conduct from the day of his dismissal from the command of the national guards of France, to the close of the last legislative session. I have, however, omitted to notice one of the most important services, which this great citizen has rendered to the principle of equality. I mean the suppression demanded and obtained by him, of the article of the penal code of the empire, which visited with a correctional penalty the usurpation of any title of nobility. This suppression so consistent with the social opinions of Lafayette, must be considered as completing the abolition of the privileges of the hereditary nobility in France, since henceforward, every one may assume on his own private authority, the titles of duke, marquis, or baron. This is something in anticipation of better institutions.

It may be observed that while the floating liberalism of the men of the monopoly and of the double vote, gave way on all sides, while the hearts of so many liberals, whose civic virtues were recognized by France, trembled, the aged patriotism of Lafayette stood firm as the pharos of liberty in the midst of that chamber, enervated by fear or undermined by corruption.

In all these striking points of this long and disastrous session; the address, the peerage, the civil list, the budget, and our foreign policy infiltrating itself through all our transactions; we have seen him, faithful to his principles of half a century's standing, combating inch by inch, from position to position, the invasion of every species of aristocracy, upon the holy dogma of the sovereignty of the people; a dogma, on which in his opinion, the interests, the wants, the civilization, the genius and the greatness of nations re-

cessarily depend; a dogma, in fine, with which he has impregnated all the great questions he has touched upon, and of which he has left on all minds, traces so profound that no human phrenzy will be able to efface them.

CHAPTER XII.

The ministry watched by the Nation — Their factitious popularity begins to desert them — They feel the necessity of a new clap-trap for public opinion — Death and funeral of M. C. Périer — Death and funeral of Lamarque — Parallel — Distresses at the Tuileries — Events of the 5th and 6th of June — Conduct of Lafayette — Meeting of the Deputies in the evening of the 5th — The same in the morning of the 6th — Conduct of Lafayette in these meetings — Interview of Messieurs Lafitte, Arago, and Odillon-Barrot with the King — Report of what passed at the interview — The placing of Paris in a state of siege — Measure against Lafayette and Lafitte — Lafayette remains at Paris, &c.

THE gates of the Palais Bourbon were closed. The contest was actually closed for want of combatants, and our panting and dismayed deputies had taken refuge at their country seats: these were not yet visited by the cholera.

Meanwhile, during the almost half century that the revolutionary torrent had been overflowing France, never had a legislative campaign proved so fatal to the national interests of every denomination: never had a chamber inflicted so many wounds on the country. The wants, the wishes, the interests, the civilization, the greatness of France, all had suffered derogation, and attaint in the withering grasp of the *doctrinaires*. And, remarkable fact! alarming phenomenon, eighteen months after the revolution of July! the proceedings of this legislature *sui generis*, no longer bore any relation with the good or the evil accomplished by the preceding assemblies; its acts were stamped with a character of originality, — a character absolutely prodigious in its kind.

To explain:

The imagination may be elevated by contemplating the sanguinary works of the convention, because the very crimes of the convention were marked by nationality, audacity, enormity; the servility of the imperial senate may be invested with a bright side, for together with tyranny that senate adulated glory; that glory whose march overturned the human race and restored antiquity. In short, there was an infusion of grandeur in the democratic convulsions of the convention, as there might be of enthusiasm, and delirium in the docility of the Napoleonic legislators to the mighty will of victory.

But what particle of merit is discoverable, on the the most attentive investigation, in the representatives of the French of July? You may rub and re-rub this impoverished specimen of humanity, it will still present to view, only an anachronism with the age, a base denial of the march of human affairs, an inundation of dull passions, vulgar inclinations, and that infirmity of intellect which characterized the Greeks of the Lower Empire, who when the religion of the Sabre was at the gates of Byzantium were engaged in stupidly disputing whether the light on Mount Tabor was created or uncreated.

Such has been in some sort the moral and physical constitution of the two sessions which have stifled in the bud the hopes of the revolution. The principle of national sovereignty, civil and political liberty, individual liberty, liberty of the press, the independence of justice, agriculture, commerce, industry, science, the fine arts, the rights of men, the glory of our arms, the national independence, enthusiasm, honor, dignity, patriotism, all has degenerated, all is tarnished by the breath of the two legislatures by which the fortunes of France have been depressed.

By this time the fears, distrusts, and sinister rumors which for twenty months past had been spread and fostered by authority, had thrown out the most rational

conjectures upon the national destinies. The popular credulity had been attacked on so many points; the alarms of the people had been excited for such important interests, that, tossed to and fro between dread of republican terror on the one hand, and the yoke of the Empire on the other, misled by a false representation of the desires of the patriots, it was long before they detected the abyss which the men of calumny and blasphemy were opening beneath their feet.

But no sooner did the loquacity of the *doctrinaires* allow room for the exercise of reflection, and for the substitution of facts for words, than a speedy reaction was operated upon the public mind. The most indifferent observers perceived that the citizen monarchy now subsisted only upon the customs and usages of legitimacy; that the sole result of the revolution had been to recreate a king such as are all kings; the magistracy such as it was; a budget almost double any former budget, the assessment of taxes, the codes, the monopolies, the army and the church, such as they were; and in short, that all that France had achieved by forty-five years revolutionary tortures, three days of gigantic conflict, and two thousand five hundred millions of contributions, paid in twenty months, reduced itself to neither more nor less than a new edition of the Capetian system, differently bound, and adorned with commotions, conspiracies, civil wars, hecatombs, and prostrations at the feet of the Holy Alliance.

A profound sentiment of regret for the past, and of anxiety for the future, then began to penetrate all hearts. The timid, but loyal citizens at length discovered that sovereignty was decidedly no longer capable of being reconverted to its original purity, and that its feeble hands were powerless to restore to France her external dignity, or to compose the domestic animosities engendered by thoughts of usurpation, resistance, and civil war. Interested devotedness, affections biassed by lucre, hatred masked under the pressure of

hands and embraces, which the restoration had extended from the exchange to the court; cupidity, in short began to discern that pecuniary, like all other interests must rest on pillars capable of resistance and endurance; that the existence of the system of the 13th March was an outrage, against the consequences of which the country must sooner or later take measures of security; a position radically false, which a breath of the national will might overthrow; a deviation from common sense in which no government whatsoever could long proceed; a wrong, the redress of which could claim no gratitude from France, because when a people are to be conciliated it is in vain they await the moment of necessity. The stock-jobbing Philipists therefore began to grow rather lukewarm towards their chosen system, and to anticipate with terror the new series of events, with which the blindness of the government might be preparing to swallow up their capital.

The transactions at Grenoble; the dissolution of the national guards in five or six departments; the armament at Marseilles; the clandestine embarkation of the Duchess de Berri on the shores of Provence; the culpable family delicacies which lent impunity to this enterprise, the undisputed passage of the *Regent* across our southern provinces, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic; commerce, industry, agriculture, all struggling under interminable oppression; the insurrection in la Vendée; the nearly accomplished overthrow of the Grey Ministry, and the perturbation which that event was on the eve of producing in the affairs of France; Poland buried in the silence of death, and the grass growing in the streets of Warsaw, under the hoofs of the Cossacks' horses; Russia calling her reserves and concentrating her armies on the banks of the Rhine; in the East, Austrian battalions inundating Bavaria, and all the smaller states of the Germanic confederation in commotion and anxiety; our handful

of soldiers shut up in Ancona, and our national flag piteously rolled up in its case; the armed attitude of Holland ; the interminable farce of the London conference; a conclave of Russian and German generals assembled at Berlin; in short the complication of events that agitated Europe, lacerating in all directions our sympathies and wounding our interests; all these things at length began to work conviction even amongst the most apathetic that the cabinet of the Tuileries had at least lost all care for the welfare of France.

As the parliamentary impression grew weaker, the ministers felt the phantoms on which their existence rested, gradually, and one by one vanishing from under them, and their conventional popularity deserting them. Their adversaries pressed them the closer that facts every day arose to justify their attacks and legitimate their fears. Their very friends moderated their encomiums, because futurity was at hand, and because moreover, those men who are most greedy of power, who would seek it even through the dirtiest paths, never seriously attach themselves to an order of things which has no morrow.

On the other hand, the publication of the remonstrance, or *compte-rendu*, in which reserved expression, but ill-conceived severity of judgment, increased the perplexities of the ministry ; a hundred and fifty senatorial signatures, protesting, throughout all France, against the march of administration, and pointing out to the King and the country the inevitable quicksand upon which the throne and the state were being driven by the most inconceivable and grotesque imbecility that the clamors of intrigue ever pushed to the head of affairs ; the voice of those citizens who hold in the strongest detestation both licentiousness and despotism, but who insisted on liberty as their property, solemnly declaring to their constituents, that the men who governed France had knowingly precipitated her from the majesty of the revolution into a labyrinth of the

most miserable intrigues; all these circumstances opened the eyes of the government, and made them sensible that the cause of their ascendancy over timorous spirits being exhausted, the effect could not be reproduced; they saw, in short, that for them to stop was to perish, and to rest on the defensive, was to retreat.

Such was the situation of affairs when death summoned the man who was regarded as the personification of the system of the 13th of March. M. Périer's comrades saw in the funeral of the president of the council, an excellent opportunity for re-animating expiring affections, and feigned an imposing manifestation of regret for the loss of that minister, and of assent to the system, the policy of which they were now become the inheritors. The national guard was therefore commanded to assist in the funeral pomp, and five thousand underlings of the various administrations received orders to appear in crape, and pour their lamentations over the tomb of the great man whose panegyric had for three days been thundered forth by the treasury journals. Nothing that can tickle the curiosity of the idlers in a great capital was neglected by the funeral police of the *juste-milieu*. Programmes, announcing the march of the procession, the number and stations of the civil and military corps that were to accompany it, were prodigally disseminated in all quarters of Paris. When the day arrived, the most magnificent weather concurred to attract the people to the funeral. But neither the charms of an imposing spectacle, nor the influence of an unclouded sky after a long winter, could revive in the popular heart an enthusiasm which the errors of the illustrious deceased had extinguished. The people, I speak not of the emissaries of government offices, remained mute, and retired with indifference from that pomp, out of which the wreck of the 13th of March would fain derive excuses for all the faults, apologies for all the fury of the minister whom death had just returned to that nothing-

ness, from which, for the happiness and glory of his country, he should never, perhaps, have been withdrawn. But M. P  rier is no more; respect be with ashes! And may the tomb, veiling for ever the fatal errors of the minister, leave behind him no other remembrance than that part of the deputy so long and courageously faithful to the cause of liberty.

Not many days afterwards an irreparable loss dismayed the country;—a national and immense loss—the full extent of which futurity will, perhaps speedily reveal. A gallant soldier, who had lavished his blood on twenty battle-fields, whose heart beat only for that France which he served and honored under all her vicissitudes of fortune; one of the highest glories of the army, and of the tribune, and an eloquent deputy, a skilful and loyal captain—Lamarque died.

Although for many weeks declared inevitable, this death produced in Paris the effect of a great and sudden calamity. It was not party spirit deploring the end of one of the most strenuous champions of public liberty; it was not the soldiers of Italy, or of Waterloo offering homage to the ashes of him who on all occasions made it a sacred and cherished duty to challenge their claims to the national gratitude, and to avenge the insults to which their old scars were so often exposed from triumphant cowardice; it was not the new army paying a tribute of gratitude to the memory of the noble general who honored its youthful courage with so much confidence and interests; it was all well-disposed men, to whatever shade of opinion they belonged, who were desirous of discharging the debt of national gratitude towards the illustrious citizen who divided his life between the defence of the independence of France without, and that of her liberties within; it was the patriots of all lands that came to shed tears over the coffin of the philosophic warrior, who, emancipating himself from the bonds of too strict a nationality, always fought for the junction

of all the people in the same communion of liberty. The tears of police, and the sobs of command were unnecessary here. This funeral belonged to the people ; the popular grief was to constitute its only ornament and pomp.

Had, however, a hundred and fifty thousand citizens, of all ranks and of all ages, been permitted to accompany, uncovered, the coffin of one of the chiefs of the opposition, and afterwards to retire to the silence of grief, what would have become of the ministry and the system, which Lamarque had a hundred times, and up to the last moment of his life, stigmatized with incapacity and want of principle ? How was such overwhelming testimony of the veering of public opinion to be resisted ? And what was to become of the 13th of March, of the 5th of June, elapsed without disorder and without victims ? How, again, was the assent of all *honest men*, and the fortunate concurrence of the national guard to be maintained, when it should be proved that the presence of these honest men, and the national guard at the funeral of Lamarque, testified on the contrary their distaste for the political enemies of this chief of the national opposition ? In this case, if all the conditions of our representative system are not mere chimeras, if all sense of decency is not extinct in the government of elective monarchy, the ministry of the 13th of March was done up !

Now that the ministry before hand had measured the extent of the danger which menaced their existence, nothing, not even their proverbial folly, can leave room to doubt but that they had conceived, premeditated, and contrived the horrible project of saving themselves by transforming a funeral ceremony into a horrible scene of carnage and desolation ; for this, certainty fails us. To *history*, perhaps to contemporary history, it belongs to verify conjecture. I am but an *historian* ; I relate, my readers will judge.

Lamarque breathed his last sigh on the 2d of June,

1832. The very next day, the deputies present in Paris, the several patriotic clubs, the schools, the Vendéans, and the refugees of all foreign nations nominated committees to concert together the route of the funeral procession, and to determine the order in which these different meetings should present themselves. Far from opposing these measures published by all the journals, the authorities sent agents to the president of the society, (*'Aid thyself and Heaven will aid thee,'*) to come to an understanding with that honorable citizen respecting various details relating to the ceremony. Tuesday morning, the 5th of June, the most perfect tranquillity reigned throughout the capital, where nothing seemed to pretend the sanguinary drama which was to close that eventful day. The sky was serene, and every thing promised that the beams of a glorious sun would irradiate the obsequies of the illustrious dead.

As early as ten o'clock numerous groups of citizens made towards the boulevards, the quarters adjacent to the house of mourning. These throngs were composed of Frenchmen of all classes, and principally of national guards in uniform. The entire capital was agitated by a sentiment of profound regret, and appeared anxious to salute with the last homage, the mortal remains of a great citizen who had fallen in the breach, in the defence of liberty. At eleven, the corpse of the deceased was placed on the funeral car, and after some confusion, inseparable from similar ceremonies, it commenced its march, drawn by patriots who disputed with each other the honor of such a burden. That multitude of natives and foreigners crowded in silence over a space more than a league in extent, overshadowing with flags of twenty different kinds, the coffin of Lamarque, and uniting in one common sentiment of respect and grief over the mortal remains of the faithful friend of all free men, offered a magnificent spectacle. The procession began to move amidst cries of *Vive la liberté ! Vive Lafayette !*

I shall advert but slightly to the incidents which preceded the arrival of the *cortège* at the *Place de la Bastille*, the body of where Lamarque was to receive the last adieus of its friends. These incidents are confined to a brutal attack made by some town sergeants, upon a young man who was crying *Vive la Liberté!* whom they dangerously wounded. Those agents of the police were, however, saved from still more imminent danger, by the efforts of that Parisian artillery which has just been disbanded for the second time. The unbecoming obstinacy of -M. de Fitz-James, in refusing to uncover, for several minutes, while a hundred thousand of his fellow citizens were passing hat in hand under his windows, gave rise to another manifestation of resentment which would have grown serious had not the noble Duke disappeared.

But there is an episode which I ought to report, as one of the most remarkable characteristics of this solemnity : I mean the unpremeditated idea of going to the triumphal column. It has been said that this procedure had been previously planned. This is not true, and to satisfy oneself that it is not, it is sufficient to remember that if the project had been preconcerted the procession would have proceeded direct from the hotel of the deceased to the column instead of arriving there by a very circuitous route without object. The truth is that the idea of this ovation which, while the procession was in full march suddenly struck some lovers of the old French honor, was adopted by the deputies who supported the pall, for Marshall Clausel and General Lafayette were seen following the triumphal car arm in arm, and bareheaded making the tour of the column, amidst the applauses of the national guard, who saw with transport this homage paid to French glory.

From this moment, nevertheless, there was some ground of apprehension that a collision between the people and the authorities was contemplated by gov-

ernment. Whenever a military corps passes before a station, the troops of the latter should be called to arms. Why then, on the approach of the funeral of Lamarque, escorted by many detachments of the line, did the post of the staff, including the officer on duty retire within its branch? Was not this violation of military etiquette this gratuitous insult to the memory of a French General, of a nature to irritate all minds and to provoke serious disorders? Such indeed would have been its immediate result, if, taking warning by the indignation which began to express itself in menaces, those in authority at this station had not determined to pay to the illustrious deceased the honors which were his due. This scene however sowed the seeds of irritation, and it was evident that a small spark would be capable of kindling a great conflagration.

Already all ranks were indignant at the brutal measure which had confined the pupils of the Polytechnic school to their hotel, debarring these brave young men of the satisfaction of offering a last homage to the military virtues which should be their examples and guides. From this moment the cries of *Vive la Liberté!* Honor to Lamarque! Down with the justemilieu! were heard in the procession. But it was remarked that these cries principally proceeded from men unknown to the friends of liberty, and upon whom these latter in vain attempted to impose silence, by representing to them that in the present melancholy circumstances the love of liberty could be expressed only by grief.

The project of forcibly transporting the remains of Lamarque to the Pantheon was also spoken of in the crowd, but this project vehemently supported by individuals generally supposed to belong to the police, appeared to be abandoned, on the representation made by the patriots that such had not been the last will of the General, and that independently of all other considerations, his will ought to be respected.

Nothing however, yet announced the deplorable catastrophe in preparation; and though the order of march originally arranged could not be strictly followed the procession reached the Place de la Bastille without material interruption; neither the rain which fell in torrents, nor some vexations arising out of the attack of the town sergeants of which I have already spoken having been able to divert the multitude from the accomplishment of a religious and patriotic duty.

The hearse had passed through the Place de la Bastille, streams of people pressed towards the platform, from which several orations were to be delivered, and around which flocked the national guards and the students of the Polytechnic school; the latter having, in defiance of the orders of their chief, formed themselves to protect from the curiosity of the multitude the corpse; the invalid bearers of the ensigns, and the orators who were about to speak.

The people were there, calm in the consciousness of strength, silent as grief; but already might be seen many moved by the love of disorder mingling with them and seeking to agitate them in spite of the efforts that the national guard and the friends of Lamarque made to repress them. Occasionally silence appeared for an instant to be restored, when Marshal Clausel, in the name of the army, M. Mauguin, in the name of the chamber of deputies, delivered speeches which were received with shouts of applause. It was thus that some years before the words of Casimir Périer had been received over the tomb of General Foy, as also those of Lafitte and Lafayette over that of Manuel and even those of M. de Schonen, when he pronounced in the honor of the illustrious deputy of La Vendée, an oration so violent, that no journal dared print it entire.

M. Pons de l'Hérault, the Polish general Uminski, the Nuncio Lelewell and the Portuguese general Saldanha, invited to pay homage to the defender of

their cause, successively read speeches which were hailed with the most lively satisfaction. Lafayette solicited to speak in his turn, advanced near the estrade and in a short extemporaneous oration called the attention of the people on the one hand to the place where the Bastille formerly stood, that spot, so deeply identified with the revolution of 1789; on the other, to the united and numerous assembling of the victorious people during the great week of 1830. He paid a warm tribute of respect to the standards, not of the kings, but of the people of Poland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Germany which overshadowed the coffin of Lamarque, and which he designated the offspring of our tri-colored cockade. He concluded by entreating the multitude who listened to him, to disperse peaceably and to do nothing to mar the remembrance of this eventful day. And, as it had been in agitation, as I have already said to transport the body of Lamarque to the Pantheon, Lafayette immediately recommended the patriots to respect the intentions of the deceased and the arrangements already made by his family. This exhortation was received with general assent; the deputies retired, and the funeral ceremony having thus terminated, never had a more imposing, a more remarkable protest been made against a government and its system.

A succession of the most unforeseen incidents was the cause of saving the *juste-milieu*

Among the diversified flags which, at the instigation of the English, appeared in the procession, were seen two red standards, from the appearance of which, it would have been difficult to have inferred premeditated design. One of these banners, which it is confidently asserted had been bought during the course of the procession was totally without inscription. The other bore upon it as a device, *Liberty or Death*, which in the former times of the revolution signified only, *To live free or to die*, a motto which Louis

Philippe as member of the club of jacobins for a long time wore on the buttons of his coat, but which latterly and during the reign of terror, was translated *Liberty or I kill thee!*

The red cap, the bloody emblem of the terrorism of 1793 appeared suddenly amidst the obsequies of Lamarque, but not till the coffin had arrived at the *Place d'Austerlitz* that is to say, at the moment of the termination of the ceremonies. From what revolutionary source, Carlist or Doctrinaire, had it arisen? Whatever it might be, this fearful motto stamped on one of the red flags, was carried for some minutes through the astonished crowd.

That some anarchists may have welcomed this demonstration with enthusiasm; that some of the *cou-ronnes d'immortelles* which were to be seen there as well as at all ceremonies of the kind, may have been thrown at this flag — that inflammatory speeches, menaces, even against Lafayette may have been vociferated; that the emissaries of different factions, amongst whom might be found the hired agents of the police, may have sought in the obsequies of Lamarque, an occasion for disorder and anarchy, are facts beyond a doubt, and upon which the process that is now instituted, unhappily imposes a reserve which nothing, not even the prerogative of the historian, permits me to lay aside.

But that which is most probable, and which the judicial investigation will no doubt confirm, is that confined to a very small number of individuals these disorderly symptoms would not have exploded but for the imprudent attack of the troops whom government had secretly drawn together in the environs of the Bastille, and which it suddenly unleashed on a population nearly the whole of which was inoffensive. The sentence which France awaits from the tribunals will declare for example whether the squadron which was debouching at a gallop behind the *Grenier d'Abondance* sweep-

ing before it all the men, women and children found in its passage, was or was not the first, the true aggressor in the horrible conflict which steeped the capital in blood for two days. Impartial justice, or, in the place of it, national good sense, will one day decide the question, whether the refusal to render in the *Place Vendome* the military honors legally due to the remains of Lamarque, the prohibition of the scholars of the Polytechnic school to assist at the procession, the attack of the *sergens* upon the boulevard Saint-Martin, the presence in the popular ranks of individuals unknown to the friends of liberty, the disguise of a great number of agents of police as national guards, and men of the people, mingling with groups of distinguished individuals, together with the interference of the city militia in the struggle; the almost total absence of the military force upon the line of procession, and its presence concealed about the place where the ceremony was to terminate — justice and reason will determine, I say, the question, whether all these circumstances do not prove that it was government which in fact struck the first blow. But admitting it to be doubtful, and although it may anticipate the enquiry before the tribunals, I fearlessly assert on the part of the people, that these deplorable events had the decided appearance of a casual rencounter in which, under different impulses, young men, mechanics and national guards took part without having had any idea of insurrection an hour before, and struck only when they were struck at. Now if it be admitted that of eight or nine hundred persons at most who were engaged in this unhappy struggle, one half at least were of the classes just named, it will be seen to what this vast and formidable plot in favor of the revolutionary scaffolds of '93 will be reduced; a plot against which, it was thought necessary, to bring more soldiers, than ever fought in the fields of Wagram or Marengo.

Ninety-three ! always '93 for government ways and means ! Is it intended to be said that all the young and generous amongst us have prostrated themselves at the shrine of that bloody era, and that terror is always at the gates of France ! Apes ! without doubt the aberrations of '93 still have admirers among men who never beheld the disasters of that epoch ! But whose fault is it, if the deeds of the convention and the crimes of the committee of public safety, turn some young heads !

One word, *Messieurs les doctrinaires*, upon this your favorite bugbear :

It was at a time when all France was unanimous in its condemnation of the misdeeds of the men of '93 ; it was when, placed near the events, the nation better understood the character of the principal actors in that terrible drama, the venality of some, the connection of others with foreign intrigues, and the practice of every vice, which reduced to a very small number the *bona-fide* terrorists of fanaticism, the nation as with one voice spoke its abhorrence of the fatal results of a system, the impression of which was yet vivid ; thus the re-action of the royalists, the assassination of the patriots, and all the horrors which succeeded to the reign of jacobinism, found neither eulogy, nor even extenuation.

But as soon as the people were persuaded that all danger was at an end, they began to theorize and speculate upon a past era. There arose a school of sophists in which the most culpable violences of the last years of the revolution were excused, as the effects of *imperious necessity*, and in which praise was lavished, and immortality adjudged to men the most fearfully distinguished in that sanguinary epoch. Two young historians then became the panegyrists of this school, in works otherwise full of merit. People no longer feared to express themselves to the same effect in their public lessons of morality and philosophy. It is not to

be denied, that these sophisms, inculcated as political principles and infused into young minds with all the power of a persuasive eloquence, have wrought on the feelings of a certain number of young men, of whom we must do them the justice to believe they would be incapable of carrying into execution the doctrines they profess; their masters themselves would fail to do what they once recommended to the adoption of their pupils. But these doughty historians, these radical philosophers, apologists of *Saint-Juste* and of *Danton*, in what rank are they now to be found? To what political party for example do M.M. Cousin and Thiers belong? To that interested party whose timid consciences start at the operation of institutions strong and free, and who blush not to invoke punishment upon the disciples they have acquired, involuntarily perhaps, only through the most melancholy aberration of the heart and understanding! and it is they who now cry out, that all is about to become chaos and anarchy because their words have been listened to, and their lessons imbibed. When shall we see France on one side, the counter-revolution on the other, but no mongrels between these two champions.

I return to Lamarque's obsequies. The apparition of squadrons of dragoons, overturning every thing in their passage, had, as I said, roused the anger of the people, and destroyed the effect of the pacific exhortations of Lafayette. Then the cries; *nous sommes attaqués! aux armes! plus de Bourbons! vite la république!* resounded with violence; and a large number of citizens and pupils of the Polytechnic school fell into a line, in order to form a rampart between the cavalry of government, and the crowd of citizens, women, and children accumulated upon the *place de la Bastille*. But, whilst this first squadron was held in check, another debouched upon the Boulevards, doubtless to place the *cortége* between two fires. It was then that the first *fusillade* was exchanged. My

readers know the result of this first conflict, and the vicissitudes of the two days.

But what became of Lafayette amidst all this confusion? Directing his steps to the place where his carriage awaited him, and not finding it, he and his son mounted a *fiacre*, from which the people detached the horses, and persisted in drawing it, spite of the entreaties and efforts of Lafayette to withdraw himself from this species of British ovation, for which, in America, as in Europe, and at every period of his life, he showed a strong distaste. It was, however, the only means left to free himself from the crowd, and escape from the noisy bursts of affection, with which he was greeted. Meantime, the combat began at the place where the coffin was, and a numerous crowd gathered round the vehicle of Lafayette, clamoring in a tone of high exasperation, and soliciting the general to suffer himself to be carried to the Hotel-de-Ville. Lafayette repressed this proposition, conjuring these men to disperse peaceably, when the group mingled with which it is said, were some agents of the police, was charged by a detachment of dragoons. At this moment the *fiacre*, turning to the right in order to reach the house of Lafayette, was accompanied only by a crowd totally unconnected with the combat, and similar to those who had so many times assembled in order to serve as cortege to the veteran of the people's cause.

Some cries, however, of *vive la République* were mingled with those of *vive Lafayette*. But it must not be forgotten that the spies would naturally introduce themselves among this *cortege*, in order to change its true character. For the rest, it was also natural that those who sought a collision, should remain on the *place de la Bastille* where the combat had already commenced. It is pretended, indeed, that Lafayette's escort had attempted to disarm a post on its passage. The fact is, that some voices having been raised in

order to incite the *poste de la Madeleine*, to take arms, the officer on guard thought it his duty to apply for orders to the general, and to offer him an escort. But Lafayette thanked him, and showing him that he was surrounded by friends, persuaded him to return to his post, which he did to the full satisfaction of the crowd. Arrived at the general's house, the brave people who had conducted him there, peaceably retired, without the least disorder having occurred during their long passage from the Bastille to the Rue d'Anjou St Honoré.

These circumstances include the whole of Lafayette's participation in the events of the 5th of June. I have, however, omitted one which ought to be told, as it reveals the existence of an intrigue that time will perchance explain, but upon which the process instituted in the criminal courts prohibits me at present from offering a decided opinion. When the red cap passed before the *estrade a couronne d'immortelles* had just been placed on the head of Lafayette, whilst another had been thrown at the red cap. Lafayette hastened to rid himself of these flowers, and holding them a moment in his hands, he threw them down at his feet, to signify his disgust at the devotion paid to the red cap, and the desire that he felt to see the flag of that color removed. By whom was the red cap surmounted with that wreath? Who hastened to spread through all parts of Paris, and above all, through the ranks of the Parisian artillery, which the government regarded as the most inflammable of the revolutionary elements, who, I ask, hastened to spread the report that the hand of Lafayette had just crowned the red cap? Who could profit by this calumny, if it was not the *juste milieu*? For it the occasion was opportune, the moment decisive. On the one hand, the rumor that Lafayette had crowned the red cap, would draw a set of ardent, unreflecting young men into efforts sure to be put down after having served to attest the existence of a vast and flagrant republican conspiracy.

On the other hand, the conviction, though but for an instant, that Lafayette had done fealty to the emblem of terror, and raised the standard of disorder and anarchy, was a fortunate chance, an infallible means of putting an end to that unlucky popularity to which unhappily nothing could be objected but half a century of sacrifice and devotion to *liberty and public order*.

From a feeling that I leave to the judgment of my readers M. Madier de Montjou hastened to inform his constituents, and above all the ministerial journal of his department, of this abomination of the cap crowned by Lafayette.*

* The *Courrier du Gard* contains the positive assertion that when the emblem of 93 was raised on the coffin of General Lamarque, General Lafayette was eager to surmount it with a *couronne d'immortelles*; and that, besides, being apprehensive of the events about to occur, he had succeeded, not without difficulty, in regaining his house, where being at length arrived, he cried out: I am safe at last.

A deputy having observed to M. Madier Montjou that this assertion made only on the evidence he had detailed, was as false as it was absurd, M. Madier thought fit to transmit the following letter to Lafayette:

'In informing several of my friends of the events of the 5th, I told them that you had manifested your grief at the excesses of the populace and at the honors they had conferred on you in spite of yourself. On the 6th, conversing on the same subject, I gave them to understand that several individuals deserving of credit asserted that a red banner, surmounted by a cap had been presented to you by the people, with an entreaty to place thereon a crown, and that you had thought proper to yield to this request.

'I was shortly after informed that you sternly deny the truth of this. I should be sincerely obliged would you authorize me to rectify the former information transmitted to my friends. They would be no less happy than myself to learn that I have been in error.'

The following is General Lafayette's answer:

La Grange, 13th of June, 1832.

'You ask if it is true *as individuals deserving of credit*

The latter entered his house at half past six in the evening. Shocked at the melancholy issue of a day which might have been afterwards remembered with such joyful satisfaction, the spirit of resistance spread,

assert (and which you have made known to your friends) that a crown was placed by me on the red cap that was borne through the procession of General Lamarque, not by the people, that is by more than 100,000 citizens whose patriotic manifestations showed any thing but sympathy with that unfortunate movement, but by a group whose character and motives time will unfold.

‘If I had only to speak of those, who, supposing them possessed of the least knowledge of the history and men of their country, could have carried want of memory, credulity, or the spirit of party to the pitch of suffering themselves to be imposed on by this tale, and who have circulated it with harmless precipitation, you know I should be a little at a loss to say what I thought of them.

‘With regard to those who pretend to be assured of the fact as well as certain persons who declare they beheld it, I have no hesitation in saying what my friends have already said to the face of many of them ; that is, that their assertion is at once a piece of gross stupidity and a lie.

‘You may give to this all the publicity you please, and in this expectation I shall add one short observation :

‘I have always been opposed, with sincerity and with the approval of my countrymen, to the criminal violence of which, in 1792 and 1793, this red cap became in France the bloody symbol ; neither have I bowed before the counter-revolutionary usurpations which have by turns retarded the liberation of 89. This steadiness during the 56 years of my public career, is, itself a protest against the more recent system which, *à propos* to a movement repressed by a force fifty times its own, would invoke the illegalities and immoralities of so many preceding systems, in order to advance its work of the demolition of the principles and engagements of our revolution of July 1830, which in spite of our mis-reckonings, will still accomplish its purpose and carry into effect the principles I have all my life advocated.’

Recevez, &c,

‘LAFAYETTE.’

but it was impossible yet to foresee the character which this new conflict would assume ; until nine a'clock the most contradictory rumors were circulated respecting it, but the only positive fact was that in the impetuosity of their first movement 4 or 500 young men, in a multitude of small groups, had seized in the twinkling of an eye, on all the posts established from the *Pont d'Austerlitz* to the *Banque de France*. This circumstance proves two things which throw light on these disastrous events : that there existed no premeditated plot, for how can we admit the idea of a combination of this kind, which should have been so feebly supported. The second, that if a greater number of citizens had taken part in the combat, this combat would have had another result, or at least very different vicissitudes. This reasoning is the better founded, as it is now notorious, that during the whole evening of the 5th, and the morning of the 6th, the different conflicts took place between groups of from twelve to fifteen insurgents, on one side, and battalions of the line and of the national guard on the other.

Meantime, the government, affrighted if not at the conflict it had probably foreseen, at least at the obstinacy of the resistance that it encountered, neglected nothing in order to engage in its cause all the timid and interested. The apparition of the red cap was for it, of a true *godsend* ! its agents dispersed themselves through every part of Paris, causing the citizens to close their shops, and to arm themselves against the frightful anarchy, pillage and incendiarism which threatened them ; Paris, all France was, they said, about to be annihilated. This manœuvre was completely successful, the capital armed itself against the red cap that it everywhere beheld, and that national guard which, the evening before had willingly protested against the measures of government, expended its ammunition without hesitation in order to defend its

property, wives and children against the cannibalism of the republic, and the rapine of the levellers of 93.

On their side, the court and the ministry, not satisfied with the forty thousand soldiers who already protected their power, hastily summoned the regiments in the immediate neighborhood of Paris, and required the rural services of the National Guard of the *banlieue* ; so that the sun of the 6th of June rose upon more bayonets assembled within the walls of Paris, to conquer the republic, than the mists of Austerlitz and Jena had seen march against the Prussians and Russians.

On the 5th, the King returned from the Chateau of St Cloud to the Tuileries, where the council of ministers was sitting, doubtless awaiting the announcement that the obsequies of Lamarque had taken place to the satisfaction of every one. It was there that all the measures of repression were resolved on, and that the battalions of the *banlieue* came *en passant* to what their rural courage with the sight of royalty. It was there also that Marshals Soult and Sebastiani proposed proclaiming the city in a state of siege, whilst fortune had not yet declared in favor of the 13th of March, and there was really danger to the government ; a proposition that was received with indignation, whilst a paternal government should doubtless deprive eight hundred thousand Frenchmen of their common rights, and treat a capital as a fallen enemy who there was no longer any thing to fear for any body.

Having returned to his hotel, Lafayette immediately became the object of the most lively solicitude. The interest and curiosity of the people was intense, his friends and enemies were the more eager to have intelligence of him, as rumors, the most contradictory and alarming were in circulation respecting him. Here, it was asserted that the insurgents had conducted and lodged him in the Hotel-de-Ville ; there, that his body, pierced by many bayonet wounds, was being carried bleeding through the streets of Paris by the

republicans, and instigating the people to vengeance ; elsewhere, that the government had seized and thrown him into the dungeon of Vincennes.

No part of this was true. Lafayette, beset from without, and doubtless also from within, by the agents of the police, was at this moment, what he was in all circumstances : calm, inflexible and prepared for any event. As my situation placed me in intimate communication with him, I was enabled on this occasion, as on many former ones, to observe the sentiments which in these new moments of trial agitated his mind. He was wholly absorbed by grief and indignation. He shuddered to see French blood shed by French hands, and was horror struck at the want of faith, and the fatal blindness of the government which had conjured up new calamities, and kindled strife between the combatants and the throne of July. But if Lafayette condemned the faults of the government, he censured with equal severity the imprudent temerity of the young men who sought in revolt and violence for that redress which they should have left to time, the laws, and the regular operation of the chambers and the press.

As to the dregs of all factions, the instruments of foreign influence who had mingled in the troubles of the 5th and 6th of June, with the view of bringing back despotism by anarchy ; — as to the wrecks of all regimes, Republicans, Carlists, or Imperialists, who showed themselves, as they always do, wherever bad passions are to be gratified, and lucre to be gained, — Lafayette had no need to disclaim all connection with them. The history of his life attests that such men have always found him foremost among their enemies.

That for which Lafayette most ardently hoped and prayed, was, that the blood of his countrymen might cease to flow ; that Frenchmen, misled by the excitement of a generous sentiment, would speedily resume their obedience to the laws, and that the King, rendered wise by the spectacle of so many disasters,

would renounce a system of government, whose deplorable results were bloodshed, everlasting bloodshed ; but no shadow of liberty, prosperity, or confidence. What Lafayette most dreaded, and it was a danger which he would gladly have averted by the sacrifice of the few years he might have to live, was, that a government, guilty in so many ways, should profit by its sad victory, to change suddenly from reserved tyranny to open and cruel oppression.

Meanwhile the conflict was maintained ; the noise of the fusillade continued, and deep anxiety was depicted in the countenance of Lafayette. Between seven and eight o'clock, several patriots successively called upon him, to inquire what could or ought to be done to put a period to the disasters which desolated the capital, and the still greater misfortunes with which it was threatened. But the time was passed when Lafayette could interpose between the people and the throne of July. He had, several months since, acquired the melancholy certainty that that throne was no longer accessible to persuasion. Besides, is it not a weakness natural to human nature, to listen impatiently to the remonstrances of those whom we have wronged, and to be angry at the most honest intentions of men who have it in their power to reproach us with want of faith ?

A few weeks before the disturbances of June, several Deputies had implored Lafayette to make a personal appeal to Louis Philippe, to point out to him the dangers to which France and himself were exposed by the policy of this government. Lafayette replied, that he was certain such a course would be perfectly useless, and that it would be better to hazard a joint measure ; that is to say, the *compte rendu*, of which he gave the idea, and for drawing up which, he was appointed a commissioner by his colleagues assembled at the residence of M. Lafitte.

In this state of things, it was agreed that the Depu-

ties of the opposition present in Paris should meet in the evening at M. Lafitte's, to deliberate on the measures to be adopted for restoring public tranquillity. The meeting was verbally fixed for nine o'clock ; but, as every regular mode of convocation was impossible, and as every body had been thrown into confusion by late events; not more than twenty members were able to attend. Among these were M. M. Lafitte, Cabet, Lafayette, George Lafayette, Mauguin, Odillon Barrot, Bérard, Nicod, Laboissière, Tribert, Clausel, Marschal, Tardieu, Girardin, Gautier de Rumigny, Taillandier, Pourrat, de Brias, Audry de Puyraveau, Subervie, Comte, &c.

For a considerable time, the conversation was confined to the reports in circulation, and which were alternately repeated and contradicted with surprising rapidity. Several individuals unconnected with the Chamber of Deputies, joined the meeting, and prevented all regular deliberation. Besides, none of the Deputies present appeared to have formed any fixed ideas respecting the important events which were passing, and the issue of which seemed yet to depend on an infinity of chances. They were divided in opinion as to the degree of blame or praise due to the conduct of government in this fatal catastrophe, as well as the direction to be given to events, in case it should be their lot to exercise that direction. Some bitterly deplored the re-actionary obstinacy of the government, which rendered revolt and insurrection the only means by which liberty could defend herself ; others could not find terms sufficiently strong to blame the turbulent spirits, whose criminal imprudence had compromised the cause of the revolution, by rendering the law the auxillary of its enemies. But all, it must be confessed, joined in one common feeling of indignation and disgust at the unfortunate *bonnet-rouge*, whose unexpected appearance had paralyzed so much loyalty to the revolution, annihilated so many preju-

dices against the ministry, created so many supporters of a despised system, and, in a word, changed the fate of that day, so big with happy results. All, too, appeared intent on stopping, speedily, and by any possible means, the dreadful effusion of blood.

In a word, this incomplete and undecided meeting presented no trace of the resolution and energy which had characterized the memorable assemblies of 1830. This was, perhaps, because the most justifiable resentment was checked and dismayed at the idea of a deadly conflict between the conquerors of 1830 and the monarchy of the barricades. In short, there are things which though true, are nevertheless incredible.

Such was the state of feeling when Lafayette joined the meeting at M. Lafitte's. His presence brought the discussion, or rather the conversation, into a more direct channel; and the questions upon which the Ministry had assembled to deliberate, were then broached. It has since been reported, that at this meeting a proposal was made for the deposition of the king. This is utterly false, and the only circumstance which could have given rise to this fabrication of the police spies, was the observation made by one of our most honorable fellow citizens, that the insurgents in several parts of Paris were shouting '*Plus de Bourbons !*' That these cries were raised is a fact which admits of no doubt.

The meeting proceeded to consider of the means of checking the effusion of blood, and imploring the conqueror to use his victory with moderation, especially considering the large share he had had in the cause of the conflict. Two measures were proposed, viz. — an address, and a deputation to the king. These propositions were discussed. Lafayette assented neither to the one nor the other; first, because, as he said, he was convinced of their perfect inutility; and next, because if, as was asserted, all was ended, it would ill become the national opposition to take

such a step after the event, especially as it was certain that the doctrinaire deputies had, for several hours past, obstructed the avenues to the throne. Lafayette also alluded, with sincere regret, to the ill success of the efforts he had made, at two great periods of his life, to solve the problem of a citizen monarchy, founded on the bases of the sovereignty of the people.

However, an address appeared to be determined on, and the discussion next turned on the way in which it should be drawn up. Some of the Deputies were of opinion that it ought to express the horror felt by the opposition at sight of the *bonnet-rouge*, profound indignation against the insurgents, entire approbation of the vigorous measures which had secured the triumphs of public order, and a hope that the guilty would be punished with inflexible severity.

This proposition, which was vehemently supported by certain Deputies, was opposed by M.M. Lafitte, Mauguin, and Lafayette. The latter declared that he shared in the utmost degree the horror with which the *bonnet-rouge* had inspired his colleagues; that at all times, he had avowed his antipathy to that emblem of the anarchy of 1793, as well as to all ideas connected with it; and that he concurred in the most decided manifestation of the sentiments of his colleagues and himself on that point. However, he also thought that the government had committed errors of the greatest magnitude, for which it would not be right to grant a bill of indemnity, and that, in present circumstances, more than at any other time, it was the duty of the representatives of France to remind the throne of July of the conditions of its existence, the engagements it had violated, the rights of the nation disavowed and trampled upon, and the disasters entailed by broken faith, and to urge the necessity of abandoning the disastrous system of the 13th of March, which daily widened the abyss that separated all that the revolution of July wished to unite.

As to the punishment to be invoked on the heads of the insurgents, Lafayette was of opinion that the government required no excitement on that point, and that, on the contrary, it was the duty of the representatives of the nation to solicit the sovereign clemency in behalf of men misled by sentiments whose extravagance alone was criminal—men who had shown themselves in the day of their triumph so merciful towards their enemies. The man who had defended the ministers of Charles X against the just vengeance of the heroes of the barricades might well hold this language to the monarchy which he had reared up. Besides, Lafayette had always concurred in the opinion of Carnot, who addressing Louis XVIII said, 'in civil discords there are no criminals, but only conquerors and conquered.*' As M. de Martignac justly remarked in his defence of the prisoners of Ham, 'in religion as in politics, martyrdom creates fanaticism. and fanaticism, in its turn creates martyrdom.'

Without any determination being formed on the question of the address, it was again proposed that a deputation should be appointed to make some verbal representations to Louis Philippe. Lafayette refused to form part of this deputation, for two reasons which he candidly explained. The first was, the positive conviction impressed upon him in his last conversation with the king that the governmental opinions of that prince were so tenacious, that persuasion, at least from him, would have no effect on the system adopted. Lafayette's second reason was, that his presence must necessarily remind the king of having violated or forgotten a solemn engagement. He, therefore, wished to spare his majesty, and to spare himself, an interview which bitter recollections would render mutually painful.

As I have before observed, all these propositions were made in a desultory conversation rather than in

* Carnot's memorial to the king.

a regular deliberation. The meeting broke up at midnight, without having come to any determination ; but with the understanding that it was to assemble again the next morning at ten o'clock at M. Lafitte's. I offer no opinion on this adjournment, when every moment cost the life of a Frenchman. I have already observed that the spirit of 1830 had vanished, and that the men whose courage had then triumphed over so many obstacles, seemed to be annihilated.

We will now take a glimpse at what was passing elsewhere, while a handful of Deputies were assembled at the hotel of M. Lafitte. It may readily be supposed that the attention of the government was fixed on that meeting, of which recent events doubtless magnified the importance. The reiterated cries of 'Vive Lafayette,' at Lamarque's funeral, had dispelled the illusions of the *juste-milieu* respecting the lost popularity of that general. The man of July had been triumphantly escorted by the people: it had even been proposed to conduct him to the Hotel de Ville through new barricades, and to make him the president of one of those meetings which, twenty months earlier, had sanctioned the work of the people, and struck the last blow at the perjured dynasty. This was more than sufficient to urge to violence a government which felt that it possessed power only in convulsions. On the other hand, if insurrection were overcome, as there was no doubt it would be, what a prize for the doctrinaires would be an anarchical plot hatched by Deputies, and headed by Lafayette, the man who, it would be said, had adopted the false device of liberty and public order. This would at once overthrow the old and inconvenient popularity of Lafayette in America as well as in Europe. In the midst of all these embarrassments it is alleged that the arrest of M.M. Lafayette and Lafitte was suggested on the night of the 5th of June; that this measure was warmly supported by the same men who next day succeeded in

getting Paris placed in a state of siege, and that it was only abandoned on the representation of two generals, members of the council, in whose opinions the king concurred. However, as the participation of some Deputies in the events which had just excited the indignation of the capital, was not a thing to be overlooked, it was determined at all events to put the liberty of M.M. Garnier-Pagès, Cabet, and Laboissière under contribution.

Partial conflicts continued till a very late hour in the night ; but the forces of the combatants were too unequal to render the events doubtful. Thirty thousand troops of the line, fifty thousand national guards, and a formidable amount of artillery, all combined under the command of a marshal of France, and opposed to seven or eight hundred young men, almost without arms, left, from the hour of daybreak, no chance for the insurgents.

Such was the condition of affairs at ten o'clock on the morning of the 6th. The Deputies of the opposition again repaired to M. Lafitte's. There were assembled M.M. Lafayette, George Lafayette, Odilon Barrot, Mauguin, Corcelles, Garnier-Pagès, Laboissière, Cabet, Jolivet, Berard, &c. But things were changed since yesterday: the triumph of the government was secured. However, the discussion was maintained on the same grounds, and the same opinions were expressed. An address and a deputation were still talked of. On the one hand, it was wished to address the triumphant power in a tone which would spare none of its faults, while on the other hand, adherence was urged to the measures of the preceding day, and an appeal to the severity of the government, against the anarchists who had disturbed public order. I do not know the *patriotic deputies* who, in these distressing circumstances, were the partisans of salutary rigors. I shall merely observe, that on the two questions of the address and the deputation

to the king, Lafayette repeated the arguments which he had advanced the preceding day, and then he retired, as well as several of his colleagues, before any determination had been adopted.

However, the members present adopted the proposition of a personal communication to the king, and for this purpose appointed M.M. Lafitte, Odillon Barrot, and Arago. The object of their mission was to urge measures for checking the disasters which afflicted Paris, and to prevail on the government to be merciful in its victory.

This interview, which presents one of the most characteristic traits of the history of that period, has been the subject of the most contradictory versions. As I must here depend on my recollections I will not attempt to give this important conversation literally; but I do not hesitate to guarantee, with all my responsibility, the truth of the facts I am about to state. In a word, I do not fear being contradicted by any disclosures which time and political necessity may perhaps bring about.

I must also beg pardon for details which may perhaps appear trivial: they are necessary for the complete understanding of the scene I have to describe.

With feelings of deep grief, the three deputies left the hotel of M. Lafitte, convinced that they should find the palace overwhelmed with that affliction which every one experienced, and which the misfortunes of Paris rendered so natural. It was, in fact, amidst the roaring of cannon, pointed at the breasts of Frenchmen, that they went to invoke the clemency and justice of the government, and to appeal to the power of reason in a quarter which had so liberally employed the reasoning of force. Imbued with the feelings which that melancholy and important mission naturally created, M.M. Lafitte, Arago, and Odillon Barrot, silently proceeded to the Tuileries.

Just as the caleche in which the three deputies were

seated had passed through the gate of the palace, a gentleman of their acquaintance, who had just come out of the palace, advanced towards them and said, 'Be quick, Guizot is just gone.' The king, therefore, it must be observed, was decidedly under doctrinaire influence, when the men of July came to address him in the name of peace and liberty. This is an extenuating circumstance, which history must take into account when passing sentence on the acts of the royalty of the barricades : justice demands this.

It was four o'clock. Louis-Philippe had just returned from a ride through some of the streets of Paris. The French people are never indifferent to the sight of a king who, on horseback, inhales the fumes of gunpowder. The national guards, who beheld in the streets some of the bodies of the slain, seemed perplexed at their triumph. Wealth and commerce, which had thought themselves consigned to the phrenzy of jacobinism, and had been dreaming of nothing but scaffolds and *bonnets-rouges*, now rejoiced to see the anarchy of 1793 put down. In short, the enthusiasm was for the security of interests, and not for the cause of humanity and liberty. Consequently the royal cortège, as it proceeded along amidst the expiring report of the fusillade, like the precursor of the calm that was to succeed the storm, was greeted with acclamations. Now these acclamations, the real cause of which was apparent, must naturally have produced a feeling of triumph and security, little favorable to the success of the mission which M.M. Lafitte, Barrot, and Arago had undertaken.

However, these honorable citizens were received with visible satisfaction by the crowd of aides-de-camp and officers on duty who filled the saloons of the palace, and who seemed more distressed at the bloodshed of their brethren, than vain of their inglorious victory. It is gratifying to render them this tribute of justice.

The three Deputies were immediately introduced into the bed chamber of Louis XVIII, transformed by the *ouvriers* of July into the office (*cabinet de travail*) of Louis Philippe, who was not long in making his appearance by a door which communicated with the Queen's apartment. The manner and physiognomy of the King were calm, his deportment was easy, free from agitation, and expressive of none of that anguish of mind which might have been justified by his situation. His Majesty received the three patriots with politeness; he said he was very glad to see them; that the opposition could not have chosen negotiators more agreeable to him; and after desiring them to be seated, and placing himself before his writing table, he seemed ready to listen to them.

What occurred then? If any facts are to be relied on, the following is what took place at this memorable interview. I relate the circumstances without comment, just as they were transferred from another's recollection to mine;—

M. Odillon Barrot was the first to speak; and in a serious, measured, and respectful address, this honorable orator represented to the king that the Deputies of the national opposition, like all good citizens, deplored the disorders and calamities of the preceding day; that they could not express their censure and indignation at the culpable excesses of those who had set at naught the laws, and resisted the legal authority with arms in their hands; but that it was likewise their duty not to disguise from the chief of the state, that the retrograde policy of his cabinet, — the disregard of the engagements of July, — the disappointment of the expectations of the revolution, — the neglect of national honor, — and, finally, the whole of the system of the 13th of March, had exasperated and inflamed the mutual animosities amongst the citizens, which had caused blood to flow in the streets of Paris, and were a prelude to the most frightful of all calamities.

ties, a civil war. Placing thus before the king the respective wrongs of the government and its adversaries, M. Odillon Barrot concluded by conjuring his Majesty to stop the effusion of blood, which still continued to flow, — to silence the cannon, which then resounded even in the royal abode, — to be indulgent towards the vanquished, — and to prevent a renewal of these scenes, by a prompt and frank return to the principles on which his dynasty had been seated by the revolution.

The king replied, that having been audaciously attacked by his enemies, he had a legitimate right to defend himself; that, in short, it was time to quell revolt, and he had employed cannon as the *shortest way of ending it*; that he had, nevertheless, rejected the proposal which had been made to him, of placing the city of Paris in a state of siege; that, as to the pretended engagements of the Hotel de Ville, and those republican institutions about which the opposition made so much noise, he could hardly comprehend what it all meant; that he had more than fulfilled the pledges he had made, and given to France as many republican institutions as he had promised, and even more; that the programme of the Hotel de Ville had only existed in the brain of M. de Lafayette, whose incessant appeals were evidently the result of a mistake; that, with respect to the system of the 13th of March, it was wrong to give the credit of it to M. Périer; that this system belonged to the king, and was the result of his own convictions, the fruit of his meditations, and the expressions of his reflections on politics and government; that he, Louis Philippe, had consented to *take* the crown only on the conditions indicated by the development of this system, which was most comfortable to the wishes and wants of France, and from which he would not deviate, even should they *mince him in a mortar* (the king's literal expression): 'in short,' the king added, 'it will not

do, gentlemen, to allege vague accusations ; specify the charges you have to make against the Périer system of which poor Périer is guiltless enough. What have you to say against this system ? Let us hear it.'

M. Arago replied, by a rapid and animated exposition of the divisions by which France was lacerated, and which the policy of the government cherished with an almost scrupulous solicitude; he referred to his own family, which had surrendered itself to the schism of political opinions; he instanced his brother and his nephew, who, perhaps, at the very moment he was speaking, were ranged in opposite ranks, prepared to take each other's life : and, to characterize the situation by an example, he adverted to the League, and to the d'Ailly, who, under Henry IV, slew his own son in the streets of Paris. M. Arago then spoke of the public posts given to the partisans of the fallen regime; of the scandalous indulgence which screened the machinations of the Carlists, whilst the failings of individuals and the press were prosecuted with a rigor unexampled in the judicial annals of the restoration. M. Arago mentioned, likewise, the astonishment and deep disgust which the apparent impunity the Duchess de Berri seemed to enjoy, excited throughout France, and the invidious interpretations to which this impunity might give rise.

At these words Louis Philippe exclaimed, that his government had no other enemies than the carlists and the republicans — that what had been objected to him was only the result of their manœuvres — that he had been accused of avarice (he, in whose eyes money had never possessed any value,) — that his best intentions had been perverted to such a degree, that, for a long time past, he could not read either the *Tribune* or the *National* — that his father, *who was the best citizen of France*, had been calumniated like himself, and impelled to give the revolution a *bloody pledge*,

which he ought to have refused* — that the exigencies of the two revolutions were equally unsustainable — that he, Louis Philippe, was not obstinate, which he had shown when, after long resistance, he had improperly given way to importunity, and effaced from the outside of his palace, and from his armorial bearings, the *fleurs de lis*, which had been, from time immemorial, the arms of his family. With regard to the representations concerning the Duchess de Berri, Louis Philippe declared, that if that princess was arrested, justice should take its course ; but that, whatever happened, his reign should not witness a *bloody drama*. At this moment, the cannon of St Merry made the glasses in the palace shake.

The discussion having brought M. Arago to foreign affairs, and this deputy deploring the state of abasement and submission into which France had fallen in the eyes of Europe, the king, on the other hand, took credit to himself for his foreign policy. ‘ This policy,’ said he, ‘ has prevented the Powers from doing what they were resolutely bent on doing. For more than six months I have held them in my own hands. The King of Holland is about to yield. I give France a new ally in King Leopold, whom I make my son-in-law, in spite of many causes of umbrage. In short, if it must be told, the Powers are in such a position, that my throne would be the most difficult to shake : not one of them has the stuff of a Duke of Orleans.’

* This disapproval of the most important act of the political life of the Duke of Orleans, recalls to my recollection a fact of which I was witness. At the Hotel de Ville, some young persons were congratulating themselves, before the citizen-monarch, at having at length got a patriot prince for a king. ‘ Yes, my friends,’ exclaimed Louis Philippe, pressing their hands, ‘ yes, a patriot like my father.’ I also recollect that these expressions caused Lafayette to look serious ; that they appeared to him to require explanation, and were one of the chief causes of the interview he had immediately after with the lieutenant-general, in which the bases of the programme of the Hotel de Ville were proposed and accepted.

‘ But, Sire, the affair of Ancona: What! the tri-colored flag, removed by order of Rome, from the towers of a citadel occupied by our soldiers? What! the ambassador of the King of July at the feet of the pope?’ ‘ Not so loud, Sir,’ said the king, quickly, ‘ I can hear you. True, there is, indeed, something to say respecting the affair of Ancona; but it was necessary to succeed—it was essential, and we have succeeded. And surely some condescension towards an aged and obstinate priest involves no vast consequences. Besides, whatever were the means employed by my ambassador, he has completely justified himself in his correspondence. Proceed.’

The discussion having returned to the system of the 13th of March, the king, who affected to make a very good use of M. Périer, pretended that this system was really but the continuation of that of the 3d of November. ‘ I appeal,’ said he, ‘ upon this point, to M. Lafitte: was it not that system you followed?’ The late President of the Council at first maintained a negative silence; but Louis Philippe having subsequently again insisted upon this parity, M. Lafitte loudly protested against an assimilation, which was the more incorrect, since it was notorious that a radical difference between the king and himself, as well respecting affairs at home, as the direction of our exterior policy, had occasioned his retirement from the council.

In conclusion Louis Philippe observed to M.M. Odillon Barrot, Lafitte, and Arago, that his duty requiring him to listen to the representatives of France, and to study the wants, and wishes of the country, he should always receive them with pleasure; that whenever they made any well-grounded representations he should pay attention to them; but that, candidly speaking, he had found nothing in their statement, and that the system pursued by his government being the result of his own conviction, he was sorry to be obliged to declare that he could make no change in it.

On rising, M. Lafitte told the king that he should retire penetrated with the deepest sorrow: he entreated him to compare the eagerness and enthusiasm which his presence formerly excited, with the effect it now produced; that this alteration denoted a deep-seated evil, and he conjured his majesty to ask himself, whether a King of *France*, who required 50,000 men to guard him, was really King of *France*.

Such was, in substance, this conversation, which left behind it lasting and deep recollections. Will history, at whose tribunal it is already arraigned, regard it as an isolated fact, an aberration sprung from temporary circumstances, and the illusion of a triumph, or, pronounce it to be the result of a premeditated plan? I will not attempt to answer this question, but I will wind up this chapter by a few words on these two hypotheses. In the first, the exultation of victory may be considered an extenuating circumstance. In the second, the royal words would be a point of national law submitted to the decision of France, a trial judged in the eyes of the world; for no identical example can be brought into proximity with this deplorable fact. How! when the whole representative system obeys the irascible laws of advancement; — when every thing is tending towards social and political perfectability; — when human reason is marching with giant strides to new conquests; — when three days sufficed to overthrow a throne, a dynasty, and a charter, to destroy an old and create a new order of things; — can there exist a man, who, more powerful than destiny, shall fix France immovably in her present condition, and deny her all hope of a better future, amidst the movement which modifies the universe!

No, this never has nor never can be thought of Louis Philippe!

I owe the utmost respect to the crown, but I also owe respect to the truth. — If the king had ever cher-

ished this fallacious hope, I conscientiously aver, that he would have no cause to fear disturbances like those which occurred in June; for, instead of an insurrection we should have a general revolution.

CONCLUSION.

WHAT inference is to be drawn from all that has been stated in the course of these volumes? This question may be answered as follows:—that both system and ministry exhibit the traces of decomposition, and the mark of death; that Lafayette continues to be the highest and purest personification of the revolution of July; that he has endured the same alternations as betrayed liberty, and that he will obtain the same triumph, when, the episode being concluded, the history shall terminate.

But what will be the duration of this episode? That of a situation which by its very nature is condemned to perish. Ruin is in the idea of the 8th of August; life and improvement are in the immortal principle of the Hotel de Ville.

I will prove this, by drawing up here the balance account of the monarchy, called the monarchy of the barricades.

If I should be asked for proofs, where is the need for them? I trace these last lines on the 29th of July 1832. I write not far from the tombs where repose the victims, who, on the anniversary of this day died for their country. There, at the gates of the Louvre, near the palace which they conquered for the royalty that they created on the public square, repose, forsaken and forgotten, the first martyrs of liberty. Their fathers, widows, children and friends, alone honor the manes of the heroes of July. They alone have memory and tears for those heroic actions, these sublime deaths which struck the world with astonishment and admiration. What! Two years have hardly passed away since they fell under the balls of the Swiss;

twelve months scarcely intervenes from the day when you affixed their names under the arch of the Pantheon, and yet you no longer offer them a recollection, a tear, a song of sorrow, a funeral right! All around them is cold and sterile! The word revolution, the great revolution of 1830, does not once appear in your mottos! The victory of the people over a monarchy of fourteen ages of duration, has no place in your memory! Oh, shame! Oh, morality! Oh, human respect! — Yes, I repeat it, so much meanness and baseness cannot endure; there is in this impiety a destiny of reprobation; it is attested by the murmurs of the tomb. Let us, however, quit these sad thoughts, and in conclusion, recapitulate the errors which government has committed, the consequence which they have produced, and the means of safety which yet remain to the government, if, indeed, it still be within the scope of human power to save it.

Is it from want of knowing how to combine resources and to unite different elements that the new monarchy has allowed the revolution of July to perish? No. The evil is not the result of error. It is for having knowingly opposed the principle of our regeneration, that with the most fruitful elements of liberty, glory and prosperity, that it has created only impossibilities. It is from having disavowed all the historical and actual conditions of its existence, and repudiated all the analogies of its position; it is from having wished not to acknowledge that it owed its existence to the power which had created it; it is from having cast off the popular robe of July, and decked itself in the tinsel of legitimacy; it is from having wished to ingraft itself on the old stock, and to deny all connection with the people; finally, it is from having connected itself with the aristocracy of bankers, of men of the college, of prefects, of advocates, and pretended philanthropists, who, during seventeen years, have been endeavoring to found a noble race, that the citizen monarchy had

disinherited France of all improvement internally, and all dignity abroad.

Properly speaking, however, the question now is, less one of liberty than of equality, less a struggle between democracy and power than between democracy and a silly coterie, which possesses only the inconveniences and pretensions of the old patrician race. All the faults of the monarchy of July, its dangers and our own, result from its alliance with the doctrinaires. To this alliance it has sacrificed its right and its legitimacy, the real legitimacy which it derived from the people.

These doctrinaires have attempted to establish between the revolution and the king whom it created, relations characterised by incoherency and impossibility; investigation has been pronounced revolt, reason a chimera, and liberty heresy. They have placed the monarchy of France at the head of a faction, and drawn it into a cause which is not its own. Envious of our prosperity, and humiliated by our glory, they have unfortunately bound us by those shameful treaties which compel us to cast down our eyes to the earth.

But it will be asked what interest can this petty aristocracy have in impeding the development of the principles of the revolution? Follow it in all its alternations of success and reverses of joy and grief; mark its changing fortune with the empire, the restoration and the revolution; extending its hand for the gold and the cordons of Bonaparte, or gorging itself with the gifts of legitimacy; hear it speaking of liberty whilst laboring to produce slavery; of glory whilst extolling foreign occupation, of the country whilst conspiring for its vassalage, and you will understand the interest which actuates it. This interest has impelled it to re-establish by speeches of the Sorbonne of ministerialism and of a stock-jobbing faction that which the night of the 4th of August, 1789, abolished, which the convention pulverised, and which the empire, in the height of its power could not re-construct: what

shall I say? That which Louis the XIth., Richelieu, Louis XIVth, and Louis the XVth themselves had discredited, namely, a privileged nobility.

How, however, is it possible to review privileges in the midst of electoral commotions, and of the movement of a revolution laboring with liberty? How scitricise the wounds of aristocracy and repair its past injuries in the midst of a war which compels an appeal to all the national power, and all its generous passions. Torpor within, and peace abroad, are then the necessary conditions of the triumph of doctrinaire interests, and hence the monarchy of July can only sustain itself by opposing internal liberty and external independence.

This is the circle in which the policy of France has turned during two years. The error of the new monarchy consists in the belief that this system and this party constitute its strength. It does not recollect, that these same doctrinaires did not oppose the restoration until the latter had repulsed their aristocratic assumption, their plebeian origin, and their vanity. A single recollection, however, is sufficient to remove this blindness, namely, that elected royalty itself has been instituted on account of, or from the belief in, its popular utility; but of what utility to our institutions can an aristocracy of advocates, bankers, and rhetoricians be? What service can this fiction of nobility render France?

Of what, moreover, can this aristocracy be made? Where are its elements, its illustrations, its recollections, and its domains?

‘Those who destroyed the government of Charles X,’ said M. de Polignac in his prison, ‘are the doctrinaires. Those who have gained a shameful victory over the good, the loyal, and the generous Lafayette are the doctrinaires. The enemies of the existing government, the enemies of your liberties, are the doctrinaires. Mistrust them.’

And how have the doctrinaires destroyed the legitimacy? As they have very nearly destroyed the popular monarchy, by wishing to arrive at power by means of doctrines independent of circumstances, and having no reference to the period. Thus, in order to turn the restoration to their purposes, they brought into discussion, one after the other divine right, the constituent faculty, and the monarchical principle of the Bourbons. Then, as now, they isolated power from its origin, and cast uncertainty on its future, in order that it might offer itself afterwards as a resource and conduct it according to its views.

That which they did against Charles X. they are now doing against Louis Philippe. Events have changed the face of every thing. A monarchy on popular conditions alone survived the restoration; the victory of the people had invested royalty with a new right, a new power; it was the defeat of an old principle and the establishment of a new one. What did the doctrinaires see in this immense innovation? Nothing but a vacant throne and seven portfolios to be given away. The question was simple: they made it complex; it was merely one between the monarchical principle and popular sovereignty; they set about encumbering it with aristocracy, democracy, supremacy, traditions, and territorial ascendancy. In short, I know not what doctrines re-produced or for the first time created, in order to vanquish the new society by privilege, as they had undermined the restoration by a semblance of liberality.

The most fatal error which Louis Philippe has committed is that of believing the doctrinarians, when they endeavored to persuade him that his situation was precisely similar to that of William III, and that the revolution of 1830 resembled in all its bearings the revolution of 1688.

In the first place, William III's mission was to form an aristocratic monarchy, for to the aristocratic prin-

ciple he owed his crown, and that element prevailed through all the system. But who crowned Louis Philippe? The democracy. And what were the actual political conditions under which that event took place? The interests of the democracy. Where in France is now to be found the aristocratic element? No where. Thus then the Prince of Orange remained faithful to the national wish and to the principle of his existence as King of England. But Louis Philippe, a king springing from the barricades, in attempting in 1832 to raise up out of worm-eaten ruins, an aristocratic monarchy in imitation of that of England, only separated himself from the cause which produced him, and took up arms against his origin. It is just as if William III attempted to plant in England the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV.

Besides, to assimilate the royalty conceded to William III to the popular royalty of the Duke of Orleans, is to pronounce a bitter condemnation on the latter. In fact, the policy of William III, wholly English and protestant as it was, consisted solely in obeying the natural will of which he was always necessarily the devoted and ardent defender; in gaining by negotiations auxiliaries to this principle; in upholding it in his alliances, and defending it in twenty battles. Let us not forget too, that then liberty was protestantism, tyranny, catholicism. Now, who armed all the protestant states of Europe against catholic France, the natural enemy of the principle of the revolution of 1688? Who placed England at the head of that propagandism of liberty? Who combated, with all the activity of revolution with all the national resources, against the restoration of the Stuarts, that is to say, the re-establishment of the principle of the right divine? Who threw the gauntlet to the enemies of England, in place of awaiting them in cowardly apathy? Who was the prince that, confirmed by the declarations of the parliament of the Stuarts, and wishing only to hold

his crown from the hands of the nation, dreaded not to summon it to a House of Commons the most democratic? William III comprehended his situation, and knew his part.

But the monarchy granted by the people of 1830—that monarchy which owed its title to consent, how has it managed its democratic principle, and disposed the national interests which consented to be personified in it? Let us see:—

After the expulsion of the perjured dynasty, and the triumph of the sovereignty of the people, the duties of the new monarch were extremely simple; they resulted from his situation.

Within: they consisted in rendering himself king by the vote of the nation, instead of remaining one by that of the 221. This would have been easy if not by the convocation of the primary assemblies, at least by the immediate calling of a new Chamber: by the re-construction of the peerage on the elective principle, in virtue of which the new dynasty itself existed; by the institution, through an initiative law, of a complete renewal of a magistracy, who could not be expected to defend interests which were not only not in unison but hostile to them; by giving to France municipal and departmental institutions, deeply imbued principle of election, which had raised up, as by magic, a monarchy, an army, a million of citizen soldiers—that principle which showed itself still active even under the empire, and which was imposed at the restoration as an irresistible necessity; by the organization of the national guard, still upon the same principle, as the secure and regular guarantee of order and liberty; by realizing the liberty of the press, personal, civil, and religious liberty, in fact as well as in law; by abolishing monopolies destructive to common rights; by harmonizing the organization of the army with the principle of equality, which governs the whole system; by giving to this army the moving national guard as a

reserve; by diminishing the load of public charges, at least by rendering the assessment of the taxes more equitable and less vexatious; by purging our codes of the laws of exception; by breaking down the shackles of public instruction, and shedding its light over the masses; by repudiating the luxury and corruption of the old monarchies, as unworthy the youthfulness and nationality of the throne of July; in fine, by re-uniting all opinions round the throne, and making it fly with swelling sails over the waves of the revolution.

Such is what was due from the monarchy, in order to personify in itself the principle of its origin. Let us now see what it has done. I will state its deeds.

It has disdained the national sanction, and has preserved for six months a Chamber which had sunk in dissolution when social order was overturned; it has made the peerage an intricate mixture, a grafted institution—an embarrasment, an obstacle; and the judges who used to send the enemies of Charles X. to the scaffold, now send Carlists and republicans to the galleys. The elective principle has been every where stifled, corrupted, eluded. We have municipal councils, which the central authority always keeps in the most disgraceful state of tutelage; mayors, the creatures of the central authority; national guards, whose superior officers are nominated by the central authority. The 4th article of the ancient charter concerning the Catholic religion, is abolished; you are now permitted to adore the Deity after your heart and conscience, but if you happen to be St Simonians, woe betide you; you will be disposed of, or it will not be their fault, as a scismaticist of La Rochelle or the Cevennes. The asylum of the citizen violated, and searched; family papers, the secrets of the fire-side, the reputation of Frenchmen, all at the mercy of the police; the state of siege, the military commissions, and the mournful knell of condemnations to death ringing through the streets of Paris; the prisons gor-

ged with victims, and the bagnios filled with statesmen ; treachery peopling the prisons, and revoking even to the judges ; these are the certain signs of the respect paid by the government to the liberty of the press, to religion, and every other liberty ! Compare all these acts with the acts of the most tyrannous periods during the last fifty years, and you will find, that if they are not identical, they are at least alike in principle. And it is by its principles more than by its acts that a political ministry is to be judged. The system of customs remains in tact, the commercial restrictions are the same ; those monopolies, the most odious to the nation, are preserved : public instruction is constantly shackled ; the preferments in the army are hardly established on a more liberal footing than under the arbitrary management ; the people are oppressed by the weight of taxes, distributed in the most unequal shape ; the civil list eats up the labor of two thousand communes, enough for the subsistence of an army ; and the court, placing its confidence in the most mortal enemies of the revolution of July, steers its bark towards the restoration.

Without : the policy of the revolutionary monarchy consisted, without speaking of the diversity of the means at its disposal, without speaking even of its affections, in feeling that war against its principle was inevitable, and that before it was declared, as declared it would be sooner or later, it ought to have cultivated the sympathies of neighboring nations, which would have corroborated its internal peace, and conveyed the dangers of war a hundred leagues from its frontiers. I shall not here re-state the manner in which the system of the 13th of March might have made its immense resources available. I have no need to refer to causes ; behold the flagrant palpable results of the progress of this system both internally and externally.

In the interior : — before the unfortunate day, the 13th of March, hope revived under the auspices of a

ministry composed in part of timid but honest men ; this hope has been extinguished. We began to feel a little calm — and were aroused from it by the fire of musketry. We asked for internal peace ; we required that blood should not flow in any part of France, and they gave us civil wars. Our liberties would have strengthened with their growth ; but our liberties, our repose, our future prospects are placed in doubt, and despair and disaffection has seized upon every heart. The earth seems to bear two Frances, irreconcilable with each other — the one the direct offspring of the restoration, of Coblenz and of Ghent — the other the personification of 1789, 1830, the consulate and even the empire. To which of the two will the victory belong ?

Externally : the 13th of March has obtained in compensation for the abandonment of Belgium, Italy, and Poland, for the rejection of a crown for a French prince, for the infraction of the principle of non-intervention, for the sacrifice of our natural allies, the glory of our arms, and the security of our frontiers, it has obtained — a crown for England, Italy secured for Austria, and for Russia — Poland.

And to what end so many losses and humiliations ? In order to separate from popular states, popular power, and popular movements. Are we not told that in their train always follow pillage, murder and civil war ? One word on this out of the way theme for a popular monarchy to broach. Let us judge of the two principles by their application to the present epoch. Spain, Portugal, Naples, Piedmont, Brazil, and Poland, have been for the last six years, the theatres of the greatest popular revolutions. Now, what acts of vengeance, what devastations were committed by the patriots on the adverse party ? Were they the patriots who took the power from Riego's hands, who confiscated the property of the citizens, who peopled the deserts of Africa and the prisons of Lisbon, Madrid,

Milan, Turin, and Venice ? Were they patriots who assassinated Ney, Labedoyere, Berton, Caron, Bories, and so many other victims of monarchical gentleness ? Were they patriots who ordered the bombardment of the town of Antwerp whilst under the protection of an armistice ? Were they patriots who dragged a whole population into the steppes of Siberia ? Were they, in fine, patriots who stained the bridge of Arcole with blood and buried their victims under the waves of the Seine ? And in Italy, what acts of popular vengeance were perpetrated by the men who effected the revolutions of Modena and Romagna ? Reckon up, for the last ten years, the victims of the despots, and those of the patriots, and say to which party belongs the charge of barbarity, to which the credit of humanity ? Be wise, then, and invoke not the memory of the past !

But what are the reasons alleged by the government for persisting thus in their deplorable errors ! They allege their parliamentary majority and certain addresses. These constitute France in the eyes of the men of the 13th of March.

A government directed by majorities resulting from a good elective institution is undoubtedly the most rational of systems. But a government supported by a majority vicious at its core, such in fact as France has been subjected to for the last seventeen years, is the most dangerous instrument that a nation can place in the hands of tyranny. Who received the octroid charter ? Who modified that charter in 1815 and 1817 ? Who from 1814 to 1832 enlarged the budget from 700 to 1200 millions ? Who augmented it by 100 millions, even after the loan of 1817 ? Who voted the thousand millions of indemnity, the Spanish War, the double vote, the septennial law, the law of sacrilege and the law of birthright ? Was it not the majority ; that majority, the elements of which still exist in the Chamber ? Such majorities as this have

sanctioned, for a century, all the crimes which sully the history of the Stuarts. And that France should have committed her liberties to the custody of such a power ! Her future happiness, her destinies depending on a scrutiny ! Give her at once an elective system, in which her wants, her wishes, and the interests of thirty-two millions of men are not represented by even two hundred thousand electors and two thousand eligible to be elected, and you may then boast of your majority ; you can do it.

With respect to the sanction of the addresses, I recollect that when the revocation of the test act and the act of uniformity were sanctioned by James the Second's majority, that prince received addresses from the Catholics, from corporations, from the colleges of Oxford, from the inns of court, &c. &c., in which absolute power; the royal prerogative, right divine, the prudence of the king and his love of religious liberty were lauded to the skies. James II also received addresses of congratulation when Jeffries and Kirk gave the partisans of Monmouth by thousands to the scaffold. What, however, was the fate of James II ? But let me resume.

The monarchy of July, stripped, by the system of the 13th of March, by its acts and by its declarations, of its utility, the only bond on the contract, its fairest prerogative, its only right, had no longer a solid foundation.

All that this system gained in duration France lost in liberty, in strength, in industry, in honor.

Around this system gravitated at different points of distance, the *heroes* of Ghent, Grenoble, Nîmes, and Lyons. Perhaps these were titles to the *esteem* of the *juste-milieu*, but the France of July had no more wish to range herself under the dictatorship of the paladins of legitimacy than under that of the men who promenaded round the prevotal guillotines in the plains of Alsace, the Rhone, and Dauphiné. She is forgetful of these glories; she recognizes no such services.

The system of the 13th March has deprived France of her resources, when France has no desire to be invaded; it has created for her only enemies, when she wanted only friends.

The system of the 13th March has destroyed the work of July, and raised the shade of legitimacy, buried for thirty-eight years with the head of Louis XVI. France wishes not to be disinherited of a sovereignty so dearly purchased.

In compensation for the loss of her recognized rights, the system of the 13th March offers France a ruinous repose, an infamous peace, projected canals, the formation of roads, the construction of monuments. France requires only liberty, honor, honest ministers, and all the consequences of the revolution of July, let them be popular, or monarchical.

The system of the 13th March has destroyed trade and commerce; because the prosperity of trade and commerce is either consequent on a state of peace with a security of its duration, or on a state of war with presumption of victories. But we have neither war nor peace; and France cannot exist without trade and commerce.

The system of the 13th March has deadened the spring of the arts, stifled the sciences, frightened away poësy, deprived life of all its blandishments; its cupidity has dried up all the sources of pleasure and happiness. France did not fight at the barricades in order to conquer a cloister.

The liberty of the press is consecrated by a law of 1830; but the prisons gape before it — thanks to the laws of the republic and the empire! But France has read, in the pages of Montesquieu, that one of the principal tyrannies of Tiberius was the abuse he made of the ancient laws, the offspring of the civil dissensions of Rome. France repudiates such a monstrous imitation.

The patriots are the objects of your raillery, for

having flocked to the barricades under the fire of the Swiss. They are now compelled to hide their scars, and to fly the signals of their glory, in order to escape the police-serjeants, or the clubs of their hired ruffians. France is weary of the impunity of these hangmen : this reign of terror must also have its 9th Thermidor. Either France, or the system of the 13th March, must then perish.

France will not perish ; because she possesses for her defence the union of all the interests of a great people, whilst her enemies have only weakness and pride to overcome her with ; and because, whilst they gain over to their side the deputies, the electors, and the *juste-milieu* of all denominations, there is left for her only the feeling of the rightfulness of her cause, the spirit of liberty, and the hatred of her enemies.

To say the truth, France likes not the *juste-milieu*, because she knows no *juste-milieu* between the ancient and the new dynasty — between the hereditary and the non-hereditary institution of the peerage — between the rejection and the acceptance of Belgium — between war and peace — between the liberty and the censorship of the press — between the freedom and the monopoly of commerce — between religious liberty and St Simonianism — between natural independence and the chains of the Holy Alliance — between the hatred and the friendship of freemen — between glory and shame, honor and infamy. France thinks, in truth, that the *juste-milieu* means nothing when applied to questions of actual policy. The *juste-milieu* round which France would have rallied, was a popular throne, environed by republican institutions: this has been denied her.

The doctrinarian system, the *juste-milieu*, are then condemned to perish. But must they necessarily drag along with them, in their downfall, all that is propped up upon their unpopularity? I do not think so; for I state the extreme limits of possibility. The very na-

ture of a representative government opens an extensive view of happiness to the monarchy of the barricades; and offers the probability that that monarch, giving way before the condition of humanity which is to change, will avow to France that it has been the dupe of false and interested representations; that it has received bad councils, committed faults; that the term of all the usurpations which paralyzed the revolution is arrived; and that it feels the necessity of marching with the events, if not with the men, of July.

France deserves to hear such language as this, and to recompense it by oblivion of the past and confidence in the future.

But if the Monarchy is not inclined to reject any of the councils it has received; if France is condemned to bow in silence her forehead to the dust, it should not be forgotten that, in the event of a violation of the constitutional compact, the refusal of the taxes is the literal, the complete interpretation, and, in some sort, the dogma in full vigor of the representative system.

And, then, what comes next? Ordinances? — Coups d'état? — Or, if they are not strong enough to play that game —

We must await the judgment of Heaven!

THE END.

27 MS

